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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

*********************************
THOMAS ARNOLD and REBECCA ARNOLD
SUPREME COURT NO. 43868

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Custer County Case CV-2014-35

vs.
CITY OF STANLEY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho
Defendant/Respondent.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in
and for the County of Custer;
Before the Honorable Alan C. Stephens, District Judge.

APPEARANCES:

Attorney for Appellant:
FREDRIC V. SHOEMAKER, ESQ. & THOMAS J LLOYD III
ESQ., 950 WEST BANNOCK STREET, SUITE 950, BOISE, ID 83702
Attorney for Respondent: PAUL J. FITZER, ESQ., 950 WEST BANNOCK STREET,
SUITE 520, BOISE, ID 83702
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Custer County
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User: CRYSTAL

~···

Case: CV-2014-0000035 Current Judge: Alan C Stephens
Thomas L Arnold, etal. vs. City Of Stanley

Thomas L Arnold, Rebecca Arnold vs. City Of Stanley
Judge

Date

Code

User

3/13/2014

NCOC

TAMMY

New Case Filed - Other Claims

APER

TAMMY

Plaintiff: Arnold, Thomas L Appearance Fredric V Alan C Stephens
Shoemaker Esq

APER

TAMMY

Plaintiff: Arnold, Rebecca Appearance Fredric V
Shoemaker Esq

TAMMY

Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Alan C Stephens
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings
below Paid by: Shoemaker, Fredric V Esq
(attorney for Arnold, Thomas L) Receipt number:
0000309 Dated: 3/13/2014 Amount: $96.00
(Credit card) For: Arnold, Thomas L (plaintiff)

TAMMY

Filing: Technology Cost - CC Paid by:
Shoemaker, Fredric V Esq (attorney for Arnold,
Thomas L) Receipt number: 0000309 Dated:
3/13/2014 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) For:
Arnold, Thomas L (plaintiff)

APER

TAMMY

Plaintiff: Arnold, Thomas L Appearance Thomas J Alan C Stephens
Lloyd Esq
'

APER

TAMMY

Plaintiff: Arnold, Rebecca Appearance Thomas J Alan C Stephens
Lloyd Esq

PETN

TAMMY

Petition for Judicial Review

Alan C Stephens

MOTN

TAMMY

Motion to Stay and Memorandum in Support

Alan C Stephens

AFFD

TAMMY

Affidavit of Paul J Fitzer in Support of Motion to
Stay and Memorandum in Support

Alan C Stephens

3/19/2014

ORDR

TAMMY

Order Granting Stay of Proceedings

Alan C Stephens

3/27/2014

APER

LAILA

Defendant: City Of Sta11ley Appearance Paul J
Fitzer Esq

Alan C Stephens

4/14/2014

STIS

LAILA

Statement Of Issues Fqr Judicial Review Pusuant Alan C Stephens
to IRCP 84(d)(5)

4/18/2014

NOTC

Notice of Lodging of Ag~ncy Record
'
Agency Record

Alan C Stephens

MISC

LAILA
LAILA

5/1/2014

NOTC

LAILA

Notice of Filing of Agency Record

Alan C Stephens

6/3/2014

STIP

CRYSTAL

Stipulation For Amende,d Agency Record To Add Alan C Stephens
Numbering

6/4/2014

ORDR

CRYSTAL

Order Amending Agency Record To Add Page
Numbering
·

Alan C Stephens

6/5/2014

STIP

CRYSTAL

Stipulation For Extension Of Time To File
Appellant's Opening Brief

Alan C Stephens

6/10/2014

MISC

CRYSTAL

Amended Agency Reco.rd - Page Numbering
Added

Alan C Stephens

CERS

CRYSTAL

Certificate Of Service
Amended Agency
Record- Page Numberi~g Added

Alan C Stephens

ORDR

CRYSTAL

Order Granting Stipulation For Stay

Alan C Stephens

3/17/2014

qt

Alan C Stephens

Alan C Stephens

Alan C Stephens

Alan C Stephens

I

6/12/2014

MISC

CRYSTAL

Petitioner's Opening Bri'ef
!
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Case: CV-2014-0000035 Current Judge: Alan C Stephens
Thomas LArnold, etal. vs. City Of Stanley

Thomas L Arnold, Rebecca Arnold vs. City Of Stanley
Date

Code

User

6/12/2014

MISC

CRYSTAL

Petitioner's Supplement To Their Opening Brief

Alan C Stephens

7/9/2014

STIP

CRYSTAL

Stipulation For Extension Of Time To File
Respondent's Brief

Alan C Stephens

ORDR

CRYSTAL

Order Granting Stipulation For Extension Of Time Alan C Stephens
To File Respondent's Brief

AFFD

LAILA

Affidavit of Cari Tassano

Alan C Stephens

STMT

LAILA

Statement Of The Case

Alan C Stephens

8/12/2014

STIP

CRYSTAL

Stipulation For Extension Of Time To File
Petitioner's Reply Breif

Alan C Stephens

8/18/2014

STIP

CRYSTAL

Second Stipulation For Extention Of Time To File Alan C Stephens
Petitioner's Reply Breif

8/21/2014

ORDR

CRYSTAL

Order Granting Second Stipulation For Extension Alan C Stephens
Of Time

9/22/2014

BREF

CRYSTAL

Petitioners' Reply Brief

Alan C Stephens

12/16/2014

NOTH

CRYSTAL

Notice Of Hearing

Alan C Stephens

HRSC

CRYSTAL

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Review 04/15/2015 Alan C Stephens
11:00 AM)

CONT

CRYSTAL

Hearing result for Judicial Review scheduled on
04/15/2015 11:00 AM: Continued

HRSC

CRYSTAL

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Review 05/20/2015 Alan C Stephens
11:00 AM)

NOTH

CRYSTAL

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Alan C Stephens

LAILA

Miscellaneous Payment: Copy Of Tape Paid by:
Arnold, Rebecca Receipt number: 0000612
Dated: 5/20/2015 Amount: $10.00 (Credit card)

Alan C Stephens

LAILA

Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost- CC
Paid by: Arnold, Rebecca Receipt number:
0000612 Dated: 5/20/2015 Amount: $3.00
(Credit card)

Alan C Stephens

MINE

CRYSTAL

Minute Entry

Alan C Stephens

HRHD

CRYSTAL

Hearing result for Judicial Review scheduled on
05/20/2015 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held

Alan C Stephens

DEOP

CRYSTAL

Decision And Order Re Judicial Review Of
Building Permit Application Denial

Alan C Stephens

CDIS

CRYSTAL

Civil Disposition entered for: City Of Stanley,
Defendant; Arnold, Rebecca, Plaintiff; Arnold,
Thomas L, Plaintiff. Filing date: 6/10/2015

Alan C Stephens

MCAF

CRYSTAL

Memorandum Of Attorney Fees and Costs

Alan C Stephens

AFFD

CRYSTAL

Affidavit Of Paul J. Fitzer In Support Of
Memorandum Of Costs

Alan C Stephens

7/1/2015

PETN

CRYSTAL

Petition For Rehearing

Alan C Stephens

7/8/2015

OBJC

CRYSTAL

Objection To Respondents Memorandum Of
Attorneys Fees And Costs

Alan C Stephens

7/24/2014

3/30/2015

5/20/2015

6/10/2015

6/24/2015

Judge
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Thomas L Arnold, Rebecca Arnold vs. City Of Stanley
1;

Date

Code

User

7/8/2015

HRSC

CRYSTAL

Judge
Hearing Scheduled {08/19/2015 11 :00 AM)
Respondents Memorandum Of Attorneys Fees
And Costs And Petitioners Objection To
Respondents Memorandum Of Attorneys Fees
And Costs

Alan C Stephens

CRYSTAL

Notice Of Hearing

Alan C Stephens
Alan C Stephens

7/15/2015

MEMO

CRYSTAL

Petitioners Memorandum In Support Of Petiton
For Rehearing

7/22/2015

ORDR

CRYSTAL

Order Directing Copies Of All Documents To Be Alan C Stephens
Transmitted To Presiding Judge At His Chambers

8/4/2015

CONT

CRYSTAL

Continued {Continued Hearing 09/16/2015 11 :00 Alan C Stephens
AM) Memorandum of Attorneys Fees And Costs
and Objection To Respondents Memorandum Of
Attorneys Fees And Costs

HRSC

CRYSTAL

Hearing Scheduled {Hearing Scheduled
09/16/2015 11 :00 AM) Petition For Rehearing

Alan C Stephens

ORDR

CRYSTAL

Amended Order Directing Copies Of All
Documents To Be Transmitted To Presiding

Alan C Stephens

8/20/2015

Judge At His Chambers
CONT

CRYSTAL

Continued {Hearing Scheduled 10/21/2015
11 :00 AM) Petition For Rehearing

Alan C Stephens

NOTH

CRYSTAL

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Alan C Stephens

9/16/2015

CONT

CRYSTAL

Continued {Continued Hearing 10/21/2015 11:00 Alan C Stephens
AM) Memorandum of Attorneys Fees And Costs
and Objection To Respondents Memorandum Of
Attorneys Fees And Costs

10/7/2015

MOTN

CRYSTAL

Petitioner's Motion To Correct The Record

Alan C Stephens

AFFD

CRYSTAL

Affidavit of John C. Anderson In Support Of
Petitioners' Motion To Correct The Record

Alan C Stephens

AFFD

CRYSTAL

Affidavit Of Rebecca W. Arnold In Support Of
Petitioners' Motion To Correct The Record

Alan C Stephens

NOTH

CRYSTAL

Notice Of Hearing

Alan C Stephens

HRSC

CRYSTAL

Hearing Scheduled {Motion 10/21/2015 11 :00
AM) Petitioners' Motion To Correct The Record

Alan C Stephens

OBJE

LAILA

Respondent's Notice of Objection and Motion to
Strike Petitioner's Motion to Correct Record and
Affidavits of Rebecca W Arnold and John C
Anderson on October 6, 2015

Alan C Stephens

MEMO

LAILA

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike
Petioner's Motion to Correct Record and
Supporting Affidavits

Alan C Stephens

RSPN

CRYSTAL

Response To Petitioner's Objection To
Respondent's Memorandum Of Attorney Fee's
And Costs And Petition For Rehearing

Alan C Stephens

REPL

CRYSTAL

Petitioners' Reply Memorandum In Support Of
Petition For Rehearing
7

Alan C Stephens
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10/13/2015

10/19/2015
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Thomas L Arnold, Rebecca Arnold vs. City Of Stanley
Date

Code

User

10/19/2015

REPL

CRYSTAL

Petitioners' Reply Memorandum In Support Of
Alan C Stephens
Motion To Correct The Record And Memorandum
In Opposition To Respondent's Motion To Strike

10/21/2015

HRHD

CRYSTAL

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Alan C Stephens
10/21/2015 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held Petitioners'
Motion To Correct The Record

HRHD

CRYSTAL

Hearing result for Continued Hearing scheduled
on 10/21/2015 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held
Memorandum of Attorneys Fees And Costs and
Objection To Respondents Memorandum Of
Attorneys Fees And Costs

HRHD

CRYSTAL

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Alan C Stephens
on 10/21/2015 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held Petition
For Rehearing

LAILA

Miscellaneous Payment: Copy Of Tape Paid by:
Arnold, Rebecca Receipt number: 0001442
Dated: 10/21/2015 Amount: $10.00 (Cash)

Alan C Stephens

MINE

LAILA

Minute Entry

Alan C Stephens

DEOP

CRYSTAL

Decision And Opinion RE: Motion For Rehearing, Alan C Stephens
Motion To Correct Record, And Motion To Strike

CDIS

CRYSTAL

Civil Disposition entered for: City Of Stanley,
Defendant; Arnold, Rebecca, Plaintiff; Arnold,
Thomas L, Plaintiff. Filing date: 11/3/2015

Alan C Stephens

STAT

CRYSTAL

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Alan C Stephens

11/9/2015

DEOP

CRYSTAL

Decision And Order RE: Request For Attorney
Fees

Alan C Stephens

12/14/2015

NOTA

CRYSTAL

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE IDAHO
SUPREME COURT Filed in CV-2012-142

Alan C Stephens

NOTA

CRYSTAL

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE
SUPREME COURT

Alan C Stephens

LAILA

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Alan C Stephens
Supreme Court Paid by: Greener Burke
Shoemaker Oberrecht PA Receipt number:
0001671 Dated: 12/15/2015 Amount: $129.00
(Check) For: Arnold, Rebecca (plaintiff)

BONT

LAILA

Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 1672 Dated
12/15/2015 for 200.00)

Alan C Stephens

STAT

LAILA

STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk
action

Alan C Stephens

BONT

LAILA

Bond Posted for Clerks Record (Receipt 1673
Dated 12/15/2015 for 100.00)

Alan C Stephens

APSC

CRYSTAL

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Alan C Stephens

STAT

CRYSTAL

STATUS CHANGED: Inactive

Alan C Stephens

12/15/2015

CCOA

CRYSTAL

Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

Alan C Stephens

2/19/2016

BNDV

LAILA

Bond Converted (Transaction number 16 dated
2/19/2016 amount 200.00)
8
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Thomas L Arnold, Rebecca Arnold vs. City Of Stanley
Date

Code

User

2/22/2016

EXHI

CRYSTAL

Certificate Of Exhibits

Afan C Stephens

2/23/2016

NOTC

CRYSTAL

Notice of Transcript Lodged

Alan C Stephens

TRAN

CRYSTAL

Transcript Filed

Alan C Stephens

BONT

LAILA

Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 261 Dated
2/23/2016 for 292.40)

Alan C Stephens

CLCS

CRYSTAL

Clerk's Certificate

Alan C Stephens

NOTC

CRYSTAL

Notice Of Lodging of Clerk's Record

Alan C Stephens

GERS

CRYSTAL

Certificate Of Service

Alan C Stephens

2/24/2016

Judge
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Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Thomas J. Lloyd III, ISB #7772
GREENER BURKE S1i0.£MAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

i.1,·

l/.\j·,

I"

950 West Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone (208) 319-2600
Facsimile (208) 319-2601
Email: fshoemaker@greenerlaw. corn
tlloyd@greenerlaw.com
AttoJ:"neys for the Petitioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDI CAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER
THOMASARNOLDaodREBECCA
ARNOLD, husband and wife,

)
)

) Case No. C \I-;)tJ J L/- 3..S)
) PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

Petitioner,

)

vs.

)

Fee Categol'Y L-3: $96.00

)

CITY OF STANLEY, a political subdivision)
of the State of Idaho,
)
)
)
Respondent.
)

COME NOW the Petitioners, Tom and Rebecca A.mold ("Petitioners''), by and throug
their attorneys of record, Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A., and pursuant to Idaho Cod
Sections 67-5270 et. seq. and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84, hereby requests judicial revie
of the decision of the Stanley City Council (the "Council"), acting on behalf of Respondent Cit
of Stanley, in denying the Petitioners' Building Permit Application No. 831, which denia
occurred no earlier than February 13, 2014.

I 9J72-003/65Z:i54

PETITION FORJUDICAL REVIEW - .t

10

From:2083192601
~.

Ill

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over this Petition for Judicial Review pursuant t

Idaho Code Section 67-5270 et. seq., the Stanley Municipal Code, and Rule 84, Idaho Rules o
ii

d

Civil Procedure.
Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5272.

2.

Th

hearing was held and action of the Respondent occurred in Custer Cotu1ty; the real propert

which was the subject of the Respondent's decision is located in the City of Stanley, Custel
County, Idaho.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
3.

Petitioners own property in City of Stanley, Custer ColU1ty, State of Idaho, mor

particularly described as follows: Lot 5 of Mountain View Subdivision, according to the officia
plat ofrecord, Custer County, State ofldaho (the "Property").
4.

The Respondent, City of Stanley ("City" or "Respondent"), is a politica

subdivision of the State of Idaho, and includes the governing board of the City of Stanley, Custe
County, Idaho, as defined by Idaho Code Section 67-6504. This Petition is taken to the Distric
Court of the Seventh Judicial District, County of Custer.
5.

Name of agency from which judicial review is sought: City of Stanley. The Ci

is a Political Subdivision of the State of Idaho and is a local governmental entity, a
contemplated by Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
6.

Decision being appealed: On or about December 5, 2013, Petitioners submitted

building permit application to the City to permit work on the Property. Petitioners believe tl1
City assigned number 831 as the number for the Building Pennit Application. Petitioners' prio

I 9372·003/6525S4
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Building Permit Application (No. 789) was approved by the City; Application No. 831 merel
requested additional time to complete the work already approved by the City in relation t
Application No. 789.

On or about February 13, 2014, the City denied Petitioners' Buildin

Pennit Application No. 831 (the '·Decision''). To date, the City has failed and refused to provid

any basis for its Decision and/or its denial of the Building Permit Application No. 831, despit
requests by Petitioners and their counsel.
7.

The Petitioners, as the applicants, are aggrieved and affected persons as define

under Idaho Code Section 67-6521.

Furthennore, the Petitioners will suffer a violation of

substantial right as a result of the denial of their Building Permit Application No. 831.
8.

Upon Petitioners' information and belief, a hearing was held on February 13

2014, and an audio recording was kept of those proceedings.

Petitioners are not aware o

whether that audio recording is complete, or whether there was any other method of recordatio
of the proceedings before the Stanley City Council on February 13, 2014.

PETITION FOR JUDICAL REVIEW
9.

Under the standards of evaluation as set forth under Idaho Code Section 67-5279

the Decision denying the Petitioners' Building Permit Application No. 831:
a.

is in violation of constitutional, statutory provisions or current ordinances o
the City and of Custer County;

b.

is in excess of the statutory authority or authority of the administrators under
the ordinances of Custer County;

c.

was made upon unlawful procedures; and

d.

was arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of the agency discretion.

193 72-003/652554
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If and when the City provides Petitioners and their counsel with a basis for its Decision
Petitioners may request an amendment to this Petition to allege any other applicable bases fa
'!

Judicial Review, as pe:mutted under Idaho Code Section 67-5279.
10.

The Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs, as allowe

under I.A.R. 41 and Idaho Code § 12·117.
11.

Petitioners reserve the right to file a separate statement of the issues withi

fourteen (14) days after the filing of this Petition, in accordance with J.R.C.P. 84(d)(5).
12.

A transcript of that portion of the February 13, 2014 City hearings is requested

There was a hearing before the Council on February 13, 2014 and it is believed that an audi
recording of the hearing was made. Said record for each hearing is believed to be in possessio
of the Clerk of the City, P.O. Box 53, Stanley, ID 83278.
13.

Petitioners request that all documents related to Petitioners' Buidling Penni

Application No. 831, as well as all documents related to the earlier Building Permit Applicatio
No. 789, be included in the Record for review, in addition to those documents alread
necessarily included pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(f)(3).
14.

Petitioners hereby certify that:

a.

They have served a copy of this Petition upon the Clerk of the City o

Stanley, as well as on the attorney for the City of Stanley, Mr. Paul Fitzer, who ha
represented that he is authorized to accept service of this Petition on behalf of the City.
b.

They have requested an estimate for preparation of the transcript, and hav

tendered an estimated fee in the amount of$100.00 in the meantime.

193 72 -003/652554
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c.

They have paid an estimated fee for the preparation of the record

including all items identified in I.R.C.P. 84(f)(3) and aI1 documents relating to th
Petitioners' Building Permit Applications Nos. 789 and 831, in the amount of$100.00.

DEMAND FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
15.

As a result of the City's actions, Petitioners have had to retain counsel. Fo

services rendered, the Petitioners are entitled to attorney fees and costs should they prevail in thi
action pursuant to I .A.R. 40 and 41, Idaho Code Section 12-117 and pursuant to Rule 54 of th
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

RIGHT TO AMEND
The Petitioners reserve the right to amend this Petition in any respect as motion practic

and discovery proceed in this matter.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioners pray for the following relief:
A.

A finding that the City's Decision:
a. is in violation of constitutional, statutory provisions or current ordinances o
the City and of Custer County;
b. is in excess of the statutory authority or authority of the administrators unde
the ordinances of the City and Custer County;
c. was made upon unlawful procedures; and
d. was arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of the agency discretion.

B.

That the Court set aside the Decision, in whole or part, and rem.and th

Application for further proceedings;

I 937Z-003/652SS4
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C.

For an award of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to applicable law
including but not limited to I.A.R. 40 and 41, Idaho Code Section 12-117, an
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54; and

D.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l~day of March, 2014.
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER. 0BERRECHT P.A.

Fredric V. Shoemaker/ Thomas J. Lloyd III
Attorneys for Petitioners

193 72-003/652554

PETITION FOR JUDI CAL REVIEW - 6

15

From: 20831;@601

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the (>'t'- day of March, 2014, I served a true and correct copy o
the following documents, under the method indicated below:

D U.S.Mail
D Facsimile
~ a n d Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D E-mail: pjf@msbtlaw.com

Paul J. Fitzer
MOORE SMITH BVXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

0

Stanley City Clerk
Attn: Cari Tassano
P.O. Box 53
Stanley, ID 83278

U.S.Mail

D Facsimile
g-Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery

Fredric V. Shoemaker
Thomas J. Lloyd
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Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Thomas J. Lloyd III, ISB #7772
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.

950 West Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone (208) 319-2600
Facsimile (208) 319-2601
Email: fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com
tlloyd@greenerlaw.com
Attorneys for the Petitioners
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER

THOMAS ARNOLD and REBECCA
ARNOLD, husband and wife,

)
)
) Case No. CV-14-00035
)
) STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICI
) REVIEW PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 84(d)(S

Petition en,
vs.

)
)

CITY OF STANLEY, a political subdivision)
of the State of Idaho,
)
)
)
)

Respondent.

COME NOW the Petitioners, Tom and Rebecca Arnold ("Petitioners"), by and throug
their attorneys of record, Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A., and pursuant to Idaho Cod
Sections 67-5270 et. seq., Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84, the Petition for Judicial Revie
filed in this matter on March 13, 2014, and the final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of La
issued by the City Council of the City of Stanley, Idaho on or about March 31, 2014; and hereb
submit this Statement of Issues for Judicial Review fourteen (14) days after the entry of the Fina
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDJCAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO l.R.C.P. 84(d)(S) -1 19372-003/660.m_l
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INTRODUCTION
On or about December 5, 2013, Petitioners submitted a building permit application to th
City of Stanley, Idaho ("the City") to permit work on the Property. Petitioners believe the Cit
assigned number 831 as the number for the Building Permit Application.

Petitioners' prio

Building Permit Application (No. 789) was approved by the City; Application No. 831 requeste
additional time to complete the work already approved by the City in relation to Application No.
789. On or about February 13, 2014, the City denied Petitioners' Building Permit Applicatio
No. 831 (the "Decision").

On March 13, 2014, Petitioners filed their Petition for Judicia

Review ("Petition"), hereby incorporated in full as if fully restated in hac verba. On the City'
Motion for a Stay, due to the fact that the City had not yet issued its Findings of Fact an
Conclusions of Law, this Court stayed this action for judicial review pending the final issuanc
of such Findings and Conclusions by the City. On or about March 31, 2014, the City entered it
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Building Permit Application No. 831.

Thi

Statement oflssues is thereby filed within fourteen (14) days of the issuance of the final Finding
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in accordance with I.R.C.P. 84(d)(S).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDI CAL REVIEW
In addition to those matters set forth in Petitioners' original Petition, Petitioners set fo
the following issues for judicial review in conjunction with Building Permit Application No
831:

1.

Did the City act arbitrarily and , without adequate foundation at law and withou

substantial evidence in the record, in denying Building Permit Application No. 831, when th
record before the City evidenced a factual record that was substantially different than th

grounds set forth in the City's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as the purported basi

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICAL REVJEW PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 84(d)(5) - 2
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for the City's decision?
2.

Did the City act arbitrarily and capriciously, without adequate foundation at la

and without substantial evidence in the record. in denying Building PenuitApplication No._83J
by belatedly incorporating inapplicable subdivision standards/ in Title 16 of the Stanle
Municipal Code for a subdivision plat that had already been approved but which lacked an

access points for certain of the subdivided lots approved therein?

3.

Did the City act arbitrarily and capriciously: without adequate foundation at la

and without substantial evidence in the record, in denying Building Permit Application No. 831

after having approved prior and substantially similar building permit applications submitted b
Petitioners for the same construction, including construction of the access points (not just th
private drives) necessary to access all lots and parcels owned by Petitioners?
4.

Did the City act arbitrarily and capriciously, without adequate foundation at la

and without substantial evidence in the record, in denying Building Permit Application No. 831
on the basis that the types of improvements (including but not limited to retaining walls, fil
setbacks, etc.) set forth as alleged requirements in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of La
are not found anywhere in the Stanley Municipal Code and have not before been required o
other, similarly-situated landowners?
5.

Did the City act arbitrarily and capriciously, without adequate foundation at la

and without substantial evidence in the record 1 in denying Building Permit Application No. 831

on the basis that the City had not previously approved access connections to the City,s rights-of
way for lots/parcels immediately adjacent to those rights-of-way, even though nothing in th
Stanley Municipal Code mandates any additional approval process for accessing the City'
rights-of-way for lots/parcels that immediately abut those rights-of-way?

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 84(d)(5)- 3
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Did the City act arbitrarily and capriciously, without adequate foundation at la

and without substantial evidence in the record, in denying Building Permit Application No. 831

on the basis that the Petitioners had not provided designs/plans prepared by a professiona
engineer for access to the City's rights-of-way for the construction contemplated by Buildin
Permit Application No. 831, when the City has previously taken the position that plans/design
prepared by a professional engineer are not necessary for the approval of a Building Penni
Application?
7.

Did the City act in violation of statutory and constitutional provisions in treatin

Petitioners disparately from similarly-situated applicants, including applicants who hav
previously been approved for Building Permits without providing the level of specificity set fort
as alleged requirements in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law?
8.

Did the City act in violation of statutory and constitutional provisions in denyin

Building Permit Application No. 831, thereby rendering certain parcels of the Petitioners'
property valueless and constituting an inverse condemnation and/or regulatory taking o
Petitioners' property?
9.

Did the City act in violation of statutory and constitutional provisions in treatin

Petitioners disparately from similarly-situated applicants, including applicants who hav
previously been approved for Building Permits without providing the types of improvement
(including but not limited to retaining walls, fill setbacks, etc.) set forth as alleged requiremen
in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law?
10.

Did the City act in violation of statutory and constitutional provisions in treatin

Petitioners disparately from similarly-situated applicants, including applicants who hav
previously been approved for Building Pennits without any requirement for obtaining addition

STATEMENT OF .ISSUES FOR JUDJCAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO .l.R.C.P. 84(d)(5)- 4
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permits to access the City's adjoining rights-of-way, when it denied Building Permit Applicatio
No. 831 on the basis that the Petitioners had not sought and the City had not previously permitte
or approved access the City's rights-of-way for lots/parcels immediately adjacent to those rights
of-way, as more fully set forth as alleged requirements in the Findings of Fact and Conclusion
ofLaw?
11.

Did the City act in violation of statutory and constitutional provisions in treatin

Petitioners disparately from similarly-situated applicants, including applicants who hav
previously been approved for Building Permits without any requirement for obtainin
designs/plans from a professional engineer for the connection to the City's rights-of-way for th
construction contemplated by Building Permit Application No. 831, when it denied Buildin

Permit Application No. 831 on the basis that Petitioners did not provide plans/designs prepare
by a professional engineer in connection with Building Permit Application No.
access points to the City's rights-of-way?

RIGHT TO AMEND
The Petitioners reserve the right to amend this Statements of Issues, pursuant to the plai
language of I.R.C.P. 84(d)(5), as well as the underlying Petition, in any respect as motio
practice and discovery proceed in this matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

(£ft"

day of April, 2014.

Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A.

Fredric V. Shoemaker I Thomas J. Lloyd III
Attorneys for Petitioners
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on the
day of .MW., 2014, I served a true and correct copy o
the following documents, under the method indicated below:

D

U.S. Mail
D.facsimiie
~ Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
E-mail: pjf@msbtlaw.com

Paul J. Fitzer
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CttTD.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

B

Fredric V. Shoemaker
Thomas J. Lloyd
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER

THOMAS ARNOLD and REBECCA
ARNOLD, husband and wife,
Case No. CV 2014-35

Petitioner,
vs.

CITY OF STANLEY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho,
Respondent.

PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF
Judicial Review by the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Custer
of the Stanley City Council in Denying Building Permit 831

Paul J. Fitzer

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Thomas J. Lloyd III, ISB #7772

MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-1800
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202

GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

950 West Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601

Attorney for Defendant
City ofStanley

Attorneys for the Petitioners
Thomas Arnold and Rebecca Arnold
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter involves the denial of a building permit for Lot 5 of the Mountain View
Subdivision in the City of Stanley. The scope of the building permit was for the continued
construction of a.n access road connecting Lot 5 to an abutting city street. Petitioners own Lot 5
and are appealing the denial of their building permit.
I.

Normal Building Permit Process Allows Construction of Two Private Access Roads
Connecting with Abutting City Streets.

The Petitioners own approximately 4.88 acres of real property (triangular in shape) in
Stanley, Idaho (the "Property"). In 2004, the Property had not yet been platted as a subdivision.
The Property's eastern border abutted two city streets: Critchfield Street and Ace of Diamond
Street. (Amended Agency Record ("AR") 45-46.)
In 2004, the Petitioners submitted Building Permit Application 637 to Respondent City of
Stanley. (AR 44.) This application described the requested work as solely to develop access
roads between the Property and the abutting city streets: "no structure. Permit is for grading and
addition of fill material and construction of access drives from Critchfield Avenue into property
and from Ace of Diamonds into the property." (Id) Attached to the application was a map of
the Petitioner's Property that showed two hand-drawn proposed access roads, one from the
southeast comer of the Property onto the northwest comer of Critchfield Avenue ("Critchfield
Access") and one from the middle of the eastern boundary of the Property onto the southwestern
comer of Ace of Diamonds Street ("Ace of Diamond Access"). (AR 45.) The map's drawings
clearly showed that the proposed access roads would connect the Property to the abutting city
street and that the improvements to create the access road would be made both on the Property
and on the abutting city streets. (Id)
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF
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The attached map also contained handwriting that described the Critchfield Access as
"Access drive along northside of Critchfield, at least 20ft wide/possibly 40 ft since property is
commercial" and the Ace of Diamond Access as "Access Drive along southside of Ace of
Diamonds 15 ft wide/possibly 30 ft depending on fill issues." (Id) There is no evidence that
any other information was submitted in support of application 637.
Application 637 was approved by the City of Stanley on October 7, 2004. (AR 44.) It was
also renewed twice. (AR 42.) There is no evidence of any issues raised by the City of Stanley
regarding how the private access roads would connect to the city streets, what improvements
would be made to the city streets, or what building requirements would be required for the
improvements that were going to be made to the city streets.
Pursuant to Permit 637, the Petitioners proceeded with developing the Critchfield Access
and Ace of Diamonds Access. (AR 42.) The Critchfield Access included "improvements to the
north 35 feet of Critchfield Avenue" and the Ace of Diamonds Access included "improvement to
approximately 25-30 feet of the south half of Ace of Diamonds." (Id) These improvements to
the city streets were necessary in order to link the private access roads to the city streets that they
abutted.

These open and obvious improvements to the city streets were done without any

separate permit and the city did not place any conditions on these improvements; there were no
requirements regarding setbacks from property lines or any other specific Stanley Municipal
Code ("SMC") requirements. (Id)
II.

Second Building Permit Approved to Allow Further Construction of Access Roads.
In November of 2006, the City of Stanley approved Building Permit 690, which was also

applicable to the entire Property.

PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF
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development of the Property in preparation for it becoming a subdivision: "no structure;
excavation, grading and fill material; construction of mountain view sub underground utilities;
silt fencing and/or retaining walls to keep fill out of wetlands; construction of access roads;
utilities, etc. to be installed per preliminary plat approval for mountain view sub." (AR 77
(emphasis added).)
The permit application for Permit 690 explicitly allowed for "construction of access
roads" on the Property. Like Permit 637, the City of Stanley appears to have approved Permit
690 without requiring any details about how the access roads would be constructed or how they
would connect with the public streets. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the City
of Stanley made any inquiry prior to approving Permit 690 and the "construction of access
roads" on the Property. This building permit was renewed twice as 690-Rl and 690-R2. (AR 57
& 58, fn. 2 & 3.)

In reliance on Permit 690, the Petitioners made additional improvements to the city
streets by further widening the Ace of Diamonds Access onto Ace of Diamonds Street. (AR 42.)
The additional work and improvement to Ace of Diamond Street was again done without
separate permit and without any setback or other SMC requirements. (Id.)

III.

Mountain View Subdivision Created.
On April 11, 2007, the final plat for Mountain View Subdivision (the "Subdivision") was

signed, subdividing the Property into Lots 1-6. (AR 65.) Lot I abuts Critchfield Street and
contains the Critchfield Access that was constructed pursuant to Permit 637. (AR 45 & 65.)
Parcel B abuts the south side of Ace of Diamonds Street and contains the Ace of Diamond
Access that was also constructed pursuant to Permit 637. (Id.) Lot 5 abuts the north side of Ace
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of Diamonds Street. (AR 65.) At the time Subdivision was created, Lot 5 did not yet have any
access road connecting it to the abutting Ace of Diamond Street. (Id)
IV.

Additional Permit for Additional Private Access Road for Lot 5.

From 2009 through 2011, the Petitioners and the City of Stanley were involved in
litigation regarding the Subdivision. (AR 71.) The parties entered into a Settlement Agreement
and Mutual Release wherein Permit 690 was reissued as Permit 789, with the "exact same scope
of work," i.e. "no structure; excavation, grading and fill material; construction of mountain view
sub underground utilities; silt fencing and/or retaining walls to keep fill out of wetlands;

construction of access roads; utilities, etc. to be installed per preliminary plat approval for
mountain view sub." (AR 71-77 (emphasis added).)

This permit was again for the entire

Subdivision and it again explicitly allowed for additional development' of "access roads." Again,
in approving Permit 789, there is no evidence that the City of Stanley made any inquiry
regarding the construction of access roads or that it put any requirements on how those roads
would be built or interface with the city streets.

Ill
Ill
Ill
II I
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In June of 2012, Permit 789 was renewed for another year, through June 9, 2013. (AR
78.) In May of 2013, Permit 789 was approved by the Stanley City Counsel for another year,
through June 9, 2014. 1 (AR 86-91.)
Pursuant to Permit 789, Petitioners pursued further "construction of access roads" in
order to increase the access between the Subdivision and Ace of Diamonds Street. Specifically,
work was commenced to develop an access road connecting the north side of Ace of Diamonds
Street with Lot 5, giving Lot 5 its own access to the abutting city street (hereinafter "Ace of
Diamonds Access 2"). (AR 42.) Consistent with the past, these open and obvious improvements
to the north side of Ace of Diamonds road, linking the city street to the private access road on
Lot 5, were done without any additional permit and without any setback or other SMC
requirements. (Id)
V.

Building Permit to Continue and Finish Access Road Construction, Specifically the
Access Road for Lot 5 to Ace of Diamond Street.
In December of 2013, the Petitioners submitted Building Permit Application 831 to the

City of Stanley. (AR 69.) Application 831 was limited to one issue - completion of the access

1

Stanley Municipal Code 15.04.060 addresses expiration and renewal of building permits:

A. A building permit may be renewed for one period of twelve (12) months (hereinafter referred to as the "renewal
term") without any statement of cause for the renewal, so long as application for the renewal and payment of the
renewal fee are filed with the city clerk prior to the expiration date of the building permit. ... The renewal term
must be consecutive to the original term of the building permit.
B. A renewed building permit may again be renewed for one additional period of twelve (12) months (hereinafter
referred to as the "second renewal term") consecutively following the renewal term, upon a showing of good cause
for the extension. An application for the second renewal term and the second renewal fee must be filed with the city
clerk prior to the expiration date of the renewed building permit. The application shall include a statement in writing
by the applicant detailing circumstances beyond the control of the applicant which have prevented completion of the
permitted project.... In the event the council finds circumstances beyond the control of the applicant which have
prevented completion of the permitted project the second renewal term application may be granted.
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road linking Lot 5 to the north side of Ace of Diamond Street: "No structures; permit is for
excavation grading and fill and addition of gravel to improve/complete access to and from Ace
of Diamonds into the property to provide usable/suitable access to the property from the public
street for access, ingress and egress by passeng [sic] or vehicles, construction equipment and/or
heavy trucks to access the property from Ace of Diamonds." (Id) Attached to Application 831
was a map showing the location of the access, depicted by cross-hatching. (AR 70.) Written on
the map were further details, "fill and gravel will be placed on east side of the existing retaining
wall to provide improved access to/from Ace of Diamonds. . . . gravel to be placed as needed to
provide access to/from the property to/from Ace of Diamonds by all types of vehicles." (Id)
This new building permit was needed because Permit 789 could not be renewed more than twice,
pursuant to the Stanley Municipal Code. (SMC 15.04.060.)

VI.

Stanley City Council Rejects Building Permit.
On January 16, 2014, the Stanley City Council met, with Building Permit 831 as one of

the items on the agenda. (AR 3-4.) The meeting minutes indicate, "Council president Botti notes
that there is an existing permit that covers fill on the applicant's property until May of 2014.
Councilmember Gadwa moves to table the application.... Motion passes." (AR 5-8.)
On February 13, 2014, Building Permit 831 was again on the agenda for the Stanley City
Council's meeting. (AR 19-20.) The meeting minutes indicate, "Mayor Mumford states that at
issue is the manipulation of property not owned by the applicant. The application seems to be to
approve work already done on the city street. The Mayor says that standards for construction
exist in the city code, and that the City would not allow work to be done on its property that did
not meet those standards. Therefore, he maintains, what has been done cannot be allowed to
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remain. The main issue is that building permits are for work on one's own property.... The
permit is denied. " 2 ( AR 21-23.)
The following is a transcription of some of what was discussed by Mayor Mumford and
President Botti during that February 13th meeting:
Mayor Herb Mumford: ... Specific analysis of an engineer. So these are standards
that are in the city code. They're not directly applicable to doing something on the
city street, but, uh, they are applicable to private citizens still within the City of
Stanley, so on city streets we would expect nothing less. And some of the issues
that you can see if you walk over there is the fill material is put almost right up to
the adjacent property. The standard would be you'd have to have at least a three
foot setback, in fact the standard says three feet plus 1/Slh of whatever this height
is that you're trying to build up. So it'd be three plus feet back from that property
line. And then our standards say also that once you start going uphill from there
with the fill, it can't be any steeper than two horizontal to one vertical And of
course the reason for that is it's- it's still fairly steep, but it's not so steep as to be
obviously unstable. And you could, you could engineer it with specific materials
and everything else and maybe go a little steeper, but then you've got to have a
whole engineering backup. And also, the city codes and I've- the, uh, Council
Members I've given references and the city code for each of these requirements.
The- you also have a, an area up here above the slope where you want to put a
road for vehicles to drive on. And it's one thing if it's a driveway on somebody's
private property, it's another if it's a roadway on the city property as an extension
of the city street. So if you have a, a roadway here on the city property, you'd
have to be set back from the top of this slope by a minimum of three feet for
obvious reasons. You know, if your wheel went off the edge of the roadway, you
don't want to immediately be caught and headed down the slope. It's kind of a
safety issue. So again, it's just a standard rule of thumb, three feet back from that
edge before you can even start to put a roadway. So I have taken those and looked
at what was done on the city property to find out if it's even possible to make an
entryway there. But that's the kind of thing that we need to be studied and
discussed with the city and improved before anything was done there.
Unfortunately things have already been done there and they can't stay the way
they are because they don't meet anybody's standards in terms of building right
up to adjacent property with very steep slope, not having setback for roads, and,

2

The building pennit portion of the Stanley Municipal Code was amended by Ordinance No. 192 that was passed on
April I 0, 2014. Those changes were not in effect at the time that Petitioners' Building Permit 831 was denied by the
Stanley City Council. The amendments are inapplicable to this matter.
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and all those things for the portion that's on the city street which is substantial. So
those are some of the other reasons that it's a problem. I mean, [Rebecca]'s
concerned that we don't know what the problem is. No, there's a lot of problems.
There's a long long list of problems, but the main issue with approval of this
building permit is the building permit is a vehicle to approve something you want
to do on your own property, but not a vehicle to prove something you want to do
on somebody else's property, either another private citizen or city, so. So Council
Members, do we have a motion on what you'd like to do with Building Permit
831 that was tabled in January 16th?

My reason would be as you suggested because it requests to place
Steve Botti:
fill on someone else's property, mainly the City of Stanley. And a valid permit
already exists to place fill on Lot 5 on the applicant's property, so that's not an
issue. That's Permit 789R2. So, um, this permit isn't necessary for that work to
continue. The issue is the placement of fill is on someone else's property which is
City property.
(AR 100, 102, 107-108.) The transcript of the February

13th

meeting is clearly not complete as

shown by how Mayor Mumford's comments commence in mid-sentence. (AR 106-07.) It is
unclear what was discussed during the meeting prior to the comments cited above. (Id) Ms.
Arnold requested a "transcript of that portion of the February 13, 2014 Stanley city Council
meeting pertaining to our building permit application" and the transcriptionist provided an
affidavit stating that she transcribed the entire "audio conversation verbatim." (AR 100 & 104.)
Therefore, it would appear that the city council erred and did not record the entirety of the
February 13th meeting regarding the Arnolds' building permit.

VII.

Appeal to the District Court for Judicial Review of the Denial of the Building Permit
to Complete the Access Road for Lot 5.
The Stanley Municipal Code does not provide for additional administrative appeals of the

decision by the Stanley City Council; instead, SMC 15.04.050 provides, "An applicant denied a
permit or aggrieved by a decision of the city council may seek judicial review under the
procedures provided by Idaho Code and any amendments thereto." Therefore, on March 13,
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2014, Petitioners filed their Petition for Judicial Review with this Court, pursuant to I.C. §§ 676519(4) and 67-6521(1) and IRCP 84 and the timelines contained therein. This matter was then
stayed while awaiting Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from the City Council regarding
its denial of Building Permit 831.
VIII. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
On March 19, 2014, the Stanley City Council held a Special Meeting wherein they
reviewed and discussed a draft Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding their denial
of Building Permit 831. (AR 30.) The draft meeting minutes state, "Motion made by
Councibnember Gadwa to approve Findings of Fact as amended by our attorney based on all
input with the Mayor having final approval of all changes .... Motion passes." (AR 31.)
On March 31 51, Petitioner Rebecca Arnold submitted a letter to the City of Stanley that
contested the City Council's decision to deny the permit. Her letter explains,
We continue to remain baffled as to why the City denied this permit. This
building permit is no different than a previous permit #637 (see copy attached),
which allowed work on the city street to construct accesses on both Critchfield and
Ace of Diamonds. Although Permit 637 on its face referenced only the Arnold
Property legal description with that legal description attached, the Site Plan attached
to 637 clearly showed the work to be done on both the Arnold Property and the
referenced city streets. There were no setbacks from any property lines required.
There was no separate permit required for the work done on the City streets and the
Stanley Municipal Code ("SMC") does not have a permitting process for
constructing accesses onto city streets. Permit 637 was not only initially approved
in 2004 by the City of Stanley, it was also renewed twice. No changes in the
relevant ordinances have taken place since that time. ·
Under Permit 637, the access from Critchfield Avenue onto the Arnold
property, including improvements to the north 35 feet of Critchfield Avenue was
completed (no setbacks from any property lines were required by the City) and an
access from the south half of Ace of Diamonds onto the Arnold Property, including
improvement to approximately 25-30 feet of the south half of Ace of Diamonds was
initially constructed (no setbacks from any property lines were required by the
City). The access from the south half of Ace of Diamonds was later widened
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(including improvements to the end of Ace of Diamonds) under Building Permits
690 and the current Building Permit 789 (and again no setbacks from any property
lines were required by the City). Improvements for the Access into the Arnold
Property from the north half of Ace of Diamonds under Permit 789 and we are
simply seeking a new permit to allow us additional time to complete the work.
Again, no changes in the relevant ordinances have been made since 63 7, 690 and
789 were issued.
SMC does not require setback for fences nor for retaining walls nor for
placement of fill and the City has not attempted to require such setbacks in other
permits. This is clearly evidenced in Building Permit 724 which was issued to Jim
and Michelle Wetzel for the placement of fill material and constructing a retaining
wall (which we ask that you incorporate into the record of today's meeting) where
the City did not require any setbacks for the placement of the fill material and did
not require any setback for the retaining wall. In fact, the Wetzel's fill material and
retaining wall abut the Arnold Property on the south side of the Arnold Property.
Numerous permits, including Permits 638 and 671, have been issued by the City for
fences without any setback requirements because there are no setback requirements
in the SMC for fences. We would like to be given the opportunity to provide other
examples where the City Issued permits for a particular piece of property that
allowed work on the adjacent City street as we are aware of several but have not
had time to research and copy because the City office has been closed and there was
little prior notice for today's meeting.
(AR42.)

Later that day, on March 31st, the Stanley City Council held its final special meeting
regarding Building Permit 831. (AR 38.) The draft meeting minutes state:
Mayor Mumford notes that we have an email from Rebecca Arnold sent to us on
3/31/2014 at 12:30 p.m., council members had not yet reviewed this email. They
were provided with copies so they could review the email and attachments in the
meeting. Mayor Mumford points out that Rebecca had previously said Permit #831
is just like permit #789 and now she says it is just like permit #637, Mayor
Mumford disagrees. Neither permit asked to do a lot of work on city streets and
from what we observed there was little or no work on the city streets under permit
#637. Permit #831 was denied because no adequate information was provided on
what they want to do on the city streets.
Councilmember Gadwa reads Permit #63 7 noting that permit was not a permit to do
work on the city streets. It was for construction of the access drive. It does not say
work can be done on the city streets. Mayor Mumford agrees. Findings of Fact
Conclusions of Law, final version, unless otherwise stated in this meeting, this is
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the final version. One of the reason we're having this meeting is to make sure
noticing and information for the meeting was taken care of properly. Mayor
Mumford submitted photos that were supplied to help illustrated some of the issues.
Mayor Mumford points out the diagram, Building on a Slope, everybody needs to
understands the SMC references there, are all references from our code, but they
aren't code requirements that say this is what Stanley requires for doing work on
the city streets, because we don't have a whole bunch of codes to do work on the
city streets, so these requirements are in the code from the standpoint of subdivision
development or other requirements. It gives us some kind of standard to use, rather
than having no standard at all. We do want it to be done properly and these are the
codes that would be relevant, the setbacks, of course, of the fill from the adjacent
property line, the slope of that fill up to the higher elevation and the set back of any
roadbed, driveway or access road from the top of the fill, those are all things that
can be found in the SMC and the references are there on the document. That is what
that drawing is intended to show, to put it all together. Those are the problems we
have with the work that was done on the city streets which doesn't appear to follow
any codes.
Mayor Mumford continues to point out you cannot put many, many cubic yards of
dirt on the city street without having a permit for doing something that substantial.
Also you either need to have a custom engineered design explaining why this is a
good plan with all the documentation to back it up, or try to grab some of the
existing standards that apply to that kind of situation. That is what is illustrated on
the Building on a Slope document where we respect our own standards, and say
well that can be O.K.. We have not seen, from this applicant, any proposal that has
any details of what they plan to do, or how we know it's not going to be an ongoing
problem. We don't want water blocked or diverted onto neighboring properties, or
erosion, or safety issues.
Council President Botti wanted to add that in addition to specifying acceptable
engineering for placing the fill of the gravel, there would also be the question, of
how that affects the drainage off of the city street onto her property or onto others.
(AR 39-40.)
The Stanley City Council then issued its signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
regarding its denial of Building Permit 831. (AR 57-64.) The Conclusions of Law now contain
three reasons to explain the denial of the building permit:
The City denies the application for Building Permit 831 on the basis that the
application fails to comply with the Stanley Municipal Code and the
aforementioned Mountain View Subdivision Plat. First, the installation of an access
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road at this location to access Lot 5 is inconsistent with the approved Mountain
View Subdivision Plat and prior approved building permits; all of which depict
access on Lot S's north-west side along the western edge of Lot 6.The Applicant
has not sought to amend the preliminary plat nor seeks a variance, etc. if the
proposed lot access has become unacceptable. Applicant appears to present the
argument that because she has already installed improvements inconsistent with her
preliminary plat and without prior approval; she has the inherent right to continue to
do so pursuant to the City's acquiescence. This is not a valid argument.
Second, the Applicant's building permit application is not limited to
construction of an access road upon her own property, but rather seeks to render
improvements on adjacent property; i.e. the City's right of way. In the absence of an
amended preliminary plat / development agreement with the City, the Applicant
may not change the point of access to her property nor render modifications to the
property not her own. There is no incidental right to modify the city's right-of-way
nor is a building permit the proper medium in which to grant the applicant the right
to modify property not her own.
Third, even if such approval were to be granted, the Applicant has failed to
provide the technical information necessary to even evaluate her request. The
difference in elevation between that portion of Lot 5 and Ace of Diamonds Street is
considerable. That portion of Lot 5 is in a ravine; the historical drainage for that
entire region. In contravention of SMC 15.04.020, the Applicant submitted its
application bereft of any information pertaining to hillside stabilization, drainage,
fill material and proposed compaction, slope of fill, retaining walls (if applicable),
setback of the fill from neighboring properties, and access road setback from top of
fill slope, enabling the Council to conduct a review to determine whether the
proposed improvements comply with good engineering practice or the Stanley
Municipal Code. In the absence of such information, the City has no way to
determine if the work sought to be performed would comply with good engineering
standards ensuring the protection of the public health and safety of its citizenry. The
work already performed at the location does not, as it threatens to affect the
adjacent private property to the north of Ace of Diamonds among other potential
deficiencies.
(AR 62-63.)
With Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed, this matter is no longer stayed and
Petitioners file this initial brief, pursuant to IRCP 84(p).
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Did the City of Stanley's denial of Building Permit 831 violate the federal and state

constitutions that provide equal protection under the law?
2.

Did the City of Stanley's failure to record and transcribe verbatim the meeting

wherein it denied Building Permit 831 constitute a prejudicial violation of Petitioners' due
process rights?
3. Was there substantial evidence to support the City of Stanley's denial of Building
Permit 831?
4. Was the City of Stanley's denial of Building Permit 831 arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion?
5. Was a substantial right prejudiced by the City of Stanley's denial of Building Permit
831?
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Petitioners seek their attorney fees for bringing this judicial review, pursuant to J.C. §§
12-117 and 12-121.
ARGUMENT
I.

Standard of Review

The City of Stanley's decision to deny the Petitioner's Building Permit 831 is subject to
judicial review by the District Court, pursuant to the Local Land Use Planning Act
("LLUPA"), Idaho Code§§ 67-6501 to 67-6538 Specifically, Idaho Code§ 67-6521(1)
provides, in pertinent part:
(l)(a) As used herein, an affected person shall mean one having a bona fide
interest in real property which may be adversely affected by:
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF
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(i) The approval, denial or failure to act upon an application for a
subdivision, variance, special use permit and such other similar applications
required or authorized pursuant to this chapter;

(d) . . Any affected person aggrieved by a final decision concerning matters
identified in section 67-6521(1)(a), Idaho Code, may within twenty-eight (28) days
after all the remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial
review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code [the IAPA].

See also I.C. § 67-6519(4).
Here, a building permit falls within the meaning and intent of "other similar applications"
and therefore the LLUP A provides the Petitioners with a remedy for the arbitrary and unfair
actions of the City of Stanley in denying their building permit. See Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome

County, 145 Idaho 630, 632-33, 181 P.3d 1238, 1240-41 (2008) (listing building permits as type
of permit falling within judicial review); see also Highlands Development Corp. v. City of Boise,
145 Idaho 958,961, 188 P.3d 900,903 (2008).

In cases, like this, where the LLUPA authorizes judicial review of a city-level land use
decision, the district court applies the standard of review set forth in IAP A. The district court
examines the Stanley City Council's findings to determine if they are supported by substantial
and competent evidence. LC. § 67-5279(1). The district court must affirm the city's action
unless the court determines that the city's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: "(a)
in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the
agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." I.C. § 67-5279(3).
Regardless of whether the city council's action meets the standard set forth in I. C. § 67-5279(3),
the district court must affirm the city's action "unless substantial rights of the appellant have
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been prejudiced." LC. § 67-5279(4). It is the burden of the party contesting the city's action,
here the Petitioners, to first illustrate how the board erred in a manner specified under LC. § 675279, and then establish that a substantial right has been prejudiced. See Drujfel v. State, Dept. of

Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 855, 41 P.3d 739, 741 (2002).

II.

The City Council's Actions Violated the Federal and Idaho Constitutions that
Protect Petitioners from Unequal Treatment Without Rational Basis.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No state shall ...

deny to any person with in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend.

XIV, § 1; see also Idaho Const., Art. I, § 2 ("Government is instituted for their equal protection
and benefit.") The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the equal protection clause
may, in some circumstances, afford individuals relief from intentional, irrational, and differential
treatment at the hands of the Government. E.g., Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562
(2000) (per curiam). To succeed on their "class of one" claim, Petitioners must demonstrate the
City Council: "(1) intentionally (2) treated [Petitioners] differently than other similarly situated
property owners, (3) without rational basis." Gerhart v. Lake County, Mont., 637 F.3d 1013,
1022 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564); see also City of Coeur d'Alene v.

Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 853-54, 136 P.3d 310, 324-25 (2006) (equal protection applied to city
ordinances related to land use).
Here, while the City of Stanley has not provided Petitioners with access to the city's
historical records regarding building permits in order to more fully show evidence of unequal
treatment, there is ample evidence of unequal treatment based solely on Petitioners' own prior
dealings with the City of Stanley.

Petitioners have gone through the approval and renewal

process regarding the construction of access roads for this Property some nine different times
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prior to filing an application for Building Permit 831 (see building permits 637, 690, and 789,
each renewed twice). In each of those previous permitting processes, the facts were essentially
identical to Building Permit 831: Petitioners were seeking to construct access roads for the
Property that linked to the abutting city streets and they submitted only a brief description of this
work and/or a map with minimal drawings regarding the work to be performed. In each instance,
the permit was granted without any request for additional information, inquiry about how the
access roads would interface with the city street, or requirement of some other permitting or plat
amendment process.
The City Council's approach with Building Permit 831 is a clear and intentional change
from its approach regarding access road building permits. As the building permits involve the
same Property, nearly identical impact on city streets, and nearly identical disclosures of
information in support of the permit, there is no rational basis for the City Council's abrupt
change in how it handled such building permit applications for access roads. The City Council's
action is a violation of the equal protection clause under the federal and Idaho constitutions.
III.

The City Council Violated Due Process By Failing to Comply With the Statutory
Requirement for a Transcribable Verbatim Record.
In all land use proceedings where judicial review is available, the Idaho Legislature has

imposed a statutory requirement of a transcribable verbatim record. See J.C. § 67-6536 (added
in 1982) ("In every case in [the LLUPA] where an appeal is provided for, a transcribable
verbatim record of the proceeding shall be made and kept for a period of not less than six (6)
months after a final decision on the matter. The proceeding envisioned by this statute for which a
transcribable verbatim record must be maintained shall include all public hearings at which
testimony or evidence is received .
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deliberates toward a decision after compilation of the record."). The Idaho Supreme Court has
further recognized that "the absence of a transcribable verbatim record" of land use proceedings
may result in a violation of a party's right to procedural due process. Chambers v. Kootenai

County Bd ofComm'rs, 125 Idaho 115, 118, 867 P.2d 989, 992 (1994) (citing Cooper v. Board
o/County Comm'rs ofAda County, 101 Idaho 407,411,614 P.2d 947, 951 (1980)); see also Gay
v. County Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626,629,651 P.2d 560,563 (Ct.App.1982)
("[A] transcribable record [is] indispensable to meaningful judicial review of rezoning
proceedings where the sufficiency of notice, adequacy of opportunity to present or to rebut
evidence, or the existence of evidence supporting the agency's findings may be put at issue.").
Here, the Building Permit was on the agenda for the City Council's meeting on February
· 13, 2014. The transcript of that meeting shows that the City Council first went into Executive
Session in order to "speak with the city attorney." (AR 105-06.) When the City Council returned
from Executive Session, someone apparently forgot to turn on the recorder. The recorder was
then turned on mid-sentence of the comments by Mayor Herb Mumford. (AR 107.) The record,
therefore, does not indicate what was said about the Building Permit application prior to the
recorder being started. (AR 106-107.)
The City Council's error with the recorder, i.e. its failure to preserve a "transcribable
verbatim record of the proceeding" in violation of LC. § 67-6536, is a violation of Petitioners'
due process rights. The Petitioners are entitled to know all of what was discussed during the
February 13th meeting and to be able to reference those discussions as part of this Court's record
on appeal. The lost portion of the meeting could contain valuable evidence in support of this
appeal, including admissions regarding the City Council's prior approach to building permits and
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its biased, arbitrary, capricious, and unequal treatment of Petitioners. The City Council has
conveniently insulated itself, at least to some degree, from close scrutiny by not having a
transcribable record of all of its discussion of the Arnolds' building permit. The City Council's
violation of due process undermined the appeal process and Petitioners request a remand that
vacates the City of Stanley's decision and requires a reconsideration and the retention of a
complete and verbatim record of all proceedings.
IV.

The City Council's Denial Was Not Supported by Substantial Evidence on the
Record as a Whole and was Arbitrary, Capricious and an Abuse of Discretion.

The Council gives three reasons for its decision to deny Building Permit 831: (1) the
access road being constructed on Lot 5 that connects with the north side of Ace of Diamonds
Street is not explicitly shown on the Subdivision Plat and therefore cannot be approved without
an amendment of the plat or a request for a variance; (2) a building permit to build a private
access road does not include permission to make necessary changes to the adjacent city street
that is being accessed and permission to make necessary access changes to the city street comes
only through "an amended preliminary plat /development agreement with the City;" and (3) the
building permit is deficient because it lacks engineering designs and other details regarding
construction of the access road. 3 The facts, however, show that each of these reasons is a mere
pretext and inconsistent with how the Stanley City Council has utilized the building permit
process in the past and has interpreted the SMC in the past. Thus, these three explanations for

3

Both of the first two arguments -- about needing to amend the subdivision plat to show an access road on
subdivision property and needing "an amended preliminary plat /development agreement with the City" in order to
make necessary access changes to an adjoining city street - are new arguments that were never mentioned during the
February 13, 2014 City Council meeting where the building permit was denied (at least not in the transcribable
portion of the meeting). These "after-thought" arguments were raised for the frrst time in the written Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law attempting to justify the City Council's actions.
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF

18

I 9372-003/673585

45

the denial are "(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole" and are "(e)
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion" within the meaning of I.C. § 67-5279(3).
A.

No Amendment Of The Subdivision Plat Is Needed In Order To Get A Building
Permit To Construct An Access Road Between A Lot Abutting A City Street.

First, the City Council's reliance on the Subdivision Plat is entirely unsupported in the
evidence and is in fact contradicted by the evidence. The City Council has failed to cite to any
provision in the SMC or otherwise that would require an amendment to the Subdivision Plat
prior to an access road being constructed that links Lot 5 and Ace of Diamond road. The City
Council correctly notes that the Subdivision Plat contains an easement for access between
Highway 21 and Lot 5, and the Council then makes an unsupported logical leap to argue that this
means that this access easement is somehow the exclusive area where the Plat would allow an
access road for Lot 5. This argument is not logical.
There is nothing about the Subdivision Plat that would indicate that Lot 5 was only
allowed access to the city streets/highways via the access easement over Lot 6. (AR 65.) The
Subdivision Plat contains an easement to allow access to Highway 21 but it contains nothing that
would indicate Lot 5 cannot also have access to Ace of Diamond Street. (Id) In fact, the
Subdivision Plat clearly shows Lot 5 directly abutting Ace of Diamond Street, which would
indicate that Lot 5 would also have access to Ace of Diamond Street. (Id) No additional
easement is shown in that location because Lot 5 directly abuts Ace of Diamond road and does
not need an access easement across any other Lot. There is nothing inconsistent about a lot
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having access to two different public right of ways. The Council's argument about inconsistency
with the Plat is illogical and is not supported by any evidence. 4
B.

A Building Permit Is The Method For Gaining Approval For An Access Road,
Including The Necessary Improvements To Create The Interface With The Public
Street, And There Is No Requirement For A Separate "Amended Preliminary
Plat/Development Agreement With The City. "

Second, the City Council incorrect asserts that the building permit process is not used to
gain approval for access roads that require improvements to city right of ways. The City Council
tries to divide the authorization of an access road into two different processes: a building permit
for the portion of the access road on the Petitioner's Property and a separate "Amended
Preliminary Plat/Development Agreement with the city" to address the portion of the access road
that interfaces with the city property. This distinction is not found anywhere in the Stanley
Municipal Code and it is inconsistent with the facts in the record.
In its findings, the City Council claims that all improvements to a city street that are
incidental to connecting that city street with a private access road must be approved through a
process other than the building permit process. However, the City Council does not point to any
city code section or statute that supports this contention. The only arguably applicable SMC
section is the section dealing with building permits that specifically addresses the process of
getting approval for building roads on the Petitioner's property. (SMC 15.04.010: " ... nor shall
any lot be excavated for ... roads or any other purpose, nor shall fill be placed on any lot, nor
shall any lot be cleared ... unless a building permit therefor has been issued by the city council .

4

If the City Council's argument were correct, then the Critchfield Access that the City of Stanley approved for Lot I
(through Building Permit 637) would be in violation of the subdivision plat because it is not referenced on the plat
and there is no access easement in that area. (AR 45 & 65.) The subdivision plat was correctly approved without
any need to reference the access road for Lot I. There is no need to amend the plat to add either Lot 1's existing
access road or the Lot 5 access road being constructed.
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...")

The Petitioners have followed the process and they cannot be faulted for not following

some other process that the City Council is attempting to create and impose out of thin air. The
City Council has undoubtedly authorized many access roads but it has not submitted any
evidence of any other circumstance where it has required a different approval process with
regard to any work to "link up" the access road to the public road way.
In fact, the evidence in the record shows that the City Council has previously used the
building permit process to authorize work done on a city right of way. When the Petitioners
submitted their application for Permit 637, they submitted a map and drawing that clearly
showed that the two access roads would impact two city streets. (AR 45.) The map and drawing
showed that the access roads would be built both on Petitioner's Property and they would
interface and also be built on the abutting city street. (Id) The City of Stanley approved that
building permit. (AR 44.) There is no evidence that the City of Stanley had any issue with the
building permit process being used to get approval to make improvements to the two city streets.
The City of Stanley certainly did not require an "Amended Preliminary Plat/Development
Agreement with the city."

In fact, the city did not speak up in the following years when

improvements were made to both city streets in order to interface with the Critchfield Access and
the Ace of Diamonds Access. (AR 42.) This undisputed evidence shows that the building permit
process has, in fact, been the process for approving the building of access roads, including that
portion of the access road that interfaces with public right of ways and requires improvements
and/or changes to the public right of ways.
In fact, it is disingenuous for the City Council to claim that its building permit process
did not apply to the incidental work necessary to connect a private road to a city street. It would
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be pointless for a property owner to build a private access road if that property owner could not
also connect that access road to the abutting city street. Clearly, that work to connect the private
access road will often, if not always, require some improvements/changes to the city street. If
this work to connect up the access road is not contemplated within the request for a building
permit, then the access road becomes pointless and is no longer an access road. It is instead a
road to nowhere.
C.

The Building Permit Approval Process Does Not Require Any Additional
Information Regarding the Access Road

The City Council indicates Petitioners violated the requirements of SMC 15.04.020 when
they "submitted [their] application bereft of any information pertaining to hillside stabilization,
drainage, fill material and proposed compaction, slope of fill, retaining walls (if applicable}.
setback of the fill from neighboring properties, and access road setback from top of fill slope."
(AR 63.) The City Council argues that this information is required to enable "the Council to
conduct a review to determine whether the proposed improvements comply with good
engineering practice or the Stanley Municipal Code. (Id)
SMC 15.04.020 provides, in pertinent part:
Applications for building permits shall be submitted in the form specified by
resolution of the city council and shall be accompanied by ... a drawing showing
the location of the proposed project on the applicant's property and the location of
the property in the city, building plans and specifications, and proof of approval of
the proposed project by the appropriate fire department and the appropriate sewer
district or state health department. Applications which do not contain all of the
foregoing shall not be considered complete. Development and construction
drawings and technical support material shall be to scale or otherwise in sufficient
detail to allow a technical or engineering review to determine whether the proposed
development complies with all zoning requirements.
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The factual record shows that the City Council's application of this provision is arbitrary
and capricious. Permit 83 I is the latest in numerous building permits that the Petitioners have
submitted that dealt with access roads. In all prior circumstances, i.e. with permits 637, 690, and
789 and their renewals, the Council has not required "information pertaining to hillside
stabilization, drainage, fill material and proposed compaction, slope of fill, retaining walls (if
applicable), setback of the fill from neighboring properties, and access road setback from top of
fill slope." (AR 44-46, 71-91.) There is no evidence in the record to explain why the Council is
suddenly creating this new and expensive requirement regarding the completion of this access
road.
Clearly, the consistent approach of the Council and the City of Stanley has been to
approve access roads based on minimal information about their location. This is the reasonable
approach. The City takes this approach because it always has the authority to then review the
assess road as constructed and require any changes required by law in order to ensure that the
access road is safe for travel. The City has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in changing its
approach in this case and such actions should be reversed by this Court.
In addition, SMC 15.04.020 provides, "Development and construction drawings and
technical support material shall be to scale or otherwise in sufficient detail to allow a technical or
engineering review to determine whether the proposed development complies with all zoning
requirements." (emphasis added) Here, the City has not pointed to any applicable "zoning
requirements" that apply to this access road. Instead, the City has pointed to numerous SMC
provisions applicable to the initial approval and construction of subdivisions.
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evidence in the record to support the City Council's claim that these provisions have ever been
applied to prohibit approval of a building permit for an access road for an existing subdivision.

V.

The Denial of the Building Permit Was A Significant Prejudice to the Petitioners
Who Now Lack Important Access to Lot 5.
Lot 5 abuts Ace of Diamond road. Clearly, Ace of Diamond is an important access point

to and from Lot 5. The denial of this building permit prejudices the Petitioners by (1) wasting
their prior effort and expense in the partial but unfinished construction of the access road
between Lot 5 and Ace of Diamond Street and (2) preventing Lot 5 from having access to Ace of
Diamond Street. Clearly, this lost access and wasted resources is a significant prejudice to the
Petitioners and merits a remedy from this Court.

VI.

Petitioners Should Be Awarded Their Attorney Fees as the Prevailing Party.
Petitioners seek their attorney fees pursuant to both I. C. §§ 12-117 and 12-121 (3 ). These

statutes provide, in pertinent part:
12-117. Attorney's fees, witness fees and expenses awarded in certain
instances. (1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state
agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on
appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and
other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.
12-120. Attorney's fees in civil actions. (1) ...
(2) ...
(3) In any civil action to recover ... in any commercial transaction unless
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except
transactions for personal or household purposes.
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Both statutes are applicable, pursuant to Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Admin., 155
Idaho 55,305 P.3d 499 (2013). See also Sanders v. Board of Trustees ofMountain Home School
Dist. No. 193, 156 Idaho 269,322 P.3d 1002 (2014).

Here, the City acted "without a reasonable basis in fact or law" by denying a building
permit based on reasoning that was not supported by evidence and that was arbitrary and
capricious. Attorney fees should be awarded pursuant to Section 12-117. In addition, Section
12-120(3) provides that attorney fees should be awarded to the prevailing party regarding all
commercial transactions. Obtaining a building permit for an access road is related and essential
to develqping the real property and is therefore a commercial transaction. In reversing the City's
improper actions, the Court should award Petitioners their attorney fees and costs pursuant to
either or both of J.C. §§ 12-117 and 12-121(3).
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Petitioners respectfully request that the District Court
reverse the decision of the Council regarding Building Permit 831 and approve the permit so that
construction can be completed on the access road linking Lot 5 of the Mountain View
Subdivision to Ace pf Diamonds Street. Petitioners also should be awarded their attorney fees
and costs as the prevailing party in this judicial review.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

__L/!:day of June, 2014.

GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

Thomas J. Lloyd III
AdamP. Boyd
Attorneys for Petitioners
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l~ay

I hereby certify that on the
{
of June, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of
the following documents, under the method indicated below:

D

Paul J. Fitzer

U.S.Mail
!:J_J:acsimile
tl Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D E-mail: pjf@msbtlaw.com

MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Attorney for Defendant

Thomas J. Lloyd
AdamP. Boyd
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IN T~E DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICAL DISTRICT OF THE
'

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER

THOMAS ARNOLD and REBECCA
ARNOLD. husband and wife,
'

Case No. CV 2014-35

Petitioners,
vs.

CITY OF STANLEY, a political subdivision
of the Stat¢ of Idaho,
Respondent.

PETITIONERS' SUPPLEMENT TO THEIR OPENING BRIEF
Judicial Review by the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Custer
of the Stanley City Council in Denying Building Permit 831

Fredric V. 1Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Thomas J. Lloyd III, ISB #7772
GREENER SuRKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.
950 West ~annock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ldal;lo 83 702
Telephone~ (208) 319-2600
Facsimile::(208) 319·2601

Paul J. Fitzer
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-1800
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202

Attorney for Defendant
City ofStanley

I
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Thomas A~nold and Rebecca Arnold
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I

I

I

INTRODUCTION

I

OJ! February

13, 2014, the Stanley City Council denied the Petitioners' application for

iennit 831. Pursuant to SMC 15.04.050, LC.§§ 67-6519(4) and 67-6521(1), and IRCP

Building

84, Petitio~ers filed a timely appeal of that denial. The agency record was finalized on May 1,
j

2014. Putsuant to IRCP 84(p) and IAR 34(c), Petitioners had until June 5, 2014 to file their
I

!

Opening ~rief The parties stipulated to a one-week extension of that deadline to June 12, 2014,

i

and this Cpurt entered its order that approved that extension. On June 11 1\ Petitioners sent their

I

Opening ]prief by over•night mail for filing.

However, due to a clerical error, Petitioners

I
inadvertetly left out some important information that was intended to be included in the
Opening ~rie£ This Supplement to the Opening Brief is being fax filed such that it will also be
filed by ~~ June 12th deadline. Petitioners ask the Court to consider the Opening Brief and this
!

suppleme~t as one complete filing of their Opening Brief in this matter.

II
!

l

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION AND ARGUMENT

In ~eir Opening Brief, Petitioners pointed out the numerous flaws in the reasoning used
i

by the City Council in their Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Petitioners inadvertently
left out

J

Findings

I

error that the City Council made in its recitation of the facts.

bf Fact and

On page 3 of the

Conclusions of Law, the City Council states, "The land is platted

subdivisi+ consisting of seven lots located within the Commercial and Residential A Districts."
(AR 59.) fhat statement is incorrect in two ways. First, the subdivision is actually six lots.
More impJrtantly, the subdivision is not located within the Residential A District. The Mountain
I

View subdivision is zoned exclusively Commercial. The approved plat (AR 65) does contain an

II
agreement/ by the Petitioners that Lots 2, 3, 4, and 5 will by used only for residential purposes
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I
I
allowed iJ the Residential A zone (SMC 17.16.010), but the subdivision is exclusively zoned
I
Commerci!al (SMC 17.24) and is subject to the requirements (i.e., setbacks, lot area and width,
I
accessory tuildings and dwellings) within that zoning district. (SMC 17.24.030-.050.)
In !fact, the zoning map for the City of Stanley makes it clear that the City Council's
statement ;:about zoning is incorrect. Unfortunately, the City of Stanley fai]ed to include the

!

zoning m~p in the record or with their Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which could

I

have possibly prevented their error. Attached as Exhibit A to this Supplement is the approved
zoning m! for the City of Stanley, which map is incorporated into the Stanley Municipal Code

I

through S,M:C 17.12.020 (incorporating the "map identified by the approving signatures of the
II
I

city council, marked and designated as the 'zoning map', which map is now on file in the office

I

of the City Clerk.").

Thi absence of this zoning map from the record is yet another example of how the City

I

of Stanley;made Findings of Fact that were not based on any documents submitted to the record.

I

Another e1a.i:nple is the statement, "The difference in elevation between that portion of Lot 5 and
;

Ace of Dikionds Street is considerable. That portion of Lot 5 is a ravine, the historical drainage
for that enlire region.'' (AR 63 .) There are no facts in the record to support that claim about Lot
5 or the ·ltorical drainage in the region. The Opening Brief points out similar deficiencies in
the record that the City Council used to support its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

(See pages 18 to 24 of Petitioner's Opening Brief.)

Ill
Ill
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I

In addition to failing to adequately support their claimed factual findings and legal
conclusio s, the City Council also purposely avoided including facts in the record that would

1
I

undenninei their factual findings and legal conclusions. For example, the Petitioners provided

I

the City ¢ouncil with a letter challenging the City Council's decision to deny the building
pemrit. In/that letter, Petitioners stated,

I

SMC does not require setback for fences nor for retaining walls nor for
plafement of fill and the City has not attempted to require such setbacks in other
This is clearly evidenced in Building Permit 724 which was issued to Jim
permits.
I
anq Michelle Wetzel for the placement of fill material and constructing a retaining
wall (which we ask that you incorporate into the record of today's meeting) where
thelCity did not require any setbacks for the placement of the fill material and did
no~ require any setback for the retaining wall. In fact, the Wetzel's fill material
anq retaining wall abut the Arnold Property on the south side of the Arnold
Prd~erty. Numerous permits 1 including Permits 638 and 671, have been issued by
thej~ity for fences without any setback requirements because there are no setback
reqµirements in the SMC for fences. We would like to be given the opportunity to
proivide other examples where the City Issued permits for a particular piece of
proberty that allowed work on the adjacent City street as we are aware of several
but/ have not had time to research and copy because the City office has been
clo~ed and there was little prior notice for today's meeting.

I

(AR 42.) The City Council ignored that information. It did not put Building Permits 638,671 or

724 into {e record for this Court to review. There is no evidence to suggest that it offered
Petitioners! the opportunity to "provide other examples where the City Issued pennits for a
particular piece of property that allowed work on the adjacent City street." The City Council
was intent

bn avoiding all evidence that would further confirm that its denial and its excuses for

the denial were completely out of character for and entirely inconsistent with how building
permits hald. been and are reviewed and approved in the City of Stanley.

In sum, both the
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information in the record and the information glaringly absent from the record points out that the

Ci1y Co~cil' s denial of this building permit was arbitrary and capricious, a violation of equal
protecti1 and not based on substantial evidence.

SPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 12th day of JlUle, 2014.
GREENER BU.R.K.E SHOEMAKER 0BERRECl-lT P.A.

Fredric V. Shoemaker
Thomas J. Lloyd III
AdamP. Boyd
Attorneys for Petitioners
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I h~reby certify that on the 12th day of June, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of the
following ciocuments, under the method indicated below:

O

Paul J. Fittr

U.S. Mail
Facsimile

D
D Overnight Delivery

MOORE sr.kITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

[81 Hand Delivery

950 W. B.trlnock, Suite 520
Boise, ID /83702
Attorney jq r Defendant

O E-mail:

pjf@msbtlaw.com

Fredric V. Shoemaker
Thomas J. Lloyd
Adam P. Boyd
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Paul J. Fitzer, ISB # 5675
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 331-1800
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202
Email: pj1Wlmsbtlaw.com
Attorney for the City of Stanley

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER
TOM and REBECCA ARNOLD,
husband and wife,
Peti tio ners,
v.

CITY OF STANLEY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-14-00035
AFFIDAVIT OF CARI TASSANO

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Custer
)
CARI TASSANO, first duly sworn, states as follows:
Cari Tassano, being over the age of eighteen years and competent to make this
Affidavit, after first being duly sworn, and upon her own personal knowledge, states as follows:
1.

I am the City Clerk for the City of Stanley.
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2.

I have knowledge of matters contained herein and I make this Affidavit based on

my own personal knowledge.
3.

The transcript of that portion of the February 13, 2014 hearing audio that was

specifically requested pursuant to a public records request by Rebecca Arnold and later requested
for inclusion in the record on Petition for Judicial Review has been previously prepared and
submitted. (See records request letter from Rebecca Arnold dated March 12, 2014 attached
hereto as exhibit A.)
4.

That full recording is compiled into two parts on two audio CDs (See CD's of

audio attached hereto as Exhibits B and C).
5.

The minutes of the February 13, 2014 hearing reflect that the meeting began at

approximately 6:03 p.m. and concluded at approximately 7:42 p.m. This approximate time total
is 99:00 minutes. (See minutes attached hereto as Exhibit D).
6.

The minutes also reflect that a recess for executive session began at

approximately 6:45 p.m. and resumed upon conclusion of the executive session at approximately
7 :26 p.m. This time total is approximately 41 :00 minutes.
7.

When one subtracts the time period for the executive session not contained on the

audio from the length of the entire hearing as approximated in the minutes, the remaining portion
of the February 13, 2014 hearing is roughly 58:00 minutes.
8.

The first audio disc is 42:49 minutes long and the second is 14:00 minutes long,

for a total of 56:49 minutes. The second disc of the audio, which part was included in the
transcript, begins recording mid-sentence.
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• 10.

•

No further audio of the February 13, 2014 hearing exists.

Further I sayeth naught.

. l'

* **

This

iJJ.

day of July, 2014.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Subscribed and sworn to me this

5~/1 day of July, 2014.

~;0/<-t--~Stateofidaho
Resiqing a~.
Cou~ty,
Idfa/9
My Conumss1on Expues:
-"J. '1-1

A~a
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1,,vJ

day of July, 2014, I caused to be served a true
I hereby certify that on the
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF CARI TASSANO by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:

Thomas Lloyd
SHOEMAKER
GREENER BURKE
OBERRECHT, P.A.
950 W Bannock St, Ste 950
Boise, ID 83 702

_x_

~

Mailed
Facsimile
Hand-delivered
E-Mail: fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com
tlloyd@greenerlaw.com

_x_ Mailed

Hon. Judge Alan C. Stephens
District Court
210 Courthouse Way, Suite 120
Rigby, ID 83442

_x_

Hon. Judge Alan C. Stephens
C/0 Custer County District Court
PO Box 385
Challis, ID 83226

_x_
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Facsimile: (208) 745-6636
Hand-delivered
E-Mail: nanderson@co.jefferson.id.us
sficklin@co. jefferson.id. us
astephens@co. jefferson.id. us
Mailed
Facsimile
Hand-delivered
E-Mail: custercountycourt@gmail.com
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Thomas L. Arnold
Rebecca Arnold
3973 Erick LN, Boise, JD 83704

March 12, 2014

Via USP$ express mail
City of Stanley
P. 0. Box 53
Stanley, ID 83278

Re:

Request for Transcript of a Portion of February 13, 2014 meeting

Mayor and Council:

Please accept this letter as our request for a transcript of that portion of the February
13, 2014 Stanley city Council meeting pertaining to our building permit application (to which I
believe you assigned the number 831), which was on the agenda that evening. Please note
that we are requesting a transcript of only that portion of the meeting tape wherein our
building permit was discussed and/or a decision rendered.
Enclosed is a check in the amount of $100 as the estimated cost for such transcript.
We are prepared to pay the cost for the transcript of the portion of the meeting as required
under Stanley City Code
Thank you for your consideration and assistance. Prease contact Rebecca Arnold al
(208) 841-2530 if you have questions or comments or need additional information.
Sincerely,

~tfJ,9

µ~
Rebecca Arnold
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APPROVED

2-13-14 Minutes

City of Sta nfey
Regular Council Meetfng Minutes
February 13, 2014
IN ATTENDANCE FOR IHE CITY: Mayor Herb Mumford, Council President Steve
Botti, Councilmember Laurii Gadwa, Councilmember Lem Sentz, Councllmember
Melinda Hadzor, and City Clerk/Treasurer Doug Plass.
OTHER ATTENDEES;

Ellen Libertine

CALL TO QRDER: The meeting is called to Order by Mayor Mumford at 6:03 p.m.

AGENDA AMENDMENTS:

None offered.

MAYORAL COMMENTS:

ihe Mayor reports that the Mountain Village Resort wlll be donating $2500 to the
purse of the Stanley Sled Dog Rendezvous, an that we still need a number of
volunteers to have a successful event. He would like to remind the Dog Sled folks not
to bring dogs into hotel rooms without prior permission. The Mountain VIiiage wants
to continue to support the event, but needs the cooperation of the mushers. The
next meeting wlll be on February 2stt1 at 10 am in the Stanley City office.
The Mayor says that It ls good to be back In Stanley. He Is glad to see that the snow
Is accumulating.

~OUNCIL COMMENTS:
Council President Botti reports that the Cfty had written a letter to the Obama
administration regarding the proposed Boulder-White Clouds National Monument. We
have received a response from the Secretary of Agriculture dated February 4tli. He
reads the response and notes that It ls a very general response but can be taken as
.a sign of Intent to Involve the focal community In the process.

,CONSl:NT AGENDA: December 5th, 2013 Council Meeting Minutes, and Prepaid and
Unpafd BIiis for January/February. Council President Botti notes a typo on page l of
the minutes that the Clerk corrects. Council President Botti moves to approve the
Consent Agenda. Councirmember Sentz seconds. All approve. Motion passes.
INSTALLATION OF NEWLY

ELECTED OFFICIAJ.,S:

It Is noted that the Mayor was sworn ln the City Office In the presence of witnesses
since the last council meeting.
Councilmember Gadwa moves to retain Councl! President Botti as the City Council
President. Council member Sentz seconds. All approve. Motion passes.

PRESENTATIQNS/CITrieN PAB,TICIPATION:
Correspondence received from Rebecca Arnold and Nerissa Campbell are presented
to the Councll and lnduded with the minutes.
COUNCIL ACTION ITEM LIST:
No work has been done recently on the list.
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AGENCY RECORD - 21

70

ORIGINAL IN RED

2-13-14 Minutes

STREETS AND ROADS: The Mayor reports that JC Anderson has been responsible
with hls snowplowing duties, and has been very busy of late.

SHERIFF'S REPORT:
The Mayor reviews the Sheriff's report, noting that It has been relatively quiet In
Stanley.

COMMUNIIY BUILDING:
USFS - Matt Phllllps requests the use of the Community Room at no fee on February
27th for a community meeting on the Redflsh to Stanley Traff project. Council
President Botti moves to approve the fee waiver. Counc!lmember Hadzor seconds. All
approved. Motion passes.
Sawtooth Ski Club requests a fee waiver for the use of the Community Room on
March 1st for their annual banquet. CounclJmember Gadwa moves to approve the
request, but ask for a refundable cleaning deposit of $50. Council President Botti
seconds. All approved. Motion passes.

AD HOC COMMIUE§g
CEDA: Mayor Mumford reports that CEDA's strategic pfan has been completed, and
that the Challis Communfty Events Center has been getting a lot of use. He doesn't
have a full report at this time.

cemeterY.: No report.
Code Revigw:. No report.
Groomer: Mayor Mumford reports that all the snowmobile trail should be In good
shape at the moment
.S:i:Jwto_Q.tb._A..$soclatlon: No report.

Chamber of commerce: Ellen Libertine says that the Chamber has been getting
ready for the upcoming events scheduled for the next three weeks.
NEW/OLD BIJSINESS:
• Title 15 Revisions (Building Permits) - Council President Botti notes that
there have been six major changes to the draft since last fa!l 1 and all of them
have been done in response to comments received from the communlty. He
outlines the changes, going through the current draft. He thanks the
community for alJ of their Input, and notes that the most recent addition Is
the inclusion of a review process with language received from the City
Attorney. He would like to schedule another work session on the topic, and
then perhaps an additional public hearing ff necessary. The Council agrees to
a work session at 1: 00 pm on Monday, February 24th.
EXECUTIVE SESSION:

Council President Botti moves to enter executive session per IC 67-2345( l)f to
discuss pending legal matters. Council member Hadzor seconds. There Is a roll call
vote and all Council members approve. Motion passes at 6:45 pm.
Council President Botti moves to adjourn executive session. Councilmember Hadzor
seconds. All approved. Motion passes. Regular session reconvenes at 7 :26 p.m.
Page 2 of9
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BUJLPING PEBMUS:
Bulld!ng Permit #831 - Thomas and Rebecca Arnold, Excavation and FIii on Lot 5 of
the Mountain View Subdivision tabled at the January 15tJ• meeting. Mayor Mumford
states that at Issue Is the manipulation of property not owned by the appffcant. The
application seems to be to approve work already done in the city street. The Mayor
says that standards for construction exist fn the city code, and that the City would
not allow work to be done on its property that did not meet those standards.
Therefore, he maintains, what h 9s been done cannot be allowed to remain. The main
Issue Is that bullding permits are for work on one's own property. Councllmember
Gadwa moves to deny bulldlng permit #831. Councll President Botti seconds. All are
in favor. The permit Is denied.

CITY CLERK REPOB,T: (City Clerk/Treasurer Doug Plass)
Doug Plass is resigning as the City Clerk/Treasurer as of February 25th, but will be
available to consult with the new appointee during March If so desired.
The Stanley City office will be dosed on February 19th.20th, but will be open on
President's Day, February 17th.

OPTION TAX REPORT /TREASURY REPORT: (City Clerk/Treasurer Doug Plass)
The current financials a re presented to the Councll for their review. There are no
questions for the Clerk/Treasurer,

ADJOURNMENI!
Mayor Mumford adjourns the meeting at 7:42 pm.

/'_J. . . . .

ATTEST: -->c-?'-l_,.,_·
<J"-~---:--·
assano, City Clerk

Noted attacl1ments follow:

Pnge 3 of9
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Paul J. Fitzer, ISB # 5675
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-1800
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202
Email: pjf@msbtlaw.com
Attorneys for the City of Stanley

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER
TOM and REBECCA ARNOLD,
husband and wife,
Petitioners,

v.
CITY OF STANLEY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-14-00035

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Rebecca Arnold ("Arnold") asserts that she possesses a constitutional right to unilaterally
determine road access to her lot in an approved subdivision which includes placing great
amounts of fill into the city's right of way; access which is in contravention to her own approved
plat approval; in contravention to the Stanley Municipal Code. She further asserts that the City
possesses no authority to regulate access within the City.
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She contends that the City is

compulsorily required to issue her a building permit and in her prayer for relief, she demands this
Court to step in the shoes of a local zoning authority to issue her building permit.

II.

BACKGROUND
Arnold is the owner and developer of the Mountain View Subdivision which received
final plat approval on April 11, 2007. As unequivocally depicted on the approved plat for the
Mountain View Subdivision, Lot 5 was granted direct access from Highway 21 on its north-west
side via an access road depicted along the western edge of Lot 6. 1 This is further reiterated in
numerous prior building permit approvals (BP # 690, 690R-1 2, 744, etc.) wherein access and
utilities are clearly depicted, and approved again and again, along this western edge. 3 Arnold
herself stated in the following in Permit 690R-2:

1

AR. P. 65.
Permit 690 was approved, with conditions, at a public meeting of the City Council of the City of Stanley on
November 8, 2006. Permit 690 was renewed, thus becoming designated as 690R-l at a public meeting of the City
Council on November 14, 2007. Building permit 690R-2 was approved on or about May 11, 2010. Building
Permit 789 is essentially a reissuance of building permits 690 - 690-R2. Permit 789 was approved (and renewed as
789-R2 on May 14, 2013) which encompassed the work sought to be accomplished in 690R-2. Building Permit
789-R2 is valid through May 12, 2014. This application reiterates the already issued and still valid Building Permit
789.
3
In Petitioner's Supplement to Their Opening Brief, Arnold insinuates nefarious intent that the City failed to include
Building Permit 638, 671, or 724 in the agency record. Throughout her briefing, she alludes that information was
not in the agency record but that it should have; by way of example, the zoning map. Why would a zoning map be a
part of an agency record pertaining to a building permit? This is an agency record pertaining to a building permit.
First, by definition, the agency record includes only those items that are part of this application or were utilized in
rendering the decision. Second, ti she believed something relevant was omitted in the record, she had every right to
move this Court to augment the record as it is the "parties" that are responsible for designating the documents which
will comprise the clerk's record on appeal. I.R.C.P. 84(1); I.AR 28.
2

With that being said, Building Permits 638, 671, 724 are irrelevant. The purpose of Permit 638 and 671 was to build
a perimeter fence on Lot 4. Building Permit 724 was to replace and extend a retaining wall on 825 Critchfield
avenue. Arnold's reference to these permits as the City's manifesting an attempt at "avoiding all evidence ... " p. 3 is
nefarious.
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No structure; excavation, grading and fill material, construction of Mountain
View Subdivision Utilities (underground); silt fencing and/or retaining walls ... ;
construction of access roads; utilities, etc. to he installed per preliminary plat
approval for Mountain View Subdivision.
Emphasis added. Now, in building permit application #831, Arnold diverges from these prior
approvals by seeking to access the eastern edge of Lot 5 from the west end of Ace of Diamonds
street. This is not depicted on the approved Mountain View Plat.
More importantly, between the City's public street, Ace of Diamonds, and this eastern
edge of Lot 5, there is a disconcerting change in elevation (Steep downslope) implicating
considerable risks to the public health and safety not to mention access issues for emergency
personnel. The Stanley Municipal Code unequivocally requires that a "Perrnittee shall follow
good engineering practices relating to fill compaction for structural support and for preventing
collapse and/or erosion of fill not used for structural support." Id The application additionally
must include "[d]evelopment and construction drawings and technical support material . . . in
sufficient detail to allow a technical or engineering review to determine whether the proposed
development complies with all zoning requirements". SMC 15.04.020.
In contravention of SMC 15.04.020, Arnold submitted her application bereft of any
drawings, sketches or engineered plans that would allow the City to render a finding that the
proposed access, notably including considerable modification of the City's own right of way,
will be performed properly limiting erosion, preserving drainage, and ensuring the public health
and safety and/or liability to the City pertaining to its Right of Way. Rather, in support of her
application she merely states that Ace of Diamonds Street shall be "graveled" and that "gravel to
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be placed as needed to provide access to/from the property to/from Ace of Diamonds by all types
of vehicles". "Gravel"? Will this be road mix? If so, what grade of road mix? What of
compaction, slope stabilization, drainage (culverts), etc. to address erosion issues or any other
demonstration of "good engineering practices"?

Who has the duty to maintain these

improvements? The City could not responsibly render a finding that these considerable public
health and safety concerns have been addressed.
In response to these concerns and against the City's written demand to cease and desist,
Arnold built the access anyway stating in numerous emails/letters that she is not required to
follow her preliminary plat and has every right to build her road on the eastern edge of the lot
connecting to Ace of Diamonds street with the incidental right to place great quantities of fill
material on the City's right of way; that the City has no right to regulate her access to Ace of
Diamonds Street.
In short, the City does not have any way of knowing what she did out there, what
material she utilized, whether it can withstand vehicular traffic, Stanley's weather, or
accommodate Spring runoff, or any other of the myriad of reasons why the State, municipalities,
highway districts, and counties all have the power to regulate the construction of roads within
their jurisdiction.
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III.
ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review: Judicial Review is not available for the denial of a building
permit.

To obtain judicial review of a final local governmental action under LLUPA, there must
be a statute granting the right to judicial review. Arnold cites to two cases from 2008 wherein
the Idaho Supreme Court in dictum purportedly support her assertion that she has a right to
judicial review of a denial of a building permit. We disagree. However, in 2010, the statutes
were amended wherein the legislature limited the persons entitled to judicial review under
LLUPA. 4 As a matter of law a building permit is not "an application for a subdivision, variance,
special use permit [or] ... such other applications required or authorized pursuant to this

chapter." Idaho Code § 67-6521 (Emphasis added).

Put simply a building permit is not

authorized under LLUPA; See Idaho Code §§ 67-6501-6538. In LLUPA, judicial review is
provided for only a narrow class of building permits pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-6517 "for
development on any lands designated upon the future acquisitions map. " 5 Building Permit 831
does not pertain to lands on the future acquisitions map.

Therefore pursuant to the plain

statutory text, judicial review is not afforded to the denial of a building permit.
That a building permit is not subject to judicial review is hardly surprisingly.

An

application required or authorized under LLUPA requires a transcribable record (Idaho Code §
4

While there is no case regarding judicial review of a building permit, in prior dictum, there is support for the
conclusion that the prior pre-2010 Idaho Code § 67-6519(4) would likely provide jurisdiction to any applicant
"aggrieved by a decision", which could include a building permit. Regardless, this language no longer appears in
the statute.
5 Highlands Development Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 964-965, 188 P.3d 900, 906-907 (2008). 145 Idaho
at 964-65, 188 P.3d at 906-07 (Justice Jim Jones dissenting).
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67-6536) and findings of fact, conclusions of law (Idaho Code § 67-6535); both of which must
occur in a public meeting and authored / conducted by the governing body (City Councils or
Board of Commissioners). However, it is commonplace (in fact in almost every jurisdiction in
the State of Idaho) that the issuance or denial of a building permit occurs at the staff level by the
building inspector or planning and zoning administrator; none of which is subject to LLUPA's
requirements governing transcribable records nor require findings of fact, conclusions of law.
That the City did so in this instance merely reflects the City's anticipation of Arnold's litigious
nature. The City did not have to prepare written findings nor provide a transcribable record.
This Court is being asked to determine that the Legislature intended that every building
permit issued in this State can only be issued following a public hearing (hence a transcribable
record which can only occur in a public meeting) followed by written findings of fact,
conclusions of law. By way of example, while all would agree that a proposed subdivision of
500 lots would require a transcribable record and findings of fact as an application "required or
authorized under this Chapter", but does the issuance of each of these 500 building permits also
require 500 separate written findings and transcribable records? Is there a single jurisdiction in
Idaho that does this? If the legislature had intended such a requirement, the plain text of the
statutes would so indicate. In its absence, we must assume this was intentional. 6

6

Twin Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 115 Idaho 214, 218, 2545 P.3d 1210, 1214 (2011) "Courts must construe
statutes " under the assumption that the legislature knew of all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the
time the statute was passed." Id citing City ofSandpoint v. Sandpoint lndep. Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 150, 879
P.2d 1078, 1083 (1994).
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B.

Arnold's Equal Protection argument lacks a reasonable basis in fact or law.

Citing to various "class of one" cases, Arnold's equal protection argument is premised
entirely on her argument that the City treated her differently "than other similarly situated
property owners". Yet, she fails to allege any other property owners much less those that are
similarly situated. Rather, she compares herself to herself. Without citing to any authority, she
alleges "unequal treatment based solely on Petitioners' own prior dealings with the City of
Stanley".

Her argument in short is that she is intentionally being singled out and treated

differently than ... herself based upon factors that fail the rational basis test. In other portions of
her brief she asserts this same disparate treatment demonstrates the City is acting arbitrarily and
capriciously by enforcing ordinances that it previously failed to do so in prior dealings with her.
An equal protection claim cannot rest on disparate treatment than upon oneself. Rather,
Arnold's accusations appear appears not to be that of equal protection but that of estoppel:
because the City did not enforce certain ordinances in the past against her, the City is now
estopped from doing so. As a matter of law, the application of estoppel against a municipality in
the exercise of its police power is prohibited. 7 The mere fact that Arnold obtained preferential
treatment or conversely that the City neglected to properly enforce its ordinances in the past does
not legally preclude the City from forever after enforcing its ordinances. The same is true for the

7

Kleiber v. City ofIdaho Falls, 110 Idaho 501,503, 716 P.2d 1273, 1275 (1986).
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equal protection claim. Akin to prosecutorial discretion such a "selective enforcement" class of
one claim is without authority of law. 8
In order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory application of the laws
such that equal protection standards are violated, [a plaintiff] . . . must first
establish the existence of a "deliberate plan of discrimination based on some
unjustifiable classification such as race, sex, religion, etc. Selective enforcement
without more, does not comprise a constitutional violation under either the Idaho
or United States Constitutions. 9
This equal protection claim is legally without merit and any amorphous references to past
incidents are irrelevant. Most importantly, even if true, the City's treatment of Arnold fulfills a
rational basis test insofar as this building permit application clearly raises public safety concerns
given the severity of the slope of the proposed access, which will be more fully discussed irifra.

C.

Arnolds' claim that the City's denial of a building permit is arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion and unsupported by substantial evidence lacks any foundation in
law and fact.
1.

Public Health and Safety Consideration

Stanley Municipal Code (hereinafter "SMC") 15.04 governs the process for the issuance
of a building permit. SMC 15.04.010 provides that
No ... lot [shall] be excavated for ... roads ... nor shall fill be placed on any lot,
nor shall any lot be cleared, or fenced unless a building permit therefor has been
issued by the city council. ... Permittee shall follow good engineering practices
relating to fill compaction for structural support and for preventing collapse
and/or erosion of fill not used for structural support.

8

Akin to the argument that because the police officer let the prior person go without citing them for speeding, the
officer should (must) let the defendant go too. The fact of selective enforcement, without more, is not per se
arbitrary. Young Elec. Sign Co. v. State ex rel. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 809, 25 P.3d 117, 122 (2001).
9
Coeur D'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 845, 136 P.3d 310, 316 (2006)(intemal quotes and citations omitted)

-880

Emphasis added. SMC 15.04.020 additionally requires that
Applications ... shall be accompanied [with] ... a drawing showing the location
of the proposed project on the applicant's property and the location of the
property in the city, building plans and specifications, and proof of approval of
the proposed project by the appropriate fire department and the appropriate sewer
district or state health department. Applications which do not contain all of the
foregoing shall not be considered complete. Development and construction
drawings and technical support material shall be to scale or otherwise in sufficient
detail to allow a technical or engineering review to determine whether the
proposed development complies with all zoning requirements.
Emphasis added. Again, Arnold wishes to modify the City's right of way placing great amounts
of fill on a steep slope for an access to her commercial lot. What more is presented other than
"gravel"?
Arnold is seeking to build an access road to her commercial lot and notably alter the
City's right-of-way allowing the public to access her commercial lot down a steep slope. Since
Arnold is asking this Court to stand in the City's shoes to issue her a building permit, what
technical information has she provided that would lead a responsible decision maker to conduct
an engineering review such to render a finding that she has demonstrated "good engineering
practices" relating to fill compaction and for preventing collapse / erosion of the road thereby
protecting the public health and safety?
In her application she merely provided that Ace of Diamonds Street was to be "graveled"
and that "gravel to be placed as needed to provide access to/from the property to/from Ace of
Diamonds by all types of vehicles". This is wholly unacceptable as clearly reiterated in the
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deliberations of the Council 1°, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw 11 , and self-evident in the
pictures 12 and contour elevations of the slope 13 • Again, the major public safety concern is the
considerable difference in elevation between that portion of Lot 5 and Ace of Diamonds Road.
The slope is extreme. Yet, there is a complete absence of technical drawings pertaining to the
slope percentage, hillside stabilization, drainage, fill material and proposed compaction, retaining
walls (if applicable), setback of the fill from neighboring properties, access road setback from
top of fill slope, and other public works road standards that would enable a city council (and its
engineer) or this Court Gurisdiction?) to conduct an engineering review to determine whether the
proposed improvements comply with the Stanley Municipal Code, the Mountain View Plat, and
other public works requirements. 14
Relating to her amorphous class of one claim, Arnold articulates this as a "new and
expensive requirement" (even though the ordinances long predate her application). Without any
evidence whatsoever, she applauds the prior policy of the City: that the City's consistent and
reasonable approach in the past was to simply approve access roads with minimal information;
that the
City takes this approach because it always has the authority to then review the
access road as constructed and [only then] require any changes required by law in
order to ensure that the access road is safe for travel. 15

10

R/ 107

11

See R. 33, 37.
R. 51-55.
13 R. 50, 56.
14 See SMC 16.08.190, SMC 16.36.060, 17.40.32.D governing slope standards and building on a slope.
15 Petitioner's Opening Brief, p. 23.
12
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So a city is powerless to prevent an unsafe road from being installed without any supervision or
permission but only thereafter the City is empowered to swoop in and require it be rebuilt to be
safe? This argument defies logic and is devoid of factual evidence or legal authority.
The plain text of the Stanley Municipal Code clearly requires good engineering practices
to be demonstrated at the application stage (SMC 15.04.020 is entitled "Application") before the
landscape is permanently altered ("[n]o ... fill shall be place ... unless a building permit ... has
been issued" SMC 15.04.010). Incorporating the City's prior arguments pertaining to selective
enforcement and prosecutorial discretion, to the extent that Arnold alleges that she was allowed
to do things in the past without interference, even if true this was in contravention of the law. It
does not establish a new policy in contravention of the plain text of its ordinances. A City does
not act arbitrarily by enforcing its preexisting law.
Arnold next argues that the City's various citations to SMC subdivision ordinance
requirements do not apply to building permits.
There is no evidence in the record to support the City Council's claim that these
provisions have ever applied to prohibit approval of a building permit for an
access road for an existing subdivision. 16
What argument could there possibly be that the subdivision ordinances do not apply to a
proposed access to a lot in an approved subdivision? Pursuant to SMC 16.16.030 "required
contents" and Idaho Code § 50-1304(2) "Essentials of Plats", a plat is required to depict all

16

Id at 23-24.
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streets including adjoining streets or roadways. 17 Adding another access to a subdivision means
the approved and recorded plat no longer depicts all streets thus necessitating an amendment.
Further, this new street also includes considerable modification of the City's right of way.
Pursuant to SMC 16.24.020, all streets within a proposed subdivision "shall be dedicated to the
public ... ; in general all other streets shall also be dedicated to public use." Pursuant to Idaho
Code § 50-1313 no street shall be deemed a street unless and until the City has accepted and
confirmed by the City Council.

If the City acts unreasonably and arbitrarily by requiring

technical drawings to conduct its own engineering review to demonstrate that "good engineering
practices" have been employed, once this "gravel" is applied in the City's right of way, who is
liable if the work is substandard and an injury occurs?

Who has the duty to maintain this

potentially substandard "improvement" to the City's right of way? The City is not compulsorily
required to accept these modifications nor grant access whatsoever.
Does the City not have the power to simply not accept this proposal and deny access to
its public road?

As a matter of law, the power to "regulate" streets is conferred on the

municipality and the City has every right to regulate work performed on its own right-of-way. 18
"In Idaho the streets from side to side and end to end belong to the public and are held by the

17 See also Idaho Code§ 50-1309 (Certification by land owners) and 1313 (Dedication of streets must be accepted
by the City)
18 McQuillen, §30.40; See also Idaho Code § 50-1313 "Dedication must be accepted", which provides that "[n)o
street . . . shall be . . . unless the dedication shall be accepted and confirmed by the city council or by the
commissioners of the highway district."
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municipality in trust for the use of the public." 19 "A city has exclusive control by virtue of its
police power over its streets, highways and sidewalks within the municipal boundaries. 20
As a matter of public health and safety, the City denied the building permit due to the
absence of any technical information that would allow the City to render a finding that the
applicant utilized good engineering practices.

While Arnold believes that it is sufficient to

merely state that "gravel" will be used, the City acting within its police powers finds this
unacceptable. Due to the severity of the slope, the City in its police power has every right to
regulate the construction of roads within its jurisdiction especially as it applies to the
modification of its own right-of-way.

Arnold's equal protection claims and arbitrary

capriciousness claims are without merit.

2.

The City Cannot be compelled to issue a second access to a lot; inconsistency
with the Mountain View Subdivision Plat

Arnold asserts that because Lot 5 abuts Ace of Diamonds road, this "would indicate that
Lot 5 would also have access to Ace of Diamond Street"21 and thus the City is compelled to issue
Arnold a building permit to access Ace of Diamonds. Arnold asserts that the City acts arbitrarily
and capriciously in denying the permit on the basis that Lot 5 already has access to a public road
pursuant to its approved preliminary and final plat approval.

19

Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 49, 44 P.3d I 100, 1104 (2002); Kleiber v. City of Idaho Falls, I IO
Idaho 501, 503, 716 P.2d 1273, 1275 (1986) citing Keyser v. City ofBoise, 30 Idaho 440, 165 P. 1121 (1917).
20 Id; See also Tyrolean Associates v. City of Ketchum, 100 Idaho 703, 604 P.2d 717 (1979); City of Nampa v.
Swayne, 97 Idaho 530, 547 P.2d 1135 (1976); Yellow Cab Taxi Service v. City of Twin Falls, 68 Idaho 145, 190 P.2d
681 (1948).
21
Petitioner's Opening Brief, p. 19.
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As a matter of law, there is no implied easement by way of necessity for an owner
abutting a public street to access said street where a lot is not landlocked and where an existing
road already provides ready access to the subject property. 22 A municipality clearly has the
jurisdiction and power to control whether an encroachment is permissible. A lot owner cannot
simply connect to the city street, road, or highway as a matter of right. "Clearly, the rights of an
owner of property abutting the street or public way are subject to the power of the ...
municipality to control and regulate the streets."23
The approved final plat of the Mountain View Subdivision clearly depicts that Lot 5 was
granted direct access from Highway 21 on its north-west side via an access road depicted along
the western edge of Lot 6. 24 In prior building permit approvals, Arnold clearly stated (in Permit
690R-2:
No structure; excavation, grading and fill material, construction of Mountain
View Subdivision Utilities (underground); silt fencing and/or retaining walls ... ;
construction of access roads; utilities, etc. to be installed per preliminary plat
approval for Mountain View Subdivision.
The approved Mountain View Subdivision Plat and prior approved building permits do not
"indicate" that an access road on the eastern edge of Lot 5 will connect to Ace of Diamonds
street along a steep ravine.
Arnold's argument misstates this legal issue spending a great amount of time arguing that
an amendment of the plat is not required; that there is no legal authority whatsoever that would

22

Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 45-46, 205 P.3d 1175, 1181-82 (2009)( Akers II)).
McQuillen, §30.63;
24
AR. P. 65.
23
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require an amendment to a plat. While we disagree as will be discussed infra it is also irrelevant;
a red herring, and not the legal issue.
The legal significance of an approved access pursuant to the Mountain View Subdivision
is not that Arnold is legally precluded from have two accesses or that or she is legally precluded
from adding a second access in contravention of an approved preliminary plat absent a plat
amendment (although that is true).

Rather the legal significance of the Mountain View

Subdivision plat is that Arnold is not entitled to second access as a matter of right; i.e. an implied
easement by necessity in favor of an abutting owner's right to access an adjacent right of way.
In short, Arnold is not land-locked nor has she in any way asserted that her approved access
pursuant to her preliminary plat is unworkable.

Thus, Arnold incorrectly believes a city is

compelled to grant a secondary access to a lot by virtue that the lot is adjacent to a city street.
Not surprisingly, Arnold fails to cite to a single case in support of such an argument.

3.

Amendment to the Plat or Building Permit?

Arnold's entire argument regarding whether a building permit is the proper medium in
which to approve an access road is irrelevant for purposes of judicial review. As stated, the real
issue is whether the city can be compelled to grant a secondary access where a lot already has
access pursuant to its approved preliminary and final plat process. However, because Arnold
devotes so much argument to the issue, as a matter of academic exercise, the City contends that
an amendment to the plat is the required medium.
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Lot 5 is but one lot in the approved Mountain View Subdivision. If another road access
is to be added within an approved subdivision, does this necessitate an amended plat? Arguably,
adding an additional access to a subdivision may increase traffic volume, noise, and may
otherwise impact the neighbors and other residents in the subdivision.

Any change to a

subdivision that is "material" necessitates an amendment to the plat. Pursuant to SMC 16.16.030
"required contents" and Idaho Code § 50-1304(2) "Essentials of Plats", a plat is required to
depict all streets including adjoining streets or roadways. 25 Arnold wishes to add another access
to the subdivision from a city street. This necessitates an amendment to the plat.
Further, a mere building permit does not require a public hearing whereas a plat
amendment allows the neighbors and other lot owners within the subdivision to testify as to
whether adding another access into the subdivision will materially impact them. At present, Ace
of Diamonds is a dead-end street. If Arnold is permitted to add an eastern access into her
commercial lot from this dead-end down a steep slope and if she chooses to continue to utilize
her west connection to Highway 21, this may alter the nature of Ace of Diamonds Street for
vehicular traffic, pedestrian safety, snow removal, drainage etc. At the very least a process must
allow for the citizenry to address this issue; i.e. plat amendment. Again, this is not germane to
the judicial review of the denial of a building permit, but does illustrate some of the City's
concerns.

25

See also Idaho Code§ 50-1309 (Certification by land owners) and 1313 (Dedication of streets must be accepted
by the City)
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D.

Transcribable Record: Arnold has failed to demonstrate the requisite prejudice by
virtue of a purported lack of a transcribable record.

Arnold cites to various case law citing the maxim that the complete "absence of a
transcribable record" may result in a violation of a party's right to procedural due process."26
Thus, in Gay v. County Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 629, 651 P.2d 560, 563
(Ct.App.1982) and Cooper v. Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 411, 614 P.2d 947, 951 (1980) no
transcribable record whatsoever was kept and the Court reversed the decision of the local
governmental authority. The complete absence of a record however is to be distinguished from
where a record was kept but was "replete with inaudible omissions"; a distinction in which no
court has yet to reverse. Thus, in Rural Kootenai Organization, Inc. v. Kootenai County, 133
Idaho 833, 843-844, 993 P.2d 596, 606-607 (1999), the Court determined that the transcripts
albeit replete with inaudible omissions, was nonetheless adequate for the court to ascertain the
basis of the board's decision. 27 The Court further explained its reasoning:
One who did not participate in the proceedings, who picks up any of the
transcripts noted by the Court hereinabove as having a particularly large number
of deletions, would be hard pressed to make any sense of the printed matter.
However, by virtue of a careful sequential reading of all the transcripts, from page
one of the first proceeding, together with a meticulous review of the minutes of all
proceedings, it becomes clear to the reader that in most instances the deletions
were very brief and can be "decoded" either by context, reference to the minutes,
reference to written statements of persons speaking, or reference to other
documents in the agency record. In many instances the omissions were not of
critical information. Review is made difficult, of course, and, at times, very
frustrating....
In any event, the Court was able to determine the basis upon
which the Commission made its recommendation and the Board made its decision
from the entire transcript and record, and [RKO's] claim here is not sustainable.
26 Chambers v. Kootenai County Ed. of Comm 'rs, 125 Idaho 115, 118, 867 P.2d 989, 992 (1994) (citing Cooper v.
Board a/County Comm 'rs ofAda County, 101 Idaho 407,411,614 P.2d 947, 951 (1980)) Emphasis Added.
21 Id.
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RKO seeks a strict application of the "verbatim" requirement under I.C. § 676536, maintaining that the transcripts should reflect the content of the agency
proceedings word-for-word. However, the somewhat informal, quasi-judicial
nature of these proceedings makes satisfaction of such a requirement difficult.
All four public hearings held in this case were tape recorded and the documents
presented at the hearings as exhibits were preserved in the record. The transcripts,
and the record as a whole, adequately reflect that the parties were given notice of
the proceedings and that they were given ample opportunity to present or rebut
evidence. 28
Similarly, a transcribable record is part of this record; specifically as requested by Arnold
and received by Arnold prior thereto in a public records request. 29

Because the Mayor's

comments begin mid-sentence, Arnold insinuates she has been deprived of procedural due
process and that she is simply in the dark as to the City's rationale or that this Court is incapable
of discerning the basis of the City Council's denial of the building permit application. This
strains credibility and Arnold can make no claim that she is denied due process.
First, for illustrative purposes only and as an officer of the court, the City notes that the
inaudible portion of the disc amounts to 1 minute, 11 seconds out of the 56 minute meeting. 30

28

Id See also Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 176 P.3d 126 (2007)(where the
plaintiff alleged her due process right to an accurate record (i.e. the transcribable record) was violated because the
county mislabeled exhibits. The Court citing to Rural Kootenai held reiterated that

a strict application of the "verbatim" requirement under LLUPA, meaning the transcripts should
reflect the content of the agency proceedings word-for-word, would be difficult given the quasijudicial nature of the proceedings." Since the transcripts and record as a whole adequately
reflected that the parties were given notice of the proceedings and were given ample opportunity
to present evidence, the transcripts were adequate for judicial review. The same results here.
Neighbors, 145 at 129-130, 176 P.3d at 134-135.
29

The transcript of that portion of the February 13, 2014 audio disc was specifically requested pursuant to a public
records request by Arnold and later requested for inclusion in the record for this Petition for Judicial Review.
30 The comprehensive meeting minutes of the February 13, 2014 hearing reflect that the meeting began at
approximately 6:03 p.m. and concluded at approximately 7:42 p.m. This approximate time total is 99:00 minutes.
(See minutes attached hereto as Exhibit D). The minutes also reflect that a recess for executive session began at
approximately 6:45 p.m. and resumed upon conclusion of the executive session at approximately 7:26 p.m. This
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Second, it is undisputed that Arnold exercised every opportunity to present and rebut evidence
and has done so. Moreover, this difference of opinion over Arnold's purported right to put an
access wherever she wishes and the City's adamant position that she must seek approval and
provide for slope stabilization etc. prior thereto extends far beyond this building permit review
with years' worth of correspondence, police reports, angry verbal assaults, etc. For Arnold to
assert that she has no idea of the City's rationale is paramount to perjury.

Lastly, the transcript,

meeting minutes, and findings ably demonstrate to this Court the City's rationale in denying the
permit.
Arnold assumes Idaho Code § 67-6536 requires a word-for-word standard; that she is
"entitled to know all of what was discussed"; that the "lost portion of the meeting could contain
valuable evidence".

However, this is not the standard.

The local governmental agency's

decision can only be reversed if the complainant carries its burden to demonstrate that it suffered
prejudice to a substantial right by virtue of that procedural error. 31 Given Arnold's considerable
written testimony, she has failed to demonstrate how she has been deprived of procedural due
process by virtue of the inaudible one minute of the audio disc. 32 See Neighbors, 145 at 130
wherein some of the exhibits were mislabeled. Neighbors asserts violated his due process right

time total is approximately 41 :00 minutes. When one subtracts the time period for the executive session not
contained on the audio from the length of the entire hearing as approximated in the minutes, the remaining portion
of the February 13, 2014 hearing is roughly 58:00 minutes. The first audio disc is 42:49 minutes long and the
second is 14:00 minutes long, for a total of 56:49 minutes. The second disc of the audio, which part was included in
the transcript, begins recording mid-sentence.
31 Gay v. Bonneville County,
(no record at all)
32
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to an accurate record. The reiterated its rational in Rural Kootenai where the audio was replete
with omissions:
Neighbors received an adequate opportunity to present evidence and [the record]
demonstrates the basis upon which the ... Board made its decision .... Neighbors
has not demonstrated how it has been harmed as a result of the manner in which
the exhibits were labeled.
Although academic since a transcribable record was maintained the City again raises the
jurisdictional issue. A transcribable record is not required for the issuance or denial of a building
permit pursuant to the plain text of the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA"), The plain text
ofldaho Code §67-6536 provides:
In every case in this chapter where an appeal is provided for, a transcribable
verbatim record of the proceeding shall be made .... The proceeding envisioned by
this statute for which a transcribable verbatim record must be maintained shall
include all public hearings at which testimony or evidence is received or at which
an applicant or affected person addresses the commission or governing board
regarding a pending application or during which the commission or governing
board deliberates toward a decision after compilation of the record.

No section in Title 67, Chapter 65 provides for an appeal of a denial of a building permit as a
building permit application is not authorized in LLUPA other than for a narrow class of building
permits "for development on any lands designated upon the future acquisitions map."33 Thus, a
transcribable record is not required.

33

Highlands Development Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 964-965, 188 P.3d 900, 906-907 (2008). , 145
Idaho at 964-65, 188 P.3d at 906-07 (Justice Jim Jones dissenting).
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E.

Arnold has failed to demonstrate that the City prejudiced her substantial rights.
Pursuant to her approved Mountain View Subdivision plat Arnold already has access to

Lot 5 via a direct connection to Highway 21. Although she clearly would like two accesses; the
second being from Ace of Diamonds Street, how is she harmed by not being granted two
accesses to her property? Her claim of right is illusory and her purported injury is self-induced.
The party contesting a city council's decision must demonstrate that two requirements are
met before the decision will be overturned. 34 First, it must demonstrate that the board erred in a
manner specified in Idaho Code section 67-5279(3). Second, it must show that the board's
action prejudiced its substantial rights. 35 Absent either of these two conditions, the district court
must affirm the board's action36 • "There is a strong presumption that the actions of the [local
governmental entity], where it has interpreted and applied its own ... ordinances, are valid." 37
As stated herein, the approved plat for the Mountain View Subdivision granted Lot 5
direct access from Highway 21 on its north-west side via an access road depicted along the
western edge of Lot 6. 38 Arnold provided no evidence how this access; i.e. complying with her
own plat constituted a hardship or is otherwise unworkable nor has she sought to amend her plat.
Now, Arnold's application seeks a secondary access from Ace of Diamonds Street, which is not
depicted on the approved Mountain View Plat and more importantly her application is bereft of
any technical information that would appease concerns over the steepness of the slope and the

34

Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork, 145 Idaho at 126, 176 P.3d at 131.
I.C. § 67-5279(4); Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork, 145 Idaho at 126, 176 P.3d at 131.
36 Taylor, 147 Idaho at 431, 210 P.3d at 539.
37
Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003)
38
AR. P. 65.
35
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materials utilized (on the city's right of way) to ensure the protection of the public health and
safety. Her building permit application was denied and she is in the same position as she was
upon the approval of her subdivision. She still has an approved access to her lot.
Incredulously, her articulated injury / prejudice is attributable to "wasting their prior
effort and expense in the partial but unfinished construction of the access road between Lot 5 and
Ace of Diamond Street". In other words, she started construction illegally without a building
permit after having been told on numerous occasions in writing that she could not do so; all of
which she ignored. Arnold's "injury" is of her own making and arrogance.

F.

Respondents should be awarded their reasonable attorney fees and costs

Arnold has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law pursuant to Idaho Code § 12117, 12-120, 12-121, Idaho App. R. 11.2 and/or Idaho R. Civ. P. 11 and any other applicable
provision of law or rule. In fact, this Court is hard-pressed to find a single alleged fact or legal
argument that makes any sense at all. An equal protection claim cannot be based upon disparate
treatment from that of oneself. The fact that she was able to violate the law in the past without
consequence does not estop a city from enforcing its ordinances thereafter. Arnold has not been
deprived due process by the absence of one minute of audio. Arnold has copies of all of the
audio recordings, months of correspondence/emails between the parties on this access issue,
detailed findings, minutes, police reports pertaining to this access.
Arnold cannot compulsorily require the city to issue a building permit to construct a road
access by virtue of her abutment to a city street where she clearly has access to her lot already.
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She has not amended her plat nor indicated that her approved access is unsatisfactory and
therefore there is no compulsorily easement by necessity. The City does not act arbitrarily by
enforcing an ordinance that requires an applicant to demonstrate good engineering practices and
produce enough information to allow the decision maker to responsibly render a finding that the
materials utilized will be installed (on the City's right of way) in a professional manner
especially in light of the safety issues attributable to the steepness of the slope. "Gravel" does
not satisfy this requirement. Lastly, merely because Arnold illegally installed her access without
a building permit with full knowledge of the City's expressed admonitions, this does not
constitute an injury or prejudice recognized under Idaho law.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The City requests that this Court dismiss this matter with prejudice and award the City its
reasonable costs and attorney fees and costs incurred in this matter pursuant to Idaho Code 12117, 12-120, 12-121, Idaho App. R. 11.2 and/or Idaho R. Civ. P. 11 and any other applicable
provision of law or rule.

***
July 24, 2014
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Petitioners Tom and Rebecca Arnold (the "Arnolds"), by and through their attorneys of
record, Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A, file this reply brief to the responsive brief of
the Respondent, City of Stanley ("City").
I. INTRODUCTION
As is obvious from the responding brief, certain of the City's elected officials are not
personally fond of the Arnolds, referring to them as arrogant and nefarious, and accusing them of
perjury. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 2, 19, & 22.) The City has been involved in significant litigation
with the Arnolds and is blinded by its disdain for them. (AR 71-75.) The Arnolds sought to
pursue the most basic improvement of their property: adding gravel fill to create an access
driveway that connects their private property (Lot 5) to an abutting public street (Ace of
Diamonds). The Arnolds submitted all of the correct paperwork that the City's building permit
ordinance requires and that its single-page application allows for, paperwork that was
substantially the same as that submitted on several prior occasions for building permits that were
approved without contest.

Notwithstanding those very undeniable facts, the City is now

wrongfully depriving the Arnolds of a standard, run of the mill building permit.
As discussed below, this Court clearly has jurisdiction to review this denial, may properly
instruct the City that it is bound by the limited requirements found in its own ordinances, and may
prevent the City from abusing its power by way of the arbitrary and capricious actions it has taken
against the Arnolds. The City's building permit ordinance and application both state, relatively
simplistically, what limited information is required to be provided, and the Arnolds provided that
information. The City cannot deny that building permit and then manufacture bogus reasons to
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justify that denial. It cannot arbitrarily demand more information when its own ordinances do
not require more and thereby deny the Arnolds of their due process rights. The City's arguments
are nothing more than a cover for its real motives, and it cannot mask the fact that the its denial
was arbitrary and capricious and must therefore be reversed.
II. REBUTTAL ARGUMENTS
A.

This Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the City's Denial of a Building Permit.

The City argues that its actions are insulated from judicial review. Boiled down to its
essence, the City is brazenly arguing that it can arbitrarily and capriciously deny a building permit
and there is nothing that an affected party can do to challenge the fiat of that decision. The City
would like to have that unchecked power so that it can punish the Arnolds, or any other property
owners that the governing individuals personally dislike, by preventing them from making the
most basic of improvements on their private property. Thankfully, that approach to autocratic
government is not consistent with Idaho statute and case law, and it is explicitly contradicted by
the City's own ordinances.
In arguing against this Court's power of judicial review, the City failed to mention that
its own building permit ordinances acknowledge that there is judicial review of decisions
regarding building permits. This ordinance was cited in Petitioners' Opening Brief and ignored
in the Respondent's Brief:
An applicant denied a permit or aggrieved by a decision of the city council
may seek judicial review under the procedures provided by Idaho Code and
any amendments thereto.
SMC § 15.04.050 (entitled Building Permits, Review) (emphasis added). Despite focusing a
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substantial portion of its argument on SMC § 15.04.010 and .020, the City conveniently acts
oblivious to this reference to this availability of judicial review just three subsections further.
Thus, even within its own Code, the City acknowledges the necessity and propriety of judicial
review when a building permit is denied. Yet, due to the exigencies of this case, it now files a
brief arguing that there is no such judicial review, wholly ignoring its own governing laws.
This position is untenable.
In arguing in contravention of its own ordinance, the City attempts to simultaneously
and nonsensically argue that Idaho law has never permitted judicial review of building permits

1

and that the 2010 amendments to LLUPA removed judicial review for building permits. Prior
to 2010, building permit denials unquestionably had judicial review. See Giltner Dairy, LLC v.

Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 632-33, 181 P.3d 1238, 1240-41 (2008) (listing building
permits as type of permit falling within judicial review); see also Highlands Development Corp.

v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 961, 188 P.3d 900, 903 (2008). In fact, judicial review (or its
equivalent, like a writ of mandamus) of a building permit denial appears to be a uniform

1

The Respondent's Brief contradicts itself. In its brief, the City challenges the assertion that building
permits had judicial review until at least 2010: "Arnold cites to two cases from 2008 wherein the Idaho
Supreme Court in dictum purportedly support her position that she has a right to judicial review of a
denial of a building permit. We disagree." (Respondent's Brief, p.5). However, in a footnote, the City
then appears to concede the issue: "there is support for the conclusion that the prior pre-2010 Idaho
Code§ 67-6519(4) would likely provide jurisdiction to any application 'aggrieved by a decision', which
could include a building permit." (Id, p.5 n.4). There actually should be no dispute based on the two
cited Idaho cases above that are directly on point. In fact, the City's counsel has a presentation
accessible via the internet discussing the status of Idaho law prior to 2010 and discussing how judicial
review was first available for "quasi-judicial" actions, including building permits, and then for all five
types
of permits,
again
including
building
permits. See
http://idahoapa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/09/Judical-review-in-21 st-century.pdf. Judicial review has always been available
in Idaho under the LL UPA for denial of a building permit.
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principle across all or almost all jurisdictions. See, e.g., 9A Eugene McQuillin, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 26.221, at 247 (3rd ed. 2007). The City fails to cite even one case from any
jurisdiction to support its brazen contention that its actions are insulated from the system of
checks and balances that is the foundation of American government.
The 2010 LLUPA amendments can not be interpreted to change this uniform state of the
law. The amended statute has language that was purposefully broad to continue to include
building permits: "The approval, denial or failure to act upon an application for a subdivision,
variance, special use permit and such other similar applications required or authorized pursuant
to this chapter." LC. § 67-6521(1)(a)(i). Building permit applications are often integral to
subdivision or zoning applications, such that denial of a building permit would often effectively
and practically prohibit a planned subdivision development.

Allowing an appeal of the

subdivision application denial but not of the building permit denial, which then effectively acts
as a denial of the subdivision application, would be inconsistent. The City gives no explanation
for why a building permit is not a "similar application" to a variance or special use permit.
The City is also incorrect in claiming the 2010 amendments were intended to "limit" the
persons entitled to judicial review under LLUPA. (Respondent Brief, p. 5.)

The 2010

amendments were actually intended to broaden the scope of judicial review and clarify that all
"applications for zoning changes, subdivisions, variances, special use permits and such other
similar applications required or authorized pursuant to [LLUPA]" would be eligible for judicial
review--not simply those "permits" that had been previously specifically identified as such by
LLUPA. LC. § 67-6519(1).)
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There is no case law or statutory history presented by the City to suggest that the 2010
amendments eliminated the judicial review for denied building permits, which has existed for
many years under LLUPA. In fact, the City passed ordinance SMC § 15.04.050 in 2011, after
the amendments to LLUPA. Thus, after the 2010 amendments to LLUPA, the City passed an
ordinance clearly acknowledging that judicial review is and should be available for a denial of a
building permit, which conduct is contradictory to its present argument that neither LLUPA nor
any other rule of law permits judicial review.

Moreover, again in April, 2014 Gust three

months before it filed its brief in this matter, claiming that there is no judicial review for the
denial of a building permit), the City passed Ordinance 192, which was a comprehensive
overhaul of Title 15 of the Stanley Municipal Code, relating to building permits. Most notably,
while those amendments created a much more in depth review process at the administrative
level, they did not change the fact that the Code explicitly provides for judicial review. See
SMC § 15.04.040(C) (April, 2014). The City is being disingenuous in now trying to argue
against its own ordinance.
The City also raises fictitious arguments about the practical implications of allowing
judicial review, arguing that the "Court is being asked to determine the Legislature intended
that every building permit issued in this State can only be issued following a public hearing."
(Respondent Brief, p. 6.) The City's argument is empty hyperbole, and is not supported by the
plain language of Idaho Code§ 67-6521(b). By that statutory language, a public hearing would
not be required in order to initially evaluate and make a decision on every permit, as the City
claims. Rather, a hearing would only be required if one was requested by the affected party
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upon an initial adverse decision. This is basic due process; this is the law. Clearly, most
building permits are resolved without a hearing because it is only where the approval of a
building permit is in dispute that the right of a public hearing and transcribable record becomes
relevant.

Such is the case here.

Had the permit been approved, then no public hearing,

transcribable record, or written findings would have become necessary. Similarly, if the denial
of the Arnolds' building permit occurred without a hearing, it would only be upon the Arnolds'
petition that a public hearing would be required. 2 Respondent is misleading the Court in
making these claims about judicial review. (Id.)
For all of these many reasons, this Court has jurisdiction to review the City's denial of
this building permit. The City's own ordinances admit that judicial review is available and for
good reason. Otherwise, the City can deny the Arnolds' building permit, potentially resulting
in a significant financial impact on the Arnolds and their property, and the Arnolds would be
left with no recourse. Put another way, without judicial review, the governing members of the
Stanley City Counsel would have the unbridled power to exact their personal revenge on the
Arnolds, and the Arnolds would have no legal remedy. This is not the law.

2

The City is also incorrect in arguing that a public hearing was not required and was only granted out of
the City's benevolence and because of anticipated litigation. Idaho statute provides a right for public
hearing for denial of a building permit. See I.C. § 67-6521(b) ("Any affected person may at any time
prior to final action on an application required or authorized under this chapter, if no hearing has been
held on the application, petition the commission or governing board in writing to hold a hearing
pursuant to section 67-6512, Idaho Code; ... ").
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B.

The Arnolds Complied With the City's Building Permit Ordinance and the City's
Denial Was Arbitrary and Capricious, Lacking any Legitimate Reason to Deny This
Building Permit.

The Arnolds are seeking this judicial review because they are otherwise powerless
before the City's animosity and disdain. 3 The Arnolds followed the City's procedures to obtain
a building permit for a simple project; they followed the same procedures they had followed on
several, similar, simple projects. The City, however, denied the building permit, manufacturing
new conditions that had never before been required, that were outside the scope of their
building permit application, and that were not required by the City's ordinances. This denial,
based on these invented requirements, was arbitrary and capricious and must be overturned.
Any denial of a building permit that is "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion"
must be overturned.

See I.C. § 67-5279(3) (agency decision affirmed unless "findings,

inferences, conclusions or decisions are: . . . (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion."). "A city's actions are considered arbitrary and capricious if made without a rational
basis, or in disregard of the facts and circumstances, or without adequate determining
principles. . . . A city's actions are considered an abuse of discretion when the actions are
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." Lane Ranch Partnership v. City o/Sun Valley, 145 Idaho

3

The City repeatedly, falsely claims that the Arnolds believe their planned improvement to the access
driveway is not subject to City scrutiny. The Arnolds have never asserted that the City lacks the
authority to require a building permit application and scrutinize applications against established building
requirements. However, the Arnolds have challenged this denial because the City has not scrutinized
the application against established building requirements but is instead creating new, uncodified
building requirements purely as an excuse to post hoc justify denying this building permit. In sum, the
Arnolds cannot be held to standards that do not exist in the Stanley Municipal Code, but that is exactly
what the City is doing.
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87, 91, 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007); see also, Rehmann v. City of Des Moines, 204 N.W. 267,
269-70 (Iowa 1925) ("The authority, delegated to municipalities to impose building restrictions
and regulations, does not carry with it the authority to arbitrarily prevent the owner from
improving his property. Independent of the power to regulate and enact restrictions, the owner
of the property has the absolute right to improve it and use it in any lawful way or for any
lawful purpose.").

Here, the City has acted without adequate determining principles and

without a rational basis.

1.

The Building Permit Application Procedure, as Misconstrued and Modified by the
City, is too Vague to Support This Denial.
As a starting point, even the arguments set forth in the Respondent's Brief reveal that

the City's building permit ordinances are arbitrary because they lack adequate "determining
principles." The arguments in the Respondent's Brief reveal that the City is attempting to
rationalize the denial based on a new and greatly expanded interpretation of the requirements of
its building permit ordinance. These new and expanded requirements (some nine different
"requirements" are listed on page 10 of the Respondent's Brief) have clarified that the City's
building permit ordinance is at best vague, seemingly allowing the City to act on its own whims
without regard to any existing governing law.
Courts have regularly reversed the denial of a building permit where the denial is based
on a vague ordinance that contains insufficient "determining principles." See, e.g., City of

Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770-72 (1988) ("We hold those portions of
the Lakewood ordinance giving the mayor unfettered discretion to deny a [newsrack] permit
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application and unbounded authority to condition the permit on any additional terms he deems
'necessary and reasonable,' to be unconstitutional."); Chandler v. Town of Pittsfield, 496 A.2d
1058, 1061-63 (Me. 1985) ("The present ordinance could easily become such an instrument of
discrimination by a majority of the councilmen giving what each might think 'due
consideration' to traffic problems and thereafter denying a permit in one instance while
granting a permit in a less meritorious case, though acting conscientiously in both. This would
be possible because no uniform rules or regulations are defined to remove the sphere of action
from

the

influences

of

whim

or

caprice.");

Application

of

Ellis,

178 S.E.2d 77, 80-81 (N.C. 1970); Appeal of Clements, 207 N.E.2d 573, 580-81 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1965); Drexel v. City ofMiami Beach, 64 So.2d 317, 319-20 (Fla. 1953) ("We think a city
council may not deprive a person of his property by declining a permit to erect upon it a certain
type of garage where the only restriction on the use of the police power is that it shall not be
exercised before 'due consideration' is given by someone, presumably the councilmen, to the
effect of the building upon traffic. Both the quoted words, as well as their synonyms, could be
construed to allow all manner of latitude in the grant of a permit in one case and the denial of a
permit in a similar one, and would give every opportunity for the exercise of the power with
partiality. Such laxness and inexactness in a delegation of the power is not sanctioned by the
courts.").
The City's building permit ordinance sets forth a very straightforward set of
requirements for the Application process. It states:
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Applications for building permits shall be submitted in the form specified by
resolution of the city council and shall be accompanied by the application fee, a
drawing showing the location of the proposed project on the applicant's property
and the location of the property in the city, building plans and specifications, and
proof of approval of the proposed project by the appropriate fire department and
the appropriate sewer district or state health department. Applications which do not
contain all of the foregoing shall not be considered complete. Development and
construction drawings and technical support material shall be to scale or otherwise
in sufficient detail to allow a technical or engineering review to determine whether
the proposed development complies with all zoning requirements.
SMC § 15.04.020. Thus, the building permit ordinance has only five "requirements:" (1)
submission of a building permit application on a form from the City; (2) payment of the
application fee; (3) submission of a drawing showing the location of the proposed project on the
applicant's property and the location of the property in the City; (4) submission of proof of
approval of the proposed project by the appropriate fire department and the appropriate sewer
district or state health department; and (5) submission of building/development plans and
specifications in sufficient detail to allow a technical or engineering review to determine
whether the proposed development complies with all zoning requirements, if any. As to this
last requirement, it stands to reason that when there are no applicable zoning requirements,
there is nothing to trigger the requirement for detailed specifications sufficient for engineering
review.
The first four of those "requirements" are not at issue, and have not been raised as a basis
by the City for the subject denial. In the Respondent's Brief, the City has reaffirmed and made
clear that it is basing its denial of the building permit on the last requirement under the
applicable building permit ordinance: building/development plans and specifications "in
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sufficient detail to allow a technical or engineering review to determine whether the proposed
development complies with all zoning requirements." SMC § 15.04.020.

Additionally,

however, the City also attempts a bit of surgical reworking of the applicable ordinance, grafting
onto the Application requirements, found in subsection .020, a more general instruction, found
in subsection .010, that the Stanley Code places upon persons who have already received
permits. (See Respondent's Brief, p. 3.) In its efforts to do so, the City has surgically created a
modified ordinance that is, at best, too vague to be enforced.
Specifically, the City has attempted to cut and paste the following language from SMC §
15.04.010 into the Application requirements of SMC§ 15.04.020: "Permittee shall follow good
engineering practices relating to fill compaction for structural support and for preventing
collapse and/or erosion of fill not used for structural support." SMC § 15.04.010 (Emphasis
added). 4 Even if this language were to be applied to the Arnolds or any other person in the
application process, this provision is void for vagueness.

That is, the language "good

engineering practices" regarding fill compaction is completely devoid of "determining
principles" and gives the City "unfettered discretion" such that it has become "an instrument of
discrimination by a majority of the councilmen" and provides "every opportunity for the
exercise of the power with partiality." City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770-72; Chandler, 496
A.2d at 1061-63; Drexel, 64 So.2d at 319-20. Apparently, based on this vague language, the
City is arguing in the Respondent's Brief that the Arnolds must provide expensive technical
4

As a matter of plain English, the Code places the "good engineering practices" requirement upon a
Pennittee - by definition, someone who has already received a permit. This is clearly not a part of the
Application process.
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drawings regarding "hill stabilization, drainage, fill material and proposed compaction"
(Respondent's Brief, p. 10) even though there is no such requirement in the City's zoning
regulations nor in the Building Permit Application requirements (SMC § 15.04.020), and even
though this additional information has never previously been required. 5
Rather than vague language about "good engineering practices," the ordinance could
easily contain specific requirements regarding fill compaction and what must be done to
prevent collapse and avoid erosion; however, without any specifics to guide and bind the City
in its review, the City cannot arbitrarily demand more from the Arnolds. This is especially true
at the Application stage, in which the Stanley Code sets forth no such requirements.
As to the actual Application requirements found in SMC§ 15.04.020, the City is similarly
taking an overbroad reading of the term "zoning requirements" that, if condoned by the Court,
would effectively create vagueness in an otherwise straightforward ordinance. The City is
trying to expand that phrase to create new obligations for the Arnolds. The Arnolds provided a
basic building plan that states what simple and basic work is to be done in finishing an existing
access driveway: "No structures, permit is for excavation, grading and fill and addition of
gravel to improve/complete access to and from Ace of Diamonds into the property to provide
usable/suitable access to the property from the public street for access, ingress and egress by
5

Also noteworthy is the fact that the Stanley Municipal Code, Section 15.04.010, which the City has
attempted to impermissibly graft onto the building permit application requirements found in the
subsequent section, specifically states that "[t]he issuance of a building permit by the city does not imply
or guarantee the suitability or structural adequacy of building pads, retaining walls, fill, or natural terrain
for meeting structural support requirements for buildings." Quite obviously, the reason the City does
not imply or guarantee the suitability of things like fill and structural support is that, at the stage of
issuing a mere building permit, it neither requires nor evaluates the technical information that would be
necessary to do so.
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passenger vehicles, construction equipment and/or heavy trucks to access the property from
Ace of Diamonds." (AR 69.) The attached map contains additional explanation: "fill and gravel
will be placed on east side of the existing retaining wall to provide improved access to/from
Ace of Diamonds. . . . gravel to be placed as needed to provide access to/from the property
to/from Ace of Diamonds by all types of vehicles." (AR 70 (emphasis added).)
Relying on the requirement that an Applicant provide "sufficient detail," the City
determined that the Arnolds' application is somehow insufficient, despite the fact that this
information and even less had been determined to be sufficient with several prior building
permit applications. 6 Now, because the City's relationship has soured with the Arnolds, the
City suddenly found this was not "sufficient detail." However, in so doing, the City has taken
an expanded view of when that "sufficient detail" is required, in contravention of the plain
language of the ordinance.
Simply stated, the City is misconstruing and expanding the meaning of the term "zoning
regulation." This term is actually not vague as it clearly refers to the zoning regulations found

6

The City accuses the Arnolds of arguing that it is estopped from enforcing its own ordinances.
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 7-8.) Respondents misunderstand the relevance of the facts regarding the City's
prior approval of similar building permits. These historical facts are highly relevant because they show
that the City has always understood and interpreted that its building permit ordinances do not require
more than what was done by the Arnolds for Building Permit #831. As discussed in the Arnolds'
opening brief, this private access driveway from Lot 5 to Ace of Diamonds is not the first private access
driveway constructed for this subdivision. (Petitioners' Opening Brief, pp. 1-3.) The Arnolds already
went through the process of constructing two other private access driveways for Lots 1 (connecting to
Critchfield Street) and Parcel B (also connecting to Ace of Diamonds Street) in the subdivision. With
each of those private accesses, the Arnolds submitted a building permit with even less information than
contained in Building Permit #831 and the City had no problem approving that building permit.
However, those permits were approved before the City's relationship with the Arnolds soured such that
the City suddenly increased its building permit requirements for the Arnolds.
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in Title 17, entitled "Zoning Regulations." Yet, the City wants that term to now also include
Title 16, entitled "Subdivision Regulations" and whatever other regulations it wants to apply to
this building permit application. To the extent that the City is trying to expand the term
"zoning requirements" to include Municipal Code sections that are not clearly set forth as
Zoning Regulations in Title 17, then the City is creating an ambiguity in the Code that can be
misconstrued at the City's whim. The City cannot use vague terms so that they can be
manipulated to mean what the City wants them to mean to fit whatever exigencies are useful to
its officials in any particular moment.
By relying on vague "requirements" that do not contain adequate "determining
principles" for denying a building permit, the City is by definition acting arbitrarily when it
denies a building permit. See Lane Ranch Partnership, 145 Idaho at 91, 175 P.3d at 780. The
City cannot be allowed, as it did in this case, to simply refer carelessly to vague provisions
about "good engineering practices" and "sufficient detail" as the basis for the denial. The City
cannot expand the term Zoning Regulations into yet another vague, open ended term. This lack
of determining principles allows the City to deny a building permit based on its own perceived
grievances against the Arnolds, rather than any codified standards. On this basis alone, the
denial should be overturned.

Without specific determining principles regarding when a

building permit can be denied, the City has no basis for denying the Arnold's building permit
and this denial should be overturned.
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2.

The Building Permit Ordinance Must Be Strictly Construed and the City Has Acted
Arbitrarily Per Se By Denying a Permit Application That Fully Complies with the
Application Requirements ofthe Building Permit Ordinance.
The City's attempt to inconsistently interpret its Code to manufacture a justification for

denying the building permit is unreasonable and without a rational basis. The Arnolds have
fully complied with the applicable ordinances and denial of the permit was therefore per se
improper.
If the party seeking the building permit meets all the standards prescribed in the
ordinance, a city council has no discretion to deny the permit. The council's refusal to grant the
permit in such circumstances is arbitrary as a matter of law.

See, e.g., Southern Co-op.

Development Fund v. Driggers, 696 F.2d 1347, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1983) ("There was no
genuine dispute of material fact regarding plaintiffs' compliance with the requirements of the
Subdivision Regulations. Under these circumstances the defendants had an administrative duty
to approve the plaintiffs' proposed plat and their refusal to do so was a violation of the
plaintiffs' guarantee of due process." (Emphasis added.)); Chase v. City of Minneapolis, 401
N.W.2d

408,

412-14

(Minn.

Ct.

App.

1987);

Application

of

Ellis,

277 N.C. 419, 424-26, 178 S.E.2d 77, 80-81 (N.C. 1970); Vagnoni v. Brady, 218 A.2d 235,
23 7 (Pa. 1966) ("The issuance of a building permit, once the prerequisite conditions have been
fulfilled, is merely a ministerial act."); Boxell v. Planning Commission of City of Maumee, 225
N.E.2d 610, 615-20 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967) ("Upon such full compliance with the ordinances and
statutes, as a matter of law the Common Pleas Court should have found the proposed
subdivision to be reasonable and proper and that the refusal of the planning commission to
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approve the proposed subdivision without plat was unreasonable and unlawful.").
A misapplied ordinance is per se unreasonable and cannot support the denial of a
building permit. See Lane Ranch Partnership, 145 Idaho at 91, 175 P.3d at 780 ("Here, the City
viewed Lane Ranch's application as incomplete based on previous attempts by Lane Ranch to
subdivide the property. The City automatically assumed that the private road application was
another attempt to build a subdivision, rather than a legitimate attempt to gain access to the
property under the current applicable zoning standards. The City's interpretation of their code
is unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion under I.C. § 67-5279(3)(e)."); see, e.g.,
Vineyard Investments, LLC v. City of Madison, 999 So.2d 438, 440-42 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)

("Thus, we are unable to find a legally valid reason for the City of Madison's denial of the
building permit application submitted by Vineyard. Additionally, . . . we find that the City of
Madison did not have the discretion to deny said building permit as Vineyard had complied
with all building codes and zoning ordinances."); Norquest!RCA-W Bitter Lake Partnership v.
City ofSeattle, 865 P.2d 18, 23-26 (Wash Ct. App. 1994) (evidence relied upon by city did not

support claimed violation of ordinance and building permit denial overturned).
The Arnolds merely desire to continue work7 on what the City has unilaterally

7

The City falsely accuses the Arnolds of having already made improvements for the access driveway on
Lot 5 that were not authorized: "In other words, she started construction illegally without a building
permit after having been told on numerous occasions in writing that she could not do so; all of which she
ignored." (Respondent's Brief, p. 22.) This accusation contradicts the agency record and is untrue.
As detailed in the Petitioners' Opening Brief, the Arnolds started work on their access driveway
between Lot 5 and Ace of Diamonds street pursuant to Building Permit 789. That permit stated that
there would be "construction of access roads." It was approved and then renewed two times through
June 9, 2014. Pursuant to that approval, the Arnolds began open and obvious work on Lot 5 regarding

PETITIONERS' REPLY BRJEF

16

193 72-003/700627

117

characterized as an "access road" but which is really a mere driveway connecting Lot 5 to the
abutting public street (Ace of Diamonds, which "dead ends" at Lot 5). In essence, they are
simply finishing a short access driveway between their private property and the public road.
This access driveway is an initial and essential component in further development of the
property. See Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175 P.3d 776,
780 (2007) ("Lane Ranch has a substantial right to have its application evaluated properly
under Title 7 of the Code. Their ability to access their property has been impeded and they are
unable to develop their property for admittedly permissible uses .... The Property consists of
166-acres which presently is only accessible by foot."). Contrary to the City's apparent
contention, however, this access driveway has nothing to do with a subdivision road, meaning

this additional access road for Lot 5 to Ace of Diamonds street. That work was authorized under
Building Permit 789. In fact, at the public hearing on February 13, 2014, the City Council
acknowledged that the work to date had been authorized by the current permit:
Steve Botti: ... And a valid permit already exists to place fill on Lot 5 on the applicant's
property, so that's not an issue. That's Permit 789R2. So, um, this permit isn't necessary
for that work to continue ....
(AR 108 (emphasis added).) Note also that the statement from Councilman Botti demonstrates the
preposterousness of the claim in the Respondent's Brief that the Arnolds "started construction illegally
without a building permit." (Respondent's Brief, p. 22.)

In sum, it appears that if Building Permit 789 was not set to expire, necessitating the application for a
new building permit, then the Arnolds could have simply continued their finishing of the access
driveway without any problem. It is only because they had oncoming weather concerns and were
running out of time under the existing permit that they needed to obtain a new building permit. See, e.g.,
Vagnoni v. Brady, 218 A.2d 235,237 (Pa. 1966) ("The Borough concedes, as it must, that if a permit is
validly issued and work done thereunder or substantial obligations incurred or substantial sums of
money expended in reliance thereon, a vested property right is created in the applicant which is entitled
to protection, and a subsequent revocation of or attempt to revoke the permit cannot abrogate this
right.").
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all of the City's references to laws related to subdivision and public roads are irrelevant. 8
As discussed above, the Arnolds fully complied with the City's building permit
ordinances governing building permit applications, namely SMC§ 15.04.020. The City's only9
claim is that the Arnolds did not comply with two vague provisions about "good engineering
practices" for fill compaction and providing "sufficient detail" to allow for review of "zoning
requirements."

Based on those provisions, the City claims that a great deal of additional

infonnation is required.
The City points to a laundry lists of its purported concerns:
Yet, there is a complete absence of technical drawings pertaining to the slope
percentage, hillside stabilization, drainage, fill material and proposed compaction,
retaining walls (if applicable), setback of the fill from neighboring properties,
access road setback from top of fill slope, and other public worlcs road standards
that would enable a city council (and its engineer) ... to conduct an engineering
review to determine whether the proposed improvements comply with the Stanley
Municipal Code, the Mountain View Plat, and other public works requirements.
(Respondent Brief, p. 10.) However, the City does not have any ordinances that require a

8

The City makes irrelevant references to ordinances and legal principles related to public streets and
easements. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 11-16.) The City is well aware of the fact that this building permit
application has nothing to do with a public street or easement. This is a private access driveway and not
a subdivision road or any road that would be dedicated to the public use.
9

The City seems to have retreated from its excuse in its original findings of fact that the building permit
could not be approved without a prior amendment to the subdivision plat because "an access road at this
location to access Lot 5 is inconsistent with the approved Mountain View Subdivision Plat and prior
approved building permits." (AR 62.) The City gave no explanation for why a private access driveway
would be inconsistent with the plat merely because the plat shows road easements. Clearly private
access driveways and road easements are treated differently, for obvious reasons. The City points to no
statute or law requiring a plat to show a private access driveway. The City also declined to even attempt
to explain why the private access driveways for Lots I (connecting to Critchfield Street) and Parcel B
(connecting to Ace of Diamonds Street) are not shown on the subdivision plat, but suddenly this access
driveway is required to be shown on the subdivision plat.
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certain slope percentage, hillside stabilization, public works road standards, etc., for a basic
access driveway.

This is not Idaho Falls or Boise where the government has expended a

significant amount of time and effort to put in place detailed and specific zoning ordinances and
requirements. 10 This is the City of Stanley, a rural town situated at the base of the Sawtooth
Mountains, and it simply does not have the Code or Ordinances that would be necessary to
justify the City's present reliance on such considerations. This is why its building permit
application form is short and relatively basic, and why the City has not previously required the
detailed information now demanded in any of the other, numerous building permit applications
found even in this record. (AR 44-46, 47, 49, 77, 80, 83, 93-94, 95-96, 97-98.)

In all of its hearings, written findings, and now briefing, the City has only pointed to two
City ordinances that it claims are "zoning regulations" that are applicable and necessitate
greater technical information from the Arnolds: SMC § 17.40.32.D and SMC § 16.36.060.11
Both of these provisions contain building requirements when building on a "hillside," a defined
term. For different reasons, neither of these provisions are applicable to this building permit.
First, as already briefly mentioned, SMC § 16.36.060 is not found within the City's
"zoning regulations." All of the City's zoning regulations are found within Title 17 of the
Stanley Municipal Code, not Title 16.
10

Importantly, Title 16 pertains to applications for

See Boise City Code Title 11 (Zoning) (449 pages); Idaho Falls Code (652 pages).

11

Though not cited in their Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or Respondent's Brief, the record
also contains a document from the City where they seem to claim that SMC 17.44.050 is applicable.
(AR 50.) That provision, however, is only applicable to property zoned as Residential C. Lot 5 is zoned
as Commercial and there is no requirement that Lot 5 comply with the requirements for Residential C
zoned property. (Exh. A to Petitioners' Supplemental Brief.) SMC 17.44.050, like the other ordinances
cited by the City, is entirely inapplicable to the Arnolds' Building Permit #831.
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subdivision approvals, not building permits. The City's building permit ordinances are clear
that technical information must only be provided to "determine whether the proposed
development complies with all zoning requirements." SMC § 15.04.020 (emphasis added).
Thus, by a plain reading of its own building permit ordinance, the requirements found in SMC
§ 16.36.060 for subdivision approval are inapplicable to any review of the Arnolds' building

permit application, and cannot be used as a reason to require additional information.
The law is clear that land-use ordinances must be construed strictly. See, e.g., Patterson
v. Utah County Bd. of Aqjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 606, n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

("Furthermore, because zoning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner's common-law
right to unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions therein restricting property uses
should be strictly construed, and provisions permitting property uses should be liberally
construed in favor of the property owner.") (including a footnote citing eight different
jurisdictions with similar rules for strict construction); Boxell v. Planning Commission of City
ofMaumee, 225 N.E.2d 610, 615-20 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967) ("In construing [the ordinance], it is

important to remember that statutes or ordinances which impose restrictions upon the use of
private property will be strictly construed and their scope cannot be extended to include
limitations not therein clearly prescribed."); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Bailey, 220
A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. 1966) ("Land use restrictions are not favored in the law, are strictly construed,
and nothing will be deemed a violation of such a restriction that is not in plain disregard of its
express words.").
In an attempt to justify denying this building permit, the City is going outside of the
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zoning requirements clearly established in Title 17, in the preconceived results-based hope of
finding subdivision requirements in Title 16 that could arguably require greater technical
review. This is improper and not in compliance with the plain language of the City's building
permit code.
In addition, by previously approving the Arnolds' subdivision, which includes Lot 5, the
City already determined that the "hillside" provisions in SMC § 16.36.060 are inapplicable.
The plat for the subdivision was approved without any requirements regarding a "hillside," i.e.
the City already determined this was not a "hillside subdivision" and therefore the provisions of
SMC § 16.36 are inapplicable to this subdivision.
Thus, the City's only remaining argument centers around one zoning regulation from
Title 17, SMC § 17.40.32.D. These "hillside provisions" for building permit applications are
very limited and say nothing about "slope percentage, hillside stabilization, drainage, fill
material and proposed compaction, . . . setback of the fill from neighboring properties, access
road setback from top of fill slope, and other public works road standards," which the City now
claims it can review as part of the building permit application process for this access driveway.
The City has improperly denied this building permit by asserting that it needs information about
all of these other elements that are not requirements in its zoning regulations.
Moreover, the limited requirements of the Code's "hillside provisions" only apply
12

where the "topographic slope of said building site exceeds fifteen percent (15%) grade." SMC

12

Similarly, the hillside subdivision regulations found in Title 16 are not applicable unless the portion of
the subdivision has an "average slope of ten percent." (SMC§ 16.08.180.) The Arnolds' subdivision
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§ 17.40.032.A. If the City is going to deny a building permit because it believes some hillside
building provisions may apply, then the City is required to make a record showing why these
hillside provisions are actually applicable, or in this case, actually finding that the slope
exceeded 15%. The City made no such finding, but rather merely forged an unsubstantiated
guess as to the slope of the property in order to concoct the basis for its denial - the very
definition of "arbitrary and capricious." (See AR 60 "The subdivision is characterized by
slopes that may exceed 15 percent. .. " (Emphasis added).) That the slope "may" be greater
than 15% is not sufficient, as a matter of law, to deny a building permit under the weight of
universal authority cited herein. If all the City has to do to avoid a determination of arbitrary
and capricious is to venture indeterminate guesses, then a municipality would have a green light
to do whatever it wants at any time because some law "may" or "may not" apply. That
certainly cannot be the standard unless this municipality has suddenly become a fiefdom. The
City does not have the record to support its denial, because it has nothing showing that the
access driveway is to be constructed on property with a slope of 15% or greater. Lacking that,
it is by definition an arbitrary denial.
In sum, the City denied this permit application purely out of spite towards the Arnolds.
It wants to justify its actions by claiming it needs more information to confirm compliance with
a litany of issues that are not discussed in the City's limited zoning regulations or building

plat was approved with no determination (or similar requirements) that the property had an average
slope of 10%, yet now the City wants to impose requirements that only apply to property exceeding 15%
slope, without any showing or proof that the existing access driveway (constructed under the prior
building permits) actually does exceed 15% slope.
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permit application requirements. 13 The City cannot deny an application based on non-existent
ordinances. It is incumbent on the City to come forward with an ordinance that plainly applies
and shows how the applicant did not comply. Without any applicable "zoning regulations"
implicated by the fifth requirement of the build permit application process, the City has all the
information it requires for evaluating Building Permit #831. The City has no valid or justifiable
reason to deny the building permit and its actions are purely arbitrary and capricious. LC. §
67-5279(3)(e). See, e.g., Ready-To-Pour, Inc. v. McCoy, 95 Idaho 510, 514-15, 511 P.2d 792,
796-97 (Idaho 1973) ("We hold that Ready-to-Pour has sustained its burden of proving that the
City Council's action herein was confiscatory, arbitrary and capricious. . . . It may be that
applicant's proposed operation will deter from the aesthetic values of the area. That, however,
is a policy decision which was made by the City Council in 1965 when it enacted the ordinance
authorizing the creation of an industrial district within the City of Ketchum. People are entitled
to rely upon the law." (Emphasis added.)); Herzog v. City of Pocatello, 83 Idaho 365, 372-74,
363 P.2d 188, 192-93 (1961) ("The issue here presented is whether the evidence sustains a
finding that appellant's action in denying respondents' requests was arbitrary, capricious and

13

In the Respondent's Brief, the City also seems to argue that it can deny the access driveway merely
because it is not an "essential" access since there is a separate easement giving Lot 5 access to a
different public street. The City gives no reason why it would be reasonable to deny the building permit
merely because it would provide a second access for Lot 5 to a different public street. Clearly, any
private lot abutting a street would expect and hope to have an access to that public street. Lot 5, in
particular, needs an access from Ace of Diamonds street because, as the City is well aware, Lot 5 has a
an irrigation wastewater ditch that runs south to north across the middle of the property and limits travel
from the east portion of Lot 5 to the access easement on the western portion of the property. Without the
southern access driveway that is the subject of this dispute, the Arnolds essentially have no access to the
eastern portion of Lot 5 from any public street. If the City intends to deny this eastern access point, then
it must have a legitimate reason that is based in law and not based in its own whim and arbitrary actions.
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discriminatory. After careful consideration of the entire record, we feel that the evidence of
discrimination in the various aspects as presented to the trial court sustains the findings of said
court.").

III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Arnolds ask this Court to overturn the City's denial of their
building permit application #831. The City's denial was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable;
the City had no legal basis to deny the permit, and has not provided any evidence to support its
claim that hillside or any other zoning regulations required additional, burdensome information.
DATED this /f4'aay of September, 2014
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

F:t.-~(~J.LloydIII
Attorneys for Petitioners
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the (lf1'L-day of~Wtv; 2014, I served a true and correct copy of
the following documents, under the method indicated below:

D U.S. Mail
D Facsimile
H Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D E-mail: pjf@msbtlaw.com

Paul J. Fitzer
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Attorney for Defendant

Thomas J. Lloyd
Loren K. Messerly
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIST~t1f.
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER

THOMAS ARNOLD, ETAL,
Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF STANLEY,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2014-35
MINUTE ENTRY

The above entitled matter having come before the Court on this the 20th day of May, 2015,
for the purpose of a Judicial Review, before the Honorable Alan C. Stephens, District Judge, in the
Custer County Courthouse, Challis, Idaho. Thomas J Lloyd III, Esq. appeared with Rebecca
Arnold. Paul J Fitzer, Esq., appeared on behalf of the defendant. Also present were Court Reporter
Mary Ann Elliot, Deputy Shawn Kramer, and Deputy Clerk Crystal Kestler.
The Court inquired of counsel. Mr. Lloyd made comments. Judge Stephens inquired of Mr.
Lloyd. Mr. Lloyd responded.

Mr. Fitzer addressed the court. Mr. Lloyd gave rebuttal argument.
Based upon the information stated by counsel; the Court will take both parties arguments
under advisement and submit a decision at a later date.

DATED AND DONE this ~ y of May 20th, 2015.

~ '
Alan C. Stepli~n,s;.
District Judge \<::~,{\;

··

_·c ,-; /.

i,'l,'

"'~~~.>/-"/
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that.a full, true and correct copy of the Minute Entry was personally
delivered; faxed or mailed this a,o_~ay of May, 2015, to the following:
Thomas J Lloyd III, Esq.
Greener Burke Shoemaker PA
tlloyd@greenerlaw.com

Email

Paul J Fitzer
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd
pjf@msbtlaw.com

Email
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DISTRICT COURT
CUSTER COUNTY
IDAHO
2015 June I 0th 2:54 PM
By: Crystal Kestler
Deputy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER

THOMAS AND REBECCA ARNOLD.
Plaintiffs,
-vs.-

CITY OF STANLEY,

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

Defendant.

Case No. CV 2014-35

DECISION AND ORDER RE:
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF BUJLJ)ING
PERMIT APPLICATION DENIAL

)

Thomas and Rebecca Arnold (the Arnolds) request that the Court review the City of
Stanley's {City Council's) denial of their building permit application. This Court hereby
,

GRANTS this request. The Court has reviewed the submissions of the parties and held a hearing
on MAY 20, 2015. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the City Council's decision to deny the
Arnolds' building permit application be AFFIRMED.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
To accurately review the City CounciPs decision to deny the building permit, this Court
must examine the decision and determine only whether it is supported by substantial and
competent evidence, and must not exchange its own judgment for that of the agency. LC. §675279.
Idaho Code §67-5279 states the standard of review as follows:
(3) The court shalt affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
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(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion
ff the agency action is not affnmed, it shaII be set aside, in whole or in
part, and remanded for further proc,eedings .as necessary.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection ... (3) of this section,
agency action shall be affnmed unless substantial rights of the appellant
have been prejudiced.
Idaho Code Ann. § 67.. 5279 (3-4).
THE CITY COUNCIL DID NOT VIOLAI.B CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
Ille Arnolds argue that the City Council violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.

and Idaho Constitutions by intentionally treating the Arnolds differently than other similarly
situated property owners without a rational basis, but have failed to provide any evidence that the
city has treated anyone else differently. Alternatively, the Arnolds claim that they are being
treated differently than they were treated in prior instances. Tilis is paramount to an estoppel

claim that is invalid against a government entity. KJieber v. City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 501,
503, 716 P.2d 1273, 1275 (1986). Additionally, regardless of whether the City Council treated
the Arnolds differently than other property owners, it had a rational basis for doing so because of
various safety concerns on the city street. This Court finds that the City Council did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions by deciding to deny the Arnolds'
building permit application because no proof has been presented that the Arnolds were treated
different than other similarly situated property owners and the City Council had a rational basis
for treating this case differently than others, ifin fact they did treat it differently.
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THE OMISSION IN THE AUDIO RECORDING DOES NOT AMOUNT TO UNLAWFUL

PROCEJWRE
The Arnolds argue that the decision to deny the permit was made on unlawful procedure.
Idaho Code §67-6536 states that "a transcribable verbatim record of the proceeding shall be
made." Plaintiff cites Chambers v. Kootenai County Bd Of Comm 'rs, 125 Idaho 115, 118, 867

P.2d 989, 992 {1994) where a District Court Judge remanded a Board of Commissioners'
decision because a large portion of the audio recording of the hearing was missing and because
the Board of Commissioners held a second evidentiary hearing without providing notice to all

parties. The Court stated:
The deviations by the commissioners from the record as established by the
hearing examiner, along with the deficiencies in the appellate record,
evidence that due process safeguards were not satisfied. In essence, the
commissioners conducted a second fact gathering session without proper
notice. Furth.et, the transcript is questionable as to whether it is even a
verbatim transcript, as pertinent parts of it are missing. We therefore
remand the case back to the commissioners.

Chambers v. Kootenai Cnty. Bd o/Comm'rs, 125 ldaho Il5, 118-19, 867 P2d 989, 992-93
{1994)
The Court in Chambers remanded the case because there were several due process
violations, the least of which was the portion of the record that was missing. In reality, the Court
did not state that the record was not a "verbatim record" because of the missing portion, but only
stated that it was "questionable as to whether it is even a verbatim transcript" Id While a

deficient record is evidence that due process safeguards were not satisfied, it is not dispositive.
In Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Bd. o/Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 843, 993 P.2d 596, 606
(1999), the audio recording in question was "replete with inaudible omissions," but the Appellate
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Court nonetheless found that it was "adequate for pUlp(>ses of ascertaining the basis of the
Board's decision. ..

In the Ctl.l'nmt case, there is a clear audio recording of the City Co\lllcil 's decision to deny
the building permit application; however, the recording is missing the first minute or two of the
decision. The Court has listened to the audio recording of the decision and heard the City

Council discussing a variety of reasons why the building pennit must be denied, any one of
which provides a sufficient basis on which to deny the building permit application. If the omitted
porti<>n of the recording contained some evidence that the City Council acted arbitrarily, that
evidence is conlradicted by the rem~er of the dise:ussion on the recording. Applying the Rural

Kootenai standard to the City Council's audio recording, it is clear that the recording is
"adequate for purposes of ascertaining the basis of the [Council's] decision'~ to deny the building
permit application. This Court finds that the appropriate due process safeguards are satisfied with

this recording.
THE DECISION TO DENY THE BUILDING PERMIT WAS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTAN]JAL EVIDENCE AND WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS
In the City Council's decision it stated that the building permit application was denied
becao&e: 1) the original plat agreement only allows for one access point to Lot 5, 2) a building

permit is not the appropriate method for gaining approval for an ac.cess road, and 3) more
information regarding the metMd to be used to build the road is required for the City Council to
be able to make the decision. The Arnolds claim ,ttiat the reasoning behind the decision was not

supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious.
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First, the Arnolds claim that because Lot 5 abuts a city street, it indicates that Lot 5
'I

i

\

'

would have access to Ace of Diamonds. However, it is stipulated that the plat agreement does
not show the access road in question and it was not considered by the City Council when the

I

j

i

subdivisfon plan was approved. It is the view of this Court that the City Council has a right to

j

deny a building pennit that is not in line with the approved plat and subdivision plans until those

I

plans have been amended. This Court is hard pressed to believe tbatjust because a parcel abuts a

I

iI

II
lI

I

city street that parcel would be entitled to access to that street. This would undermine the City
Council's ability to regulate street access, control traffic, and maintain its own property.
Secona, the original plat and subdivision agreements, allowing for thfee access roads into
the property, were approved by a specific process. This process is in place to allow the City
Council, property owners in Stanley, and neighbors of the a:fkcted property to raise any coneems
about plat and subdivision agreements that the City enteis into and allows the City Council to
make an educated decision whether to accept or deny a plan to build the ad(iitional road. As was
stated in the memoranda to the Court, the building pennit application process is mostly clerical
and would not allow for the same type of edueated decision. By arguing that an additional access

road can be built in contradiction to the plat agreement and that the City Cmmcil has no power to
refuse to issue a building permit for such a road is essentially to claim that the plat approval
process itself is arbitrary.

The Arnolds argue that the City Council approved their previous building pennit
applications for access roads and never asked for more information or for a plat amendment.
They claim that doing so for this application was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of
discretibn. However, the previous building permit applications were for roads that were already
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included in the approved plat agreement. Of course the City Council would not ask that the

Arnolds seek an amendment if the roads were being built in accordance with the original pJan.
t

l

This argument is ill-conceived and the Court finds that the City Council's reasoning was

i

suppotted by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

r

I
I

l

l

l

Third, when construction is being dQne on city streets, the City Council has a duty to

ensure that the construction is being done consistent with building codes and that the work is up
to engineering standards. The Arnolds argue that the City Council is arbitrarily asking for more

I

infonnation regcding the construction of the roa<f because of a vendetta. However, the requests

seem reB$0ntlble due to the special circumstances regarding the slope of the access road and the
fact that the road is being constructed on city property. It is clear that the City Council has a right

to ask for information ensuring that the road on its property will be properly constructed and will
ultimately be safe.

Essentially, the. approved plat agreement allows for three access roads. If the Arnolds
wish to change the number of access roads, they must first change the plat agreement. However,
the City Council is not required to approve the planned changes unless they become fully
satisfied ~ the work will be in line with the City's building ordinances. Otherwise, the
approval process would become arbitrary and the City Council would be stripped ofits power to
enforce building policies within the City.

This Court finds that the City Council's reasons for

denying the permit are supported by substantial evidence and the decision to deny the building

permit was not arbitrary, capricious; or an abuse of discretion.
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PREJUDICED SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS
The Court understands that the Arnolds have already constructed most of the access road
~d will lose all of the investment put into building the road and may have to brunt the cost of
tearing at least ·a part of it down if the rQad is not ultimately approved as is. Tws, however, is not
a consideration for the Court because the road was constxucted in violation of Stanley city

ordinances. As it is, the Arnolds will likely suffer a substantial fmancial setback because of the
City Councirs decision to deny the permit However, that setback would have been minimal if
the Am.olds luuf followed the correct procedure and obtained permission to build the access road
before begimting cons1ruction. Had the Arnolds followed the established procedure before
beginning construction, their setback would be limited to the added costs of requesting a plat
amendment and providing the specifications requested by the City Council. It is questionable

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 11[!!:_ day of JUNE, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the Decision And Order Re:
Judicial Review Of Building Permit Application Denial was personally delivered; faxed emailed or
mailed this 11th day of June, 2015, to the following:
Thomas J Lloyd Ill, Esq.
Greener Burke Shoemaker PA
tlloyd@greenerlaw.com

Email

Paul J Fitzer
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd
pjf@msbtlaw.com

Email
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_By: Crystal Kestler Depµty

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER

THOMAS ARNOLD and REBECCA
ARNOLD, husband and wife,
Petitioners,

Case No. CV 2014-35

vs.

CITY OF STANLEY, a political subdivision
of the State.of Idaho,
Res ondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Judicial Review by the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Custer
of the Stanley City Council in Denying Building Permit 831

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Thomas J. Lloyd III, ISB #7772
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

950 West Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-260 I

Attorneys for the Petitioners
Thomas Arnold and Rebecca Arnold

Paul J. Fitzer
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-1800
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202

Attorney for Defendant
City ofStanley
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COME NOW the Appellants. Thomas and Rebecca Arnold~ by and through their counsel
of record, Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht, P.A.. and respec;tft.Illy petition the Cotm,
· · pursuant to tdaho .Rule of Civil Procedure
84(r} and (t), and Idaho
Appellate Rule 42·,
to rehear
.
'
.
.

this matter and to- reconsider its June 1-0, 2015 Decision and Order Ile: JtIClici?I Review of
Building :Permit Application Denial ("Decision").
The grounds for this- Petition for Rehearing is that_ the Decision includes manifest errors
of fact and law1 as will be set forth in Appdlants' Memorandum in Support of Petition for
Rehearing to be filed within 14 days of this Petition in accordance with 1.A.R:. 42{b),

RESP.ECtFlJLLY SUBMITI'ED this 1st day of July, 2015.
GR.EBNER: BURKE SHOEMAKER OBER.RECHT P.A.

-ds:~
s~Z
Fredric V,
Th.otf>AS. J. Lloyd III

Attorneys/or Pelitioners

'

'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that.on the 1st day of July. 2015. I served a true and correct copy .of the
follpwing documents, under the method indicated below:
·

Paul J. Fitz:e.t
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD,

95UW. Banrtoc~ Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702

Attorneyfor Defem:Jqnt

D
D

U.$.Mail

·

Facsimile

1:8:1 Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
0 E-mail:· pj£@msbtlaw~com

0

F~dricV,8~

Thomas J. Lloyd

PETITION FOR RE8.ll:ARlNG - 3
19372,-003 (778630)
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DISTRICT COURT
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IDAHO
2015 July 15 PM 3:33

Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB #1687
Thomas J. Lloyd III, ISB #7772

By: Crystal Kestler Deputy

GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

950 West Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601

Attorneys/or the Petitioners
Thomas Arnold and Rebecca Arnold
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER

Case No. CV 2014-35

THOMAS ARNOLD and REBECCA
ARNOLD,

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING

Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF STANLEY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho,
Respondent.

COME NOW the Appellants, Thomas and Rebecca Arnold (the "Arnolds"), by and
through their counsel of record, Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht, P.A., and hereby file this
Memorandum in Support of their Petition for Rehearing.
INTRODUCTION

The Arnolds recently filed their Memorandum in Opposition to the City of Stanley's
request for attorney fees and costs in this matter. As discussed in that Opposition, the standard
for assessing whether the City is entitled to attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-117 whether the Arnolds filed this Petition for Judicial Review with a reasonable basis in fact or law
- is very much the same standard that applies to whether a Rehearing is warranted. See Idaho

Judicial Council v. Becker, 122 Idaho 288, 834 P.2d 290 (1992) (noting a court's inherent
authority to reconsider its own decisions). Because the Arnolds contend that the decision of this
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Court should be reconsidered in light of the prevailing Idaho law, the non-existence of the
alleged standards that the City and the Court have now contended were violated by the Arnolds,
and the prevalence of factual errors in the arguments by the City and the subsequent decision of
the Court, the Arnolds respectfully request a rehearing on their Petition for Judicial review.
Material errors of fact and law were advanced by the City, and the Court's decision reflects those
same errors of fact and law. Interests of justice and fairness require that the Court's decision be
reconsidered, with an eye specifically toward the legal and factual issues presented in this
Memorandum and the Memorandum previously filed in opposition to the City's request for
attorney fees.
Before addressing the factual and legal errors that the Arnolds contend were incorporated
into the Court's decision, the Arnolds would be remiss not to set fmih the significant prejudice to
them stemming from certain untruths conveyed to the Court by the City. The concluding
paragraph of the Court's decision appears to echo many of the items of misinformation provided
by the City, but without any factual support in the limited record for such assertions. For
example, the Court's concluding remarks evidence that the Court was persuaded by the City's
argument that the Arnolds had constructed a road in violation of applicable city ordinances.
Additionally, the Court rebukes the Arnolds for not following the correct procedures in obtaining
permission to build an "access road" before initiating construction, and that if the Arnolds had
followed those "established procedure[s]," they would not find themselves in the predicament
that now exists.
However, what the Arnolds had attempted to argue on this Petition for Judicial Review, is
that - contrary to the City's barren assertions during oral argument - the factual arguments set
forth against the Arnolds were flawed in numerous ways. First, this case is not and never has
been about access roads. Knowing full well that it would have a difficult time convincing the
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Court that a private property owner does not have the right to construct a driveway on its
property, the City endeavored to convince this Court that Building Permit No. 831 was about the
construction of roadways that were to intersect with the City of Stanley's public streets. In truth,
however, Building Permit No. 831, as evidenced on the face of the permit application in the
record and like all of the permits issued before it for the same construction, made no mention of
any construction of roadways. Rather, the object of this Building Permit was simply for the
improvement of a driveway on private property. That the City has continued to mischaracterize
the access drive constructed by the Arnolds as a roadway is a gross mischaracterization. 1
Moreover, the City came before the Court and argued repeatedly that it has an important
interest in ensuring that its building ordinances are followed, yet it never once placed before the
Court a single provision from the Municipal Code for the City of Stanley that it could colorably
claim had been violated or would be violated by the construction and completion of the access
driveway contemplated by Building Permit No. 831. Still, despite not being able to cite any such
authority, and despite knowing full well that the Arnolds had .never been charged with any sort of
illegal activity relative to this access drive, the City stood before the Court and lobbed
accusations of criminal and otherwise illegal conduct by the Arnolds. Though there was nothing
in the record to support the City's unsubstantiated and plainly false accusations, the Arnolds fear
that the Court was convinced by the City that they had, in fact, engaged in some improper or
illegal conduct. The City's accusations, though perhaps intended to be nothing more than
hyperbole and impassioned argument, went too far into the realm of untruth, and the Arnolds
respectfully contend that the conduct of the City created an unfair impression by the Court. On
1

The Arnolds recognize that at times throughout these proceedings, they have casually referred to the easement
driveways identified on the Mountain View Subdivision plat as "access roads." The liberal and improper use of that
phrase for lack of a better descriptor, however, does not change the fact that the underlying record in this action
evidences no roadways along the lines that have been characterized by the City. The subject plat does not contain
any roads, but only the location of certain easements over adjoining parcels. Contemplated to be private drives
within the easement areas, these plat markings are not "roads" in any traditional sense of the word, nor in the sense
used in Idaho Code§ 40-109(5).
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these grounds, the Arnolds contend that they should be entitled to a rehearing on the facts of
record in this case and not on the unsupported and bald accusations by the City.
At the core of the misinformation provided by the City is the as-yet undisputed fact that
the City has never promulgated any rules or regulations, let alone any city ordinances or code
provisions, that could possibly be used to support the assertion that the Arnolds had not followed
"established procedures" for either the construction of an access driveway, or for the submission
of information in conjunction with an application for a building permit to complete an access
driveway. Over the Arnolds protestations, neither the City nor the Court has yet cited any such
authority, though both the City and the Court has nevertheless concluded that the Arnolds'
Building Permit application ought to have complied with those unknown ordinances. This is not
to say, as the Arnolds have made clear in prior briefing and argument, that the City of Stanley
does not have the power to regulate access to its public roadways. The problem here, as it has
always been, is that the City simply has not exercised that power to promulgate any such
regulations in its municipal code. Pervasive through the City's arguments was the assertion that
it was merely seeking to have the Arnolds comply with established procedures. What the record
actually demonstrates, however, is that the City's treatment of the Arnolds with respect to
Building Permit No. 831 was nothing more than an ad hoc attempt to impose new regulations
solely upon the Arnolds, without having actually established those regulations according to the
"established procedures" that are supposed to govern the city's own conduct.
Having established, then, that much of the argument provided by the City was misleading
and, in certain cases, patently false, the Arnolds turn to the specific legal and factual errors that
support a rehearing of this matter.

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING - 4

143

19372-003 {7Sl515_2)

ARGUMENT
A. Incorporation Of The Legal Arguments Previously Set Forth.

In filing this request for rehearing, in the interests of judicial economy, the Arnolds
incorporate herein by reference the arguments previously set forth in the original Petition for
Judicial Review and the recently-filed Memorandum in Opposition to the City's request for
attorney fees. Specifically, the Arnolds dispute the following conclusions of law in the Court's
Order:
1) "The original plat agreement only allows for one access point to Lot 5."

Again, there is no legal principle in the state of Idaho that would support a finding that
the existence of a platted easement would nullify or otherwise eliminate a property owners'
vested rights to access the public roadways directly abutting their property. Johnston v. Boise
City, 87 Idaho 44, 51,390 P.2d 291,294 (1964). Absent express agreement by the parties (which
does not exist here, as there is nothing in the plat that indicated any form of waiver or
abandonment of any property rights by the Arnolds), proper implementation of traffic regulations
pursuant to the City's police power (which, as evidenced by the record in this case, have never
before been implemented) or statutorily-prescribed condemnation proceedings (which
undisputedly have never occurred), there is no basis in law or fact for the Court to have
concluded that the existence of a platted easement access on the west side of Lot 5 necessarily
destroyed the Arnolds' right to access Ace of Diamonds on the east side of Lot 5.
2) "A building permit is not the appropriate method for gaining approval
for an access road."

This conclusion in the Court's decision is factually flawed, and is based on the
misinformation provided by the City in the underlying hearing. Contrary to the City's argument
and the Court's conclusion, the Arnolds did not need a building permit to obtain access to their
property from the abutting public roadway. The Arnolds already had and s}Jould continue to have
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access to their property from the public roadways abutting their property. As set forth in prior
briefing, there is nothing in over a century's worth of Idaho law that would support the contrary
conclusion reached by the City and the Court, and neither the City nor the Court cited any
authority in favor of that conclusion.

3) "More information regarding the method to be used to build the road
is required for the City Council to be able to make the decision."
The Stanley Municipal Code identifying the required elements of a building permit
application - indeed the entirety of the Stanley Municipal Code - is devoid of any requirements
either for (a) the infom1ation asserted to be necessary at the Building Permit stage or (b) for the
actual construction of the private access driveway contemplated by Building Permit No. 831.
Though the Court has concluded that more information was "required" from the Arnolds, neither
the Court nor the City has yet pointed to the source for that requirement. In effect, then, the
Court has given the City permission to exercise unfettered discretion by imposing new
restrictions and requirements on property owners applying for building permits, on a purely ad
hoc basis. Such power, if it did exist, is unconstitutional. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub.
Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770-72 (1988).

B. Additional Contentions Of Error In The Court's Decision.
Further in support of this Petition for Rehearing, the Arnolds contend that the Court's
decision contained certain other factual and legal errors that warrant the Court's reconsideration
of its conclusions in this matter.
1. A subdivision plat is not required to contain any and all points of access to the

public roads.
The Court's decision evidences a belief that the Mountain View Subdivision plat must be
considered the controlling authority by which all access points were established. Citing to "the
original plat and subdivision agreements," which is problematic in its own right given the lack of
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any "plat agreement" in the record before the Court, the Court erroneously states that "it is
stipulated that the plat agreement does not show the access road in question and it was not
considered by the City Council when the subdivision plan was approved." (Decision, p. 5.) The
Arnolds never stipulated to any such fact, nor would they because it is based upon a flawed
premise. As set forth below, there is no requirement in a subdivision plat to include points of
access to private property from the public roadways - that is not an element of a plat by the legal
requirements governing the contents of plats, so it is inappropriate to treat a subdivision plat as
the end-all, be-all of access points.
The Court's error in this regard is best illustrated by examining the subdivision plat in the
record, itself. If the Court's conclusion were correct, that an additional access driveway cannot
be built "in contradiction to the plat," then the Mountain View Subdivision plat would create a
de facto landlocked parcel in Lot 1 of the plat. That parcel abuts Critchfield A venue in the same,
dead-end manner that Lot 5 abuts Ace of Diamonds. However, Lot 1 does not abut any of the
platted easement areas (what the City and the Court have referred to as the platted access roads).
The logical extension of the Court's conclusion, then, is that because there is no access driveway
indicated on the plat for access onto Lot 1 from Critchfield, and therefore no access drive that
was approved by the City in the plat approval process, then no access exists for Lot 1 and Lot I
is entirely landlocked. Clearly, the plat was not intended by any party to be such a definitive
limitation on property owners' abilities to access their property from the abutting public roads.
There was no evidence in the record that the subdivision plat filed by the Arnold was ever
intended by anyone, including and especially the landowners themselves, to cause any
abandonment of other valid and appurtenant property rights.
More importantly, though the Arnolds did plat the easements that run across certain of
the parcels in order to provide access to otherwise landlocked parcels, nothing in any existing
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law would require a plat to evidence, include, and incorporate each and every access point from
private property to the abutting public roadways. Indeed, the plat completed by the Arnolds
showed only those easements that were to run across the subject parcels because that is exactly
what is required of plats. See I.C. § 50-1304(2) ("Essentials of Plats"). Specifically, the plat
identifies "Private Access and Utility Easements," as the purpose of a plat is, in part, to identify
for future purchasers what easements exist across the parcel. In contrast, nothing in the Idaho
Code governing the essential contents of plats requires an access driveway from private property
onto abutting public streets to be shown on the plat. Id In light of this correction of law, the
Court's conclusion that "the plat approval process itself is arbitrary" if the Arnolds are permitted
to construct an access driveway that was not previously (and unnecessarily) placed upon the plat,
is in error. The plat approval process, for the purposes that it is actually intended to serve by
operation of Idaho Code § 50-1301 et seq., remains intact and is not affected in any right by the
continued ability of a property to access abutting public roadways.
It is legal error for the Court to have concluded that a plat amendment would be required

in order to regain an access right to the abutting public road, just as it would be legal error to
conclude that the Mountain View Subdivision plat effectively landlocked Lot 1 by cutting off its
access to Critchfield A venue. The Arnolds have, by this Court's decision, lost vested property
access rights simply because they (or their licensed engineers at Galena Engineering) properly
followed Idaho Code on platting requirements. This error must be remedied.
2. The access drive is not constructed on City property.

On page 6 of the Court's decision, the Court comments that the City "has a duty to ensure
that the construction is being done consistent with building codes," and that the City's "requests
seem reasonable due to the special circumstances regarding the slope of the access road and the
fact that the road is being constructed on city property." These premises are factually flawed.
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First, as detailed above, there is no access road pertinent to Building Permit No. 831. Fully
contained within a singular building lot (Lot 5), there is no colorable way to contend that the
Arnolds' driveway is a road. Second, the access driveway already exists - it is not being sought
to be constructed on city property; it has already been constructed on the Arnolds' property.
Third, there are no building codes that would apply, even if the Building Permit application was
for the initial construction of the driveway, other than ad hoc requirements that would be
inappropriately imposed by the City without prior authorization or notice to its citizens.
Finally, Building Permit No. 831 sought no construction on the City's property. Rather,
it sought to smooth the transition between the existing public roadway and the existing access
driveway by simply laying additional gravel at the transition between the dirt/gravel Ace of
Diamonds roadway and the dirt/gravel driveway for Lot 5. There is a reason why the City has
yet to produce an applicable building code or ordinance to which such simple improvements
would be subject, as the Stanley Municipal Code simply does not rise to the level of
sophistication that the City is attempting to enforce. For whatever reason (likely having to do
with the cost of enforcement), the City of Stanley has opted to not adopt codes and ordinances of
the sort that it is now attempting to "enforce" against the Arnolds. The Arnolds respectfully
contend that the Court's conclusion is based upon an erroneous understanding that the Arnolds
were somehow seeking to construct an access road on top of City property (i.e., on top of an
existing road). Because that understanding is belied by the record, the Arnolds request that the
Court reconsider its decision based upon the record before the Court, rather than upon the
erroneous factual assertions contended by the City without any support in the record.
CONCLUSION

The Arnolds understand that asking the Court for a rehearing to reconsider its decision
necessarily places them in the undesirable position of suggesting to this Cami that it committed
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legal error in reaching its Decision. However, neither the facts of record nor several established

legal principles were taken into consideration in the Court's decision. including~ inter alia: the
non.,.existence in the Idaho Code of any requirement that a subdivision plat show every point of
access between private property and the public roads {LC.§ 50-1304(2)); the vested.legal right

'Qf a ptQ_pe.tty owner to access abutting public roads (a right expr~ssly disavowed. by the Court
without any citation to supporting legal authority); and the non-existence of any established
standards or ordinances along the lines of those claimed by lhe City to be central to its decision
t<:> deny Building Perr.nit NQ. 831. In view of the5e e.n;e>ts, the Arnolds respectfully request that

the Court rehear and reconsider the Arnolds) Petition for Judicial Review, in the hopes of

pltUizying and oorrecting these errors without fue need, f()r any further appeai of this matter,
Dated this15th day of July, 2015.

Frewio V, Bhoem et l Thomas J. Lloyd ID
Attorneysfer Petitioners
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Fredric V. Shoemaker, ISB # 1687
Thomas J. Lloyd III, ISB #7772
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.
Counselors and Attorneys at Law
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone (208) 319-2600
Facsimile (208) 319-2601
fshoemaker@greenerlaw.com
tlloyd@greenerlaw.com
Attorneys for Petitioners
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER
THOMAS ARNOLD AND REBECCA
ARNOLD, HUSBAND AND WIFE,
Petitioner,

Case No.: CV 2014-35
PETITIONERS' MOTION TO
CORRECT THE RECORD

v.

CITY OF STANLEY, A POLITICAL
SUDIVISION OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO,
Respondent.

COME NOW Petitioners Thomas Arnold

~c.i

Rebecca Arnold, by and through their

counsel of record the firm of GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A., and pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(o), hereby move this Court for an Order allowing Petitioners to
correct the record in these proceedings. The basis for this Motion is that the Respondent, City of
Stanley, made several allegations within its briefing and its comments at oral argument that are
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not supportable by the existing record, nor the demonstrable facts as set forth within the
Affidavits filed contemporaneously with this Motion. Because Petitioners believe that these
inaccuracies were adopted by the Court in issuing its decision, it is imperative that the record be
corrected prior to the Court hearing and ruling upon the pending Petition for Rehearing.
This Motion is supported by the Affidavit of Rebecca Arnold and the Affidavit of John C.
Anderson filed concurrently herewith.

Because this Motion pertains only to correcting the

factual errors that Petitioners contend have been asserted by the City of Stanley and adopted by
the Court, there are no legal issues to be addressed other than those which have already been set
forth in Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing. As such, no memorandum of law is necessary to be
filed herewith.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this 6th day of October, 2015.

RKE SHOEMAKER 0BERRECHT P.A.

Fr dric V. Shoemake
Thomas J. Lloyd III
Attorneys for Petitioners
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I hereby certify that on the 6th day of October, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of
the following documents, under the method indicated below:
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[8J Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D E-mail: pjf@msbtlaw.com

Paul J. Fitzer
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TuRCKE, CHTD.

950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Attorney for Defendant

Fredric V. Shoemak
Thomas J. Lloyd
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Attorneys for Petitioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER
THOMAS ARNOLD AND REBECCA
ARNOLD, HUSBAND AND WIFE,

Case No.: CV 2014-35

Petitioner,
V.

CITY OF STANLEY, A POLITICAL
SUDIVISION OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO,

AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA W.
ARNOLD IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONERS' MOTION TO
CORRECT THE RECORD

Res ondent.

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Ada
)
REBECCA W. ARNOLD, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over eighteen years of age and am competent to testify regarding the matters

set forth herein. My husband and I are the named Petitioners in the above-captioned matter. I
make the following statements based upon my own personal knowledge.
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2.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho and have been

admitted since March 31, 1988 under Idaho State Bar Number 3783. During my career as an
attorney I have worked in private practice and in corporate (in-house) practice. I was elected as a
Commissioner of the Ada County Highway District ("ACHD") in 2004, 2008 and 2012. I am
currently serving in my 11th year as an ACHD Commissioner. Due to my extensive experience
with ACHD, I am well versed in the regulation, design and construction of roads and the process
for adopting standards for roads.
3.

The above-captioned matter is a request for judicial review for a decision by the

City of Stanley (hereinafter "City") to refuse renewal of a building permit that had been previously
issued by the City. The building permit that had been approved and which my husband and I
sought to renew was for work on Lot 5 of Mountain View Subdivision in Stanley, Idaho
(hereinafter "Lot 5"). References to the "Agency Record" or "AR" in this Affidavit shall mean
and refer to the Agency Record submitted in this matter which consists of 108 numbered pages. I
submit this Affidavit so as to correct numerous incorrect and/or false statements made within the
Agency Record which was prepared and submitted by the City of Stanley and to correct numerous
false statements made by the City's attorney in its Respondent's Brief and oral argument.
4.

I personally designed the layout of Mountain View Subdivision ("MV

Subdivision") and, throughout 2005, 2006 and 2007, directed the efforts of Galena Engineering in
preparing the preliminary plat, making revisions to the preliminary plat and preparing the final plat
for MV Subdivision. I personally handled the approval process for both the preliminary and final
plats of MV Subdivision through the City; I handled all communications with the City and I
attended the public hearings and/or meetings pertaining to the City's review, consideration and
approval of the preliminary and final plats.
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5.

The only accesses shown on both the preliminary and final plats of the MV

Subdivision were the private access easements. The accesses for lots abutting the public streets
were not shown on the preliminary plat or the final plat of MV Subdivision because Stanley
Municipal Code ("SMC") does not require accesses for lots abutting public streets to be shown on
the plat.

The City did not, at any time during the consideration and approval of the MV

Subdivision preliminary and final plats, impose any restrictions on access from Ace of Diamonds
street into Lot 5 of MV Subdivision and did not prohibit access from Ace of Diamonds onto Lot 5
of MV Subdivision. The City did not, at any time during the consideration and approval of the
MV Subdivision preliminary and final plats, impose any restrictions on access from Critchfield
onto Lot 1 of MV Subdivision and did not prohibit access from Critchfield onto Lot 1 of MV
Subdivision.
6.

Access from MV Subdivision onto Highway 21, a state highway under the

jurisdiction of the Idaho Transportation Department, existed prior to the filing of the preliminary
plat application for MV Subdivision. All surrounding streets and roads are shown on the MV
Subdivision final plat and no new roads or streets have been proposed by the Arnolds. There was
no "plat agreement" entered into with respect to MV Subdivision. My husband and I did not enter
into any "plat agreement" with respect to MV Subdivision. Further, there is no "plat agreement"
shown or documented within the in the Agency Record submitted herein.
7.

As a property owner in Stanley, I am familiar other plats approved by the City that

do not show accesses for any of the lots abutting public streets. As a specific example, I own
property in Meadow Tracts Subdivision which abuts Benner Street in Stanley, Idaho. Meadow
Tracts Subdivision is adjacent to MV Subdivision on the west side. In fact, portions of Meadow
Tracts Subdivision are depicted on the MV Subdivision plat that is included in the Agency Record
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at p. 65 (including Lot 3 of Meadow Tracts Subdivision which is owned by Stanley City
Councilman Lem Sentz). The Meadow Tracts Subdivision plat does not show the accesses for
any of the lots in that subdivision.
8.

There is no factual basis for the phrases and characterizations made by the City in

its Respondent's Brief that our property has: "steep downslope," "severity of slope," "steep slope,"
"[t]he slope is extreme," or "steep ravine." The City did not, at any time during the consideration
and approval of the MV Subdivision preliminary and final plats, deem MV Subdivision to be a
"Hillside Subdivision" as defined under Title 16 of the Stanley Municipal Code. Per that title
"'Hillside subdivision' means any subdivision, or portion thereof, having an average slope of ten
percent (10%) or more. (Ord. 52, 1978)." (SMC 16.08.180.) Rather, the City approved MV
Subdivision without applying the standards or requirements set forth in Title 16, Chapter 16.36. A
complete copy of SMC, Title 16 is attached hereto for ease of reference as Exhibit A.
9.

The statement made by the City on Page 22 of the it's Respondent's Brief that "she

[Rebecca Arnold] started construction illegally without a building permit after having been told on
numerous occasions in writing that she could not do so" is false. I have not engaged in any illegal
activity (I constructed the access driveway onto Lot 5 with a building permit) and no such writing
was given to me on numerous occasions or even one occasion prior to such construction.
10.

I have not been charged with or convicted of any "illegal" activity in the City of

Stanley. I have not been served with any written cease and desist by the City of Stanley in
connection with the construction of the access driveway from Ace of Diamonds onto Lot 5 or in
connection with any construction on Lot 5 under Building Permit 789. I did not make the
statements that were attributed to me on Page 4 Respondent's Brief.
11.

I personally drafted the language on Building Permit 690 (approved by the City in
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November, 2006) and intentionally included the use of a semicolon before and following
"construction of access roads" on the building permit to separate that activity from the other
activities and from modifiers. The phrase "to be installed per preliminary plat approval" was not
intended to modify the language in the previous clause. The "emphasis added" by the City in it's
Respondent's Brief at the top of page 3 misstates and mischaracterizes the intent for the
construction under Building Permit 690 and is grammatically incorrect as well.

The same

language and intent applied to Building Permit 789, which was also approved by the City of
Stanley.
12.

The access driveway from Ace of Diamonds into Lot 5 was constructed pursuant to

Building Permit 789, which was approved by the City. The access driveway has been used, and
currently is still being used, to access Lot 5 of MV Subdivision from Ace of Diamonds street.
The City of Stanley has not, at any time, prohibited the use of the access driveway from Ace of
Diamonds into Lot 5 of MV Subdivision.
13.

I was present on the jobsite when our contractor, John C Anderson, excavated

topsoil and vegetation from Lot 5 to put in the base for the retaining wall constructed on Lot 5
under Building Permit 789 and instructed him to stockpile the topsoil and vegetation for later use.
All of the stockpiled topsoil and vegetation shown in the photograph included on page 54 of the
Agency Record was removed from the Arnold Property, Lot 5 of MV Subdivision. The notation
"Denuded slope on city property" on the photograph included as page 54 of the Agency Record is
incorrect because the denuded area is located on the Arnold Property, Lot 5.
14.

I submitted the application for Building Permit 831 in December, 2013 to complete

the work on the access driveway from Ace of Diamonds into Lot 5. Specifically, I submitted that
application to add additional fill material on Lot 5 and gravel on the access driveway because the
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access driveway needed additional finish work and gravel to easily accommodate use by all types
of vehicles. The application for Building Permit 831 did not include any request for approval of
an access from Ace of Diamonds onto Lot 5 because access already existed.
15.

I personally took the photograph included in the Agency Record at page 55. The

photograph is a photograph of vegetation on my property. The photograph that I took did not
include the typed annotation shown on the photograph included in the Agency Record at page 55.
The notation added to my photograph which reads "City property with natural vegetation, sage,
grasses and wildflowers, prior to 9-28-13" is not accurate and was not included by me.
16.

The City argues that SMC 17.40.032 (D) applies to Building Permit Application

831 and that the Application failed to comply with SMC 17.40.032 (D) which provides
specifications for construction of a retaining wall on a building site where the topographic slope of
the building site exceeds fifteen percent. However, Building Permit Application 831 did not
include any proposal to build a retaining wall.
17.

The arguments by the City that I am a "class of one" and received "preferential

treatment" completely ignores the fact that several other landowners openly constructed access
driveways from public streets into their properties and added gravel to City property as part of
building permits that were approved by the City for work on their private property. None of these
individuals obtained a separate permit for work to build access driveways. Some of the other
individuals, that I am aware of, that built access driveways to their private properties from public
streets without separate permits include: Tom Peterson who constructed an access driveway from
Merritt Lane downslope to his property located at 350 Merritt Lane; Mr & Mrs Van Der Wal who
constructed an access driveway from Merritt Lane upslope to their property at 34 7 Merritt Lane;
Niece Smiley Creek, LLC who constructed an access driveway from Critchfield into its Stanley
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Town Square project located at the corner of Critchfield and Niece. Exhibit B hereto is an
example of a building permit approved by the City of Stanley without requiring engineering
drawings or even a scaled site plan and illustrates how the Arnolds are subjected to greater
scrutiny, far from receiving preferential treatment.
18.

Arguments made by the City that the access to the West side of Lot 5 is sufficient

completely ignores the fact that driving from the West to the East side of Lot 5 is not physically
feasible due to a wetlands and a wastewater irrigation ditch which runs through the middle of Lot
5. This is a fact that the City is well aware of and has documents on file which clearly show this
irrigation ditch as well as the Wetlands Delineation applicable to the property.
Further your Affiant saith naught.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

..IP.!_ day of October, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of October, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the
following documents, under the method indicated below:

D U.S.Mail
D Facsimile
[8J Hand Delivery
D Overnight Delivery
D E-mail: pjj@msbtlaw.com

Paul J. Fitzer
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83 702
Attorney for Defendant
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Title 16
SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS
Chapter 16.04
GENERAL PROVISIONS
16.04.010: TITLE:
These regulations shall be known and cited as the CITY SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS,
hereinafter referred to as the "subdivision ordinance". (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.04.020: AUTHORITY:
These regulations are authorized by title 67, chapter 65 and title 50, chapter 13, of the Idaho Code.
(Ord. 52, 1978)

16.04.030: PURPOSE:
The purposes of these regulations are to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare,
and to provide for:

A The harmonious development of the area;

B. The coordination of streets and roads within the subdivision with other existing or planned
streets and roads;

C. Adequate open space for travel, light, air and recreation;

D. Adequate transportation, water drainage and sanitary facilities;

10/6/2015

http://sterlingcodifiers.com/codebook/printnow. php

162

Sterling Codifiers, Inc.

Page 2 of 34

E. The avoidance of scattered subdivision of land that would result in either of the following:
1. The lack of water supply, sewer service, drainage, transportation, or other public services,
2. The unnecessary imposition of an excessive expenditure of public funds for the supply of
such service;

F. The requirements as to which:
1. Roads shall be created and improved,
2. Water and sewer, or other facilities shall be installed;

G. The manner and form of making and filing of any plat;

H. The administration of these regulations by defining the powers and duties of approval
authorities. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.04.040: SCOPE:
These regulations shall apply to the subdividing of land within the corporate limits of the city,
including the property within one mile outside the corporate limits of the city as provided under the
requirements of section 50-1306, Idaho Code. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.04.050: INTERPRETATION:
All subdivisions as herein defined shall be submitted for approval by the council and shall comply
with the provisions of these regulations. These regulations shall supplement all other regulations,
and where at variance with other laws, regulations, ordinances or resolutions, the more restrictive
requirements shall apply. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.04.060: LIABILITY:
This title shall not be construed to hold the city responsible for any damage to persons or property
by reason of the inspection or re inspection authorized in this title, or failure to inspect or reinspect
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or by reason of approval or disapproval of plats, plans, or parts thereof as provided in this title.
(Ord. 52, 1978)

Chapter 16.08
DEFINITIONS
16.08.010: GENERALLY:
Terms used in this title shall be interpreted as follows:

A The present tense includes the past or future tense, the singular includes the plural, and the
plural includes the singular.

B. "Shall" is mandatory; "may" is permissive; and "should" is preferred.

C. The masculine shall include the feminine. (Ord. 101, 6-2-1992: Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.020: ADMINISTRATOR:
"Administrator" means an official, who may be a member of the city council or appointed official
thereof or planning and zoning commission, having knowledge in the principles and practices of
subdividing, who is appointed by the council to administer this title. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.030: BLOCK:
"Block" means a group of lots, tracts, or parcels within well defined boundaries, usually streets.
(Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.040: BOARD:
"Board" means the city council of the city of Stanley. (Ord. 52, 1978)
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16.08.050: CITY:
"City" means the city of Stanley, Idaho. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.060: COMMISSION:
"Commission" means the planning and zoning commission appointed by the council; provided
however, if the council has not appointed a planning and zoning commission, "commission" means
the council. (Ord. 8, 5-8-1990: Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.070: COMPREHENSIVE PLAN:
"Comprehensive plan" means that plan adopted by the city on December 15, 1977, and amended
and updated on June 10, 1998. (Ord. 48A, 6-10-1998: Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.080: COND0MINIUM 1 :
"Condominium" means an estate consisting of an undivided interest in common in real property, in
an interest or interests in real property, or in any combination thereof; together with a separate
interest in real property, in an interest or interests in real property, or in any combination thereof.
(Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.090: COUNCIL:
"Coun_cil" means the city council of the city of Stanley, Idaho. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.100: COUNTY RECORDER:
"County recorder" means the office of the Custer County recorder. (Ord. 52, 1978)
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16.08.110: CULVERT:
"Culvert" means a drain that channels water under a bridge, street, road or driveway. (Ord. 52,
1978)

16.08.120: DEDICATION:
"Dedication" means the setting apart of land or interests in land for use by the public by ordinance,
resolution, or entry in the official minutes as by the recording of a plat. Dedicated land becomes
public land upon the acceptance by the city. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.130: EASEMENT:
"Easement" means a grant by a property owner to specific persons or to the public to use land for
specific purposes, and also, a right acquired by prescription. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.140: ENGINEER:
"Engineer" means any person who is licensed in the state to practice professional engineering.
(Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.150: FLOODPLAIN:
"Floodplain" means the relatively flat area or lowland adjoining the channel of a river, stream, lake,
or other body of water which has been or may be covered by water of a flood of 100-year
frequency. The floodplain includes the channel, floodway and floodway fringe, as established per
the engineering practices as specified by the army corps of engineers, as follows:

A "Flood of 100-year frequency" means a flood magnitude which has a one percent (1%) chance
of being equaled or exceeded in any given year.

B. "Flood" means the temporary inundation of land adjacent to and inundated by overflow from a
river, stream, lake, or other body of water.

10/6/2015

http://sterlingcodifiers.com/codebook/printnow.php

166

Sterling Codifiers, Inc.

Page 6 of 34

C. "Channel" means a natural or artificial watercourse of perceptible extent, with definite bed and
banks to confine and conduct continuously or periodically flowing water.

D. "Floodway" means the channel or a watercourse and those portions of the floodplain adjoining
the channel which are reasonably required to carry and discharge the floodwater of any
watercourse.

E. "Floodway fringe" means that part of the floodplain which is beyond the floodway. Such areas
will include those portions of the floodplain which will be inundated by a flood of 100-year
frequency, but which may be developed when such development will not have a significant
effect upon the floodwater carrying capacity of floodway and the floodwater levels. Such areas
are characterized by shallow flood depths and low velocities of water flow. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.160: GOVERNING BODY:
"Governing body" means the city council of the city of Stanley, Idaho. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.170: HIGHWAY:
"Highway" means a street designated as a highway by an appropriate state, federal agency, or the
city. (Ord. 101, 6-2-1992: Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.180: HILLSIDE SUBDIVISION:
"Hillside subdivision" means any subdivision, or portion thereof, having an average slope of ten
percent (10%) or more. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.190: IMPROVEMENT:
"Improvement" means any alteration to the land or other physical constructions associated with
subdivision and building site developments. (Ord. 52, 1978)
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16.08.200: LOT:
"Lot" means a parcel, plot, tract, or other land area of suitable size as required on these regulations
and the existing zoning ordinance, and created by subdivision for sale, transfer, or lease. (Ord. 52,
1978)

16.08.205: LOT LINE SHIFTS AND CHANGES:
"Lot line shifts and changes" means a change or modification of the boundary lines between
existing lots or parcels which does not reduce the area, frontage, width, depth, or building setback
lines of each lot below the minimum zoning requirements and which does not create additional lots.
Readjustment of lot lines is intended to include other minor changes to a subdivision or plat such
as, but not limited to, notation changes, boundary shifts and removal of lot line(s), combining two
(2) or more lots, each of which do not reduce the area, frontage, width, depth, or building setback
lines of each lot below the minimum zoning requirements, nor create additional lots. (Ord. 187,
6-14-2012)

16.08.207: MINOR LAND DIVISIONS:
A "minor land division" means a division of a parcel of land into two (2) or three (3) tracts, lots or
parcels for transfer of ownership, building development, leasing or encumbering with mortgage or
deed of trust. (Ord. 187, 6-14-2012)

16.08.210: MOBILE HOME:
"Mobile home" means a unit designed for conveyance after fabrication on its own wheels, or on
flatbed or other trailers, and arriving at a site where it is to be used for human habitation, and
whether or not permanently placed on jacks or other foundations. For purposes of this title, "mobile
home" includes trailers, campers, motor homes and recreational vehicles used for human
habitation, but prefabricated houses designed for permanent foundations shall not be included in
this definition. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.220: MOBILE HOME SUBDIVISION:
"Mobile home subdivision" means a subdivision designed and intended for exclusive mobile home
residential use. (Ord. 52, 1978)
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16.08.230: MONUMENT:
"Monument" means any permanent marker either of concrete, galvanized iron pipe, or iron or steel
rods used to identify any tract, parcel, lot, or street lines as specified in Idaho Code section 50'"
1303. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.240: ORIGINAL PARCEL OF LAND:
"Original parcel of land" means a lot or tract as recorded on any plat or record on file in the office of
the county recorder, or any unplatted contiguous parcel of land held in one ownership and of record
at the effective date hereof. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.250: OWNERSHIP:
"Ownership" means the individual, firm, association, syndicate, partnership, or corporation having
any interest in the land to be subdivided. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.260: PERFORMANCE BOND:
"Performance bond" means an amount of money or other negotiable security paid by the subdivider
or his surety to the city clerk which guarantees that the subdivider will perform all actions required
by the governing body regarding an approved plat, and provides that if the subdivider defaults and
fails to comply with the provisions of an approved plat, the subdivider or his surety will pay
damages up to the limit of the bond, or the surety will itself complete the requirements of the
approved plat. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.270: PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT SUBDIVISION:
"Planned unit development subdivision" means a subdivision designed as a combination of
residential and commercial uses planned for a tract of land to be developed as a unit under single
ownership or control, which is developed for the purpose of selling individual lots or estates. (Ord.
84, 5-8-1990: Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.280: PLAT:
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"Plat" means the drawing, mapping or planning of a subdivision, cemetery, town site, or other tract
of land or are platting of such including certifications, descriptions and approvals:

A "Preliminary plat" means the first formal presentation by drawings of a proposed subdivision.

8. "Final plat" means the final and formal presentation by drawings of an approved subdivision
development, the original and one copy of which is filed with the county clerk and recorder.
(Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.290: SUBDIVISION:
"Subdivision" means the result of an act of dividing an original lot, tract, or parcel of land into more
than three (3) parts for the purpose of transfer of ownership or development; which also includes
the dedication of a public street and the addition to, or creation of a cemetery. However, this title
shall not apply to any of the following:

A An adjustment of lot lines as shown on a recorded plat which does not reduce the area, frontage,
width, depth or building setback lines of each building site below the minimum zoning
requirements, and does not change the original number of lots in any block of the recorded plat;

8. An allocation of land in the settlement of an estate of a decedent or a court decree for the
distribution of property;

C. The unwilling sale of land as a result of legal condemnation as defined and allowed in the Idaho
Code;

D. Widening of existing streets to conform to the comprehensive plan;

E. The exchange of land for the purpose of straightening property boundaries which does not result
in the change of the present land usage. (Ord. 101, 6-2-1992: Ord. 84, 5-8-1990: Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.300: SURVEYOR:
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"Surveyor'' means any person who is licensed in the state as a public land surveyor to do
professional surveying. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.08.310: UTILITIES:
"Utilities" means installations for conducting water, sewage, gas, electricity, television, stormwater,
and similar facilities providing service to and used by the public. (Ord. 52, 1978)

Chapter 16.10
LOT LINE SHIFTS, LOT CHANGES, AND MINOR LAND
DIVISIONS
16.10.010: PROCEDURE:
Lot line shifts, lot changes, and minor land divisions are exempted from the subdivision approval
requirements in chapters 16.12 through 16.44 of this title, and shall be accomplished by the
following procedure:

A A written application shall be filed with the city clerk and shall contain the following information:
1. Name, address and telephone number of the applicant.
2. Legal description of property and proof of ownership and/or agency.
3. Documentation of the permission of the owner of the parcel to be changed.
4. Zoning district the property is in.
5. Name of proposed plat amendment.
6. Name, address and telephone number of the engineer or surveyor who is preparing the final
plat map.
7. Record of survey conforming to the requirements of Idaho Code, title 55, chapter 19.
8. Descriptions of existing 1use and any proposed changes of use inclusive of any changes to
traffic flow or access, including location of utility lines, wells, and easements.
9. A preliminary map showing all existing buildings, lot lines, blocks and boundaries along with
the proposed lot line changes, including description of lot sizes and setbacks as they would
exist after the changes, shall accompany the application. Adjoining streets, street names,
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rights of way, alleys, access roads, and roadway widths must be included on the preliminary
map. The map shall be to scale.

B. Prior to approving an application under this section, the city clerk shall make the following
findings:
1. That the proposed lot line shift, lot change, or minor land division conforms to existing zoning
regulations; and
2. That the proposed lot line shift, lot change, or minor land division is in conformity with the
comprehensive plan; and
3. That the proposed lot line shift, lot change, or minor land division will not create a
nonconforming use under the city's zoning regulations, or that it will not increase an existing
nonconforming use.

C. The city clerk shall, upon finding that the application package is complete, and that the
requirements of subsections 81, 82, and 83 of this section have been satisfied, approve the
application. Approval, conditional approval, or disapproval shall occur within thirty (30) days of
the date of receipt of the application by the city.

D. Within ten (10) days after a decision has been rendered, the city clerk shall provide the applicant
with written notice of the action on the request.

E. Once the application has been approved, the applicant shall be required to submit a final plat
map that conforms to specifications on the approved application, prepared by an engineer or
surveyor. The city shall require:
1. Two (2) mylars for sign off by the city clerk. One shall be retained for the records of the city.
The second shall be returned to the applicant for their submission to Custer County for county
approval.
2. Two (2) blue line copies of the final plat map for city records. (Ord. 187, 6-14-2012)

16.10.020: APPEAL:
The applicant may appeal in writing the decision of the city clerk relative to application disapproval.
Such appeal must be submitted to the city council within sixty (60) days of application disapproval.
The city council shall render a decision within sixty (60) days of receipt of appeal. (Ord. 187, 6-142012)
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16.10.030: FEES:
Each applicant shall pay an administrative fee to cover the costs of processing the application by
the city. The fee shall be set by resolution of the city council. (Ord. 187, 6-14-2012)

16.10.040: REPEATED DIVISION OF AN ORIGINAL PARCEL:
No property involved in a minor land division shall be involved in a subsequent minor land division
for a period of five (5) years from the recording date of the previous record of survey for a minor
land division. (Ord. 187, 6-14-2012)

Chapter 16.12
SUBDIVISION APPROVAL
16.12.010: PROCEDURE GENERALLY:
Any person desiring to create a "subdivision" as defined in this title shall submit all necessary
applications to the administrator. No final plat shall be filed with the county recorder or
improvements made on the property until the plat has been acted upon by the city council and
approved by the city council. No lots shall be sold until the plat has been recorded in the office of
the county recorder. (Ord. 52, 1978)

Chapter 16.16
PRELIMINARY PLAT
16.16.010: APPLICATION REQUIRED:
The subdivider shall file with the administrator a completed subdivision application form and
preliminary plat data as required in this title. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.16.020: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO BE SUBMITTED:
The subdivider shall submit to the administrator at least the following:
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A Six (6) copies of the preliminary plat of the proposed subdivision, drawn in accordance with the
requirements hereinafter stated; each copy of the preliminary plat shall be on good quality
paper, shall have dimensions of not less than twenty four inches by thirty six inches (24" x 36"),
shall be drawn to a scale of not less than one inch to one hundred feet (1" = 100'), shall show
the drawing date, and shall indicate therein by arrow, the generally northerly direction;

B. Six (6) sets of preliminary engineering plans (not meant to be cross sections or detailed designs)
for streets, water, sewers, sidewalks and other required public improvements; however, such
engineering plans shall contain sufficient information and detail to enable the commission to
make a determination as to conformance of the proposed improvements to applicable
regulations, ordinances and standards;

C. A written application requesting approval of the preliminary plat;

D. Appropriate information that sufficiently details the proposed development within any special
development area, such as hillside, planned unit development, floodplain, cemetery, mobile
home, large scale development, hazardous and unique areas of development. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.16.030: REQUIRED CONTENTS:
The following shall be shown on the preliminary plat or shall be submitted separately:

A The name of the proposed subdivision;

B. The names, addresses and telephone numbers of the subdivider or the subdividers and the
engineer or suNeyor who prepared the plat;

C. The name and address of all adjoining owners of property whether or not bisected by a public
right of way as shown on record in the county assessor's office;

D. The legal description of the subdivision;
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E. A statement of the intended use of the proposed subdivision, such as residential single-family,
two-family and multiple housing, commercial, industrial, recreational, or agricultural; and a
showing of any sites proposed for parks, playgrounds, schools, churches, or other public uses;

F. A map of the entire area scheduled for development if the proposed subdivision is a portion of a
larger holding intended for subsequent development;

G. A vicinity map showing the relationship of the proposed plat to the surrounding area (112 mile
minimum radius, scale optional);

H. The land use and existing zoning of the proposed subdivision and the adjacent land;

I. Streets, street names, right of way and roadway widths, including adjoining streets or roadways;

J. Lot lines and blocks showing the dimensions and numbers of each; provided however, the
commission may waive the use of blocks where the use of blocks is unduly cumbersome and
not necessary to the orderly development and identification of the subdivision or traffic flow;

K. Contour lines, shown at five foot (5') intervals where land slope is greater than ten percent (10%)
and at two foot (2') intervals where land slope is ten percent (10%) or less, referenced to an
established bench mark, including location and elevation;

L. A site report as required by the appropriate health district where individual wells or septic tanks
are proposed;

M. Any proposed or existing utilities, including, but not limited to, storm and sanitary sewers,
irrigation laterals, ditches, drainages, bridges, culverts, water mains, fire hydrants, and their
respective profiles;

N. A copy of any proposed restrictive covenants and/or deed restriction;

O. Any dedications to the public and/or easements, together with a statement of location,
dimensions and purpose of such;
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P. Any additional required information for special developments as specified in this title;

Q. A statement as to whether or not a variance, as specified in this title, will be requested with

respect to any provision of this title describing the particular provision, the variance requested,
and the reasons therefor. (Ord. 84, 5-8-1990: Ord. 52, 1978)

16.16.040: FEE:
The city clerk, at the time of the filing of an application for any land use planning action within the
city limits, shall collect the fee for such action established by a resolution of the city council. Direct
costs incurred by the city in obtaining a review of the application, by architects, engineers or other
professionals necessary to enable the city to approve or disapprove the application in an informed
manner, shall be reimbursed to the city as they are incurred. (Ord. 166, 1-11-2006)

16.16.050: ADMINISTRATOR REVIEW:

A Certification: Upon receipt of the preliminary plat and all other required data as provided for in
this chapter, the administrator shall certify the application as complete and shall affix the date of
application acceptance thereon. He shall thereafter place the preliminary plat on the agenda for
consideration at the next regular or special meeting of the commission.

B. Review By Other Agencies: The administrator shall refer the preliminary plat and application to
as many agencies as deemed necessary. Such agencies may include the following:
1. Other governing bodies that have joint jurisdiction;
2. The appropriate utility companies;
3. The superintendent of the school district;
4. Other agencies having an interest in the proposed subdivision.

C. Administrator Review: Upon expiration of the time allowance for department and agency review,
the administrator shall prepare a recommendation to the commission. (Ord. 52, 1978)
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16.16.060: COMMISSION ACTION:

A Hearing: Within a reasonable time following the administrator's recommendation, the
commission shall review the preliminary plat, comments from concerned persons and agencies,
and the report from the administrator to arrive at a decision on the preliminary plat.

8. Findings: In determining the acceptance of a proposed subdivision, the commission shall
consider the objectives of this title and at least the following:
1. The conformance of the subdivision with the comprehensive development plan;
2. The availability of public services to accommodate the proposed development;
3. The continuity of the proposed development with the capital improvement program;
4. The public financial capability of supporting services for the proposed development;
5. The other health, safety, or environmental problems that may be brought to the commission's
attention.

C. Action: The commission may approve, approve conditionally, disapprove, or table the
preliminary plat for additional information. Such action shall occur within thirty (30) days of the
date of the meeting at which the plat is first considered by the commission. The action, and the
reasons for such action shall be stated in writing by the administrator and forwarded to the
applicant. The administrator shall also forward a statement of the action taken and the reasons
for such action, together with a copy of the preliminary plat to the council for their information
and record. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.16.070: PUBLIC NOTIFICATION:

A Notification To Property Owners: The administrator shall notify all adjoining property owners who
appear on the list of property owners' names and addresses that has been provided by the
subdivider. Such written notification shall be mailed at least ten (10) days prior to the
commission meeting.

B. Failure To Notify: The administrator's failure to comply with the notification provision shall not
invalidate the commission's action, provided the spirit of the procedure is observed. (Ord. 52,
1978)
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16.16.080: APPEAL:
Any person, or aggrieved party who appeared in person or writingbefore the commission, or the
subdivider may appeal in writing the decision of the commission relative to the final action taken by
the commission. Such appeal must be submitted to the council within sixty (60) days from such
commission action. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.16.090: APPROVAL PERIOD:
Failure to file and obtain the certification of the acceptance of the final plat application by the
administrator within one year after action by the commission shall cause all approvals of the
preliminary plat to be null and void, unless an extension of time is applied for by the subdivider and
granted by the commission. (Ord. 52, 1978)

Chapter 16.20
FINAL PLAT
16.20.010: APPLICATION REQUIRED:
After the approval or conditional approval of the preliminary plat, the subdivider may cause the total
parcel, or any part thereof, to be surveyed and a final plat prepared in accordance with the
approved preliminary plat. The subdivider shall submit to the administrator the following:

A. Three (3) copies of the final plat;

B. Three (3) copies of the final engineering construction drawings for street, water, sewers,
sidewalks and other public improvements. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.20.020: REQUIRED CONTENTS:
The final plat shall include and be in compliance with all items required under title 50, chapter 13 of
the Idaho Code. The final plat shall include at least the following:
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A A written application for approval of such final plat as stipulated by the commission;

8. Proof of current ownership of the real property included in the proposed final plat;

C. Such other information as the administrator or commission may deem necessary to establish
whether or not all proper parties have signed and/or approved the final plat;

D. Conformance with the approved preliminary plat and meeting all requirements or conditions
thereof;

E. Conformance with all requirements and provisions of this title;

F. Acceptable engineering practices and local standards. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.20.030: FEE:
At the time of submission of an application for a final plat, a fee of fifty dollars ($50.00) shall be
paid. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.20.040: ADMINISTRATOR REVIEW:

A. Acceptance: Upon receipt of the final plat, and compliance with all other requirements as
provided for in this chapter, the administrator shall certify the application as complete and shall
affix the date of acceptance thereon.

8. Resubmittal: The administrator shall review the final plat for compliance with the approved or
conditionally approved preliminary plat. If the administrator determines that there is substantial
difference in the final plan than that which was approved as a preliminary plat or conditions
which have not been met, the administrator may require that the final plat be submitted to the
commission in the same manner as required in the preliminary plat process.
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C. Submission To The Council: Upon the determination that the final plat is in compliance with the
preliminary plat and all conditional requirements have been met, the administrator shall place
the final plat on the council agenda within forty five (45) days from the date that an acceptable
final plat application was received and acknowledged by the administrator. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.20.050: COUNCIL ACTION:
The board/council at its next meeting following receipt of the administrator's report shall consider
the commission's findings and comments from concerned persons and agencies, to arrive at a
decision on the final plat. The board/council shall approve, approve conditionally, disapprove, or
table the final plat for additional information within thirty (30) days of the date of the regular meeting
at which the plat is first considered. A copy of the approved plat shall be filed with the administrator.
(Ord. 52, 1978)

16.20.060: APPROVAL PERIOD:
The final plat shall be filed with the county recorder within one year after written approval by the
council; otherwise, such approval shall become null and void unless prior to the expiration date an
extension of time is applied for by the subdivider and granted by the council. (Ord. 52, 1978)

Chapter 16.24
DESIGN STANDARDS
16.24.010: MINIMUM STANDARDS REQUIRED:
All plats submitted pursuant to the provisions of this title, and all subdivisions, improvements and
facilities done, constructed, or made in accordance with such provisions shall comply with the
minimum design standards set forth in this chapter; provided, however, that any higher standards
adopted by any highway district, state highway department of health agency shall prevail over
those set forth in this chapter when directed by state law. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.24.020: DEDICATION:
Within a proposed subdivision, arterial and collector streets shall be dedicated to the public in all
cases; in general all other streets shall also be dedicated to public use. (Ord. 101, 6-2-1992: Ord.
52, 1978)
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16.24.030: STREET NAMES:
The naming of streets shall conform to the following: Street names shall not duplicate any existing
street name within the city, except where a new street is a continuation of an existing street; street
names that may be spelled differently but sound the same as existing streets shall not be used.
(Ord. 52, 1978)

16.24.040: EASEMENTS:
Unobstructed utility easements shall be provided along front lot lines, rear lot lines, and side lot
lines when deemed necessary; total easement width shall not be less than twelve feet (12').
Unobstructed drainage easements shall be provided as required by the board/council. (Ord. 52,
1978)

16.24.050: BLOCKS:
When they are required, every block shall be so designed as to provide two (2) tiers of lots, except
where lots back onto anarterial street, natural feature, or subdivision boundary; blocks shall not be
less than five hundred feet (500') long in all cases. (Ord. 84, 5-8-1990: Ord. 52, 1978)

16.24.060: LOTS:
The lot width, depth and total area shall not be less than the requirements of any applicable zoning
ordinance. (Ord. 52, 1978)

Chapter 16.28

IMPROVEMENT STANDARDS
16.28.010: CONSTRUCTION PLANS:
It shall be the responsibility of the subdivider of every proposed subdivision to have prepared by a
registered engineer, a complete set of construction plans, including profiles, cross section,
specifications and other supporting data for all required public streets, utilities and other facilities.
Such construction plans shall be based on preliminary plans which have been approved with the
preliminary plat, and shall be prepared in conjunction with the final plat. Construction plans are
I 0/6/2015

http://sterlingcodifiers.com/codebook/printnow.php
181

Sterling Codifiers, Inc.

Page 21 of34

subject to approval by the responsible public agencies. All construction plans shall be prepared in
accordance with the public agencies' standards or specifications. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.28.020: REQUIRED PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS:
Every subdivider shall be required to install the following public and other improvements in
accordance with the conditions and specifications as set forth in sections 16.28.030 through
16.28.120 of this chapter. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.28.030: MONUMENTS:
Monuments shall be set in accordance with section 50-1303 of the Idaho Code. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.28.040: STREETS AND ALLEYS:
All streets and alleys shall be constructed in accordance with the standards and specifications
adopted by the council. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.28.050: INSTALLATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES:
Underground utilities are encouraged and shall be required subject to the council adopted policies
and ordinances. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.28.060: STORM DRAINAGE:
An adequate storm drainage system may be required in all subdivisions. The requirements for each
particular subdivision shall be established by the council. Construction shall follow the
specifications and procedures established by the council. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.28.070: PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY AND SEWER SYSTEMS:
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A All public water supply or sewer systems and connections shall be constructed in accordance
with any adopted city plans, specifications and ordinances. All new public water supply or sewer
systems shall be an extension of an existing public system whenever possible. Section 50-1326
of the Idaho Code requires that all water and sewer plans be submitted to the state department
of environmental and community services or its authorized agent for approval.

8. The subdivider shall provide for a perpetual method of maintenance and operation of the public
water supply or sewer system to ensure the continued usefulness of the system. (Ord. 101, 6-21992: Ord. 52, 1978)

16.28.080: STREET NAME SIGNS:
Street name signs shall be installed in the appropriate locations at each street intersection in
accordance with the local standards. A fee of thirty five dollars ($35.00) per street sign shall be paid
by the subdivider. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.28.090: FIRE HYDRANTS AND WATER MAINS:
Adequate fire protection shall be required in accordance with the appropriate fire district standards.
(Ord. 52, 1978)

16.28.100: SIDEWALKS, CROSSWALKS AND PEDESTRIAN WALKWAYS:
Pedestrian walkways, when required, shall have easements at least ten feet (1 O') in width and
include a paved walk at least eight feet (8') in width. Sidewalks and crosswalks shall be constructed
in accordance with the standards and specifications as adopted by the council. (Ord. 84, 5-8-1990:
Ord. 52, 1978)

16.28.110: GREENBELTS OR LANDSCAPE SCREENING:
Greenbelts or landscaping screening may be required for the protection of residential properties
from adjacent streets, waterways, or other features. Subdivision plats shall show the location of any
greenbelt areas. (Ord. 52, 1978)
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16.28.120: STREET LIGHTING:
Streetlights may be required to be installed at intersections throughout the subdivision. A subdivider
shall conform to the requirements of the city and the public utility providing such lighting. (Ord. 52,
1978)

16.28.130: FINANCIAL GUARANTEE ARRANGEMENTS:
In lieu of the actual installation of required public improvements before filing of the final plat, the
council may permit the subdivider to provide a financial guarantee of performance for those
requirements which are over and beyond the requirements of any other agency responsible for the
administration, operation and maintenance of the applicable public improvement. (Ord. 52, 1978)

Chapter 16.32
SPECIAL DEVELOPMENTS
16.32.010: PURPOSE:
The purpose of chapters 16.36 through 16.44 of this title is to identify various types of
developments that normally pose special concerns to the commission and elected officials when
reviewing and acting upon subdivision requests. Chapters 16.36 through 16.44 of this title outline
the plan submittal requirements and design standards that shall be taken into consideration when
acting on special developments. The provisions of chapters 16.36 through 16.44 of this title are in
addition to the plan requirements, design standards and improvement standards that are required
by chapters 16.12 through 16.28 of this title.

Chapter 16.36
HILLSIDES
16.36.010: APPEARANCE AND PRESERVATION:
In order to preserve, retain, enhance and promote the existing and future appearance, natural
topographic features, qualities and resources of hillsides, special consideration shall be given to the
following:
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A Skyline and ridge tops;

B. Rolling grassy landform, including knolls, ridges and meadows;

C. Tree and shrub masses, grass, wildflowers and topsoil;

D. Rock outcroppings;

E. Streambeds, draws and drainage swales, especially where tree and plant formations occur;

F. Characteristic vistas and scenic panoramas. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.36.020: HILLSIDE DEVELOPMENT EVALUATION:

A All development proposals shall take into account and shall be judged by the way in which land
use planning, soil mechanics, engineering geology, hydrology, civil engineering, environmental
and civic design, architectural and landscape design are applied in hillside areas, including, but
not limited to:
1. Planning of development to fit the topography soils, geology, hydrology, and other conditions
existing on the proposed site;
2. Orientation of development on the site so that grading and other site preparation is kept to an
absolute minimum;
3. Shaping of essential grading to blend with natural landforms and to minimize the necessity of
padding and/or terracing of building sites;
4. Division of large tracts into smaller workable units on whichconstruction can be completed
within one construction season so that large areas are not left bare and exposed during the
winter-spring runoff period;
5. Completion of paving as rapidly as possible after grading;
6. Allocation of areas not well suited for development because of soil, geology, or hydrology
limitations for open space and recreation uses;
7. Minimizing disruption of existing plant and animal life;
8. Consideration of the view from and of the hills.
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8. Areas having soil, geology, or hydrology hazards shall not be developed unless it is shown that
their limitations can be overcome; that hazard to life or property will not exist; that the safety,
use or stability of a public way or drainage channel is not jeopardized; and that the natural
environment is not subjected to undue impact. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.36.030: ENGINEERING PLANS:
The developers shall retain a professional engineer(s) to obtain the following information:

A Soils Report: For any proposed hillside development, a soils engineering report shall be
submitted with the preliminary plat. This report shall include data regarding the nature,
distribution and strength of existing soils, conclusions and recommendations for grading
procedures, design criteria for corrective measures, and opinions and recommendations
covering the adequacy of sites to be developed.

B. Geology Report:
1. For any proposed hillside development a geology report shall be submitted with the
preliminary plat. This report shall include an adequate description of site geology and an
evaluation of the relationship between the proposed development and the underlying geology
and recommendations for remedial remedies.
2. The investigation and subsequent report shall be completed by a professional hydrologist
registered in the state of Idaho.

C. Hydrology Report:
1. For any proposed hillside development a hydrology report shall be submitted with the
preliminary plat. This report shall include an adequate description of the hydrology,
conclusions and recommendations regarding the effect of hydrologic conditions on the
proposed development, and opinions and recommendations covering the adequacy of sites to
be developed. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.36.040: GRADING PLAN:

A A preliminary grading plan shall be submitted with each hillside preliminary plat proposal and
shall include the following information:
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1. Approximate limiting dimensions, elevations, or finish contours to be achieved by the grading,
including all cut and fill slopes, proposed drainage channels and related construction;
2. Preliminary plans and approximate locations of all surface and subsurface drainage devices,
walls, dams, sediment basins, storage reservoirs and other protective devices to be
constructed;
3. A description of methods to be employed in disposing of soil and other material that is
removed from the grading site, including the location of the disposal site.

B. A final grading plan shall be submitted with each final plat and shall include the following
information:
1. Limiting dimensions, elevations or finish contours to be achieved by the grading, including all
proposed cut and fill slopes, and proposed drainage channels and related construction;
2. Detailed plans and locations of all surface and subsurface drainage devices, walls, dams,
sediment basins, storage reservoirs and other protective devices to be constructed;
3. A schedule showing when each stage of the project will be completed, including the total area
of soil surface which is to be disturbed during each stage together with estimated starting and
completion dates. In no event shall the existing ("natural") vegetative ground cover be
destroyed, removed, or disturbed more than fifteen (15) days prior of grading. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.36.050: MAINTENANCE:
The owner of any private property on which grading or other work has been performed pursuant to
a grading plan approved or a building permit granted under the provisions of this title shall
continuously maintain and repair all graded surfaces and erosion prevention devices, retaining
walls, drainage structures or means, and other protective devices, plantings and ground cover
installed or completed. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.36.060: DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS:

A Soils:
1. Fill areas shall be prepared by removing organic material, such as vegetation and rubbish,
and any other material which is determined by the soils engineer to be detrimental to
propercompaction or otherwise not conducive to stability; no rock or similar irreducible
material with a maximum dimension greater than eight inches (8") shall be used as fill
material in fills that are intended to provide structural strength.
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2. Fills shall be compacted to at least ninety five percent (95%) of maximum density, as
determined by AASHO T99 and ASTM 0698.
3. Cut slopes shall be no steeper than two (2) horizontal to one vertical; subsurface drainage
shall be provided as necessary for stability.
4. Fill slopes shall be no steeper than two (2) horizontal to one vertical; fill slopes shall not be
located on natural slopes two to one (2: 1) or steeper, or where fill slope toes out within twelve
feet ( 12') horizontally of the top of an existing or planned cut slope.
5. Tops and toes of cut and fill slopes shall be set back from property boundaries a distance of
three feet (3') plus one-fifth (11 5) of the height of the cut or fill, but need not exceed a
horizontal distance of ten feet (10'); tops and toes of cut and fill slopes shall be set back from
structures a distance of six feet (6') plus one-fifth (115) the height of the cut or fill, but need not
exceed ten feet (1 O').

6. The maximum horizontal distance of disturbed soil surface shall not exceed seventy five feet
(75').

8. Roadways:
1. Road alignments should follow the natural terrain and no unnecessary cuts or fills shall be
allowed in order to create additional lots or building sites.
2. One-way streets shall be permitted and encouraged where appropriate for the terrain and
where public safety would not be jeopardized. Maximum width shall be seventeen feet (17')
between the backs of curbs.
3. The width of the graded section shall extend three feet (3') beyond the curb back or edge of
pavement on both the cut and fill sides of the roadway. If sidewalk is to be installed parallel to
the roadway, the graded section shall be increased by the width of the sidewalk plus one foot
( 1') beyond the curb back.
4. Standard vertical curb (6 inches) and gutter shall be installed along both sides of all paved
roadways.
5. A pedestrian walkway plan may be required.

C. Driveways And Parking: Combinations of collective private driveways, cluster parking areas and
on street parallel parking bays shall be used to attempt to optimize the objectives of minimum
soil disturbance, minimum impervious cover, excellence of design and aesthetic sensitivity.
(Ord. 84, 5-8-1990: Ord. 52,1978)

16.36.070: VEGETATION AND REVEGETATION:
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A The developer shall submit a slope stabilization and revegetation plan which shall include a
complete description of the existing vegetation, the vegetation to be removed and the method of
disposal, the vegetation to be planted, and slope stabilization measures to be installed. The
plan shall include an analysis of the environmental effects of such operations, including the
effects on slope stability, soil erosion, water quality, and fish and wildlife.

B. Vegetation sufficient to stabilize the soil shall be established on all disturbed areas as each
stage of grading is completed. Areas not contained within lot boundaries shall be protected with
perennial vegetal cover after all construction is completed. Efforts shall be made to plant those
species that tend to recover from fire damage and do not contribute to a rapid rate of fire
spread.

C. The developer shall be fully responsible for any destruction of native vegetation proposed for
retention. He shall carry the responsibility both for his own employees and for all subcontractors
from the first day of construction until the notice of completion is filed. The developer shall be
responsible for replacing such destroyed vegetation. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.36.080: UTILITIES:
All new service utilities shall be placed underground. (Ord. 52, 1978)

Chapter 16.40
FLOODPLAINS
16.40.010: FLOOD AREA; DEVELOPMENT PLAN:
For any proposed subdivision that is located within a floodplain, the developer shall provide the
commission with a development plan of adequate scale and supporting documentation that will
show and explain at least the following:

A Location of all planned improvements;

B. The location of the floodway and the floodway fringe per engineering practices as specified by
the army corps of engineers;
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C. The location of the present water channel;

D. Any planned rerouting of waterways;

E. All major drainageways;

F. Areas of frequent flooding;

G. Means of flood proofing buildings;

H. Means of ensuring loans for improvements within the floodplain. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.40.020: JUSTIFICATION FOR DEVELOPMENT:

A Upon the determination that buildings are planned within the floodplain or that alterations of any
kind are anticipated within the floodplain area that will alter the flow of water, the developer shall
demonstrate conclusively to the commission that such development will not present a hazard to
life, limb or property; and will not have adverse effects on the safety, use, or stability of a public
way or drainage channel or the natural environment.

B. No subdivision or part thereof shall be approved if levees, fills, structures, or other features
within the proposed subdivision will individually or collectively significantly increase flood flows,
heights, or damages. If only part of a proposed subdivision can be safely developed, the council
shall limit development to that part and shall require that development proceed consistent with
that determination. (Ord. 52, 1978)

Chapter 16.44
AREAS OF CRITICAL CONCERN
16.44.010: GENERALLY:
Hazardous or unique areas may be designated as areas of critical concern by the council or by the
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state. Special consideration shall be given to any proposed development within an area of critical
concern to assure that the development is necessary and desirable and in the public interest in
view of the existing unique conditions. Hazardous or unique areas that may be designated as areas
of critical concern are as follows:

A. Avalanche paths.

8. Earthquake locations.

C. Unstable soils.

D. Unique animal life.

E. Unique plant life.

F. Scenic areas.

G. Historical significance.

H. Floodplain.

I. Other areas of critical concern. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.44.020: PLAN SUBMISSION:
The developer shall prepare and submit an environmental impact statement along with the
preliminary plat application for any development that is proposed within an area of critical concern.
(Ord. 52, 1978)

16.44.030: CONTENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT:
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The content of the environmental impact statement shall usually be prepared by an interdisciplinary
team of professionals that shall provide answers to the following questions:

A What changes will occur to the area of environmental concern as a result of the proposed
development.

B. What corrective action or alternative development plans could occur so as not to significantly
change the area of environmental concern.

C. What changes in the area of environmental concern are unavoidable.

D. What beneficial or detrimental effect would the development have on the environment (i.e.,
animal life, plant life, social concerns, economic noise, visual, and other). (Ord. 52, 1978)

Chapter 16.48
VACATIONS AND DEDICATIONS
16.48.010: APPLICATION REQUIRED:
Any property owner desiring to vacate an existing subdivision, public right of way or easement, or
desiring to dedicate a street right of way or easement shall complete and file an application with the
administrator. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.48.020: ACTION BY ADMINISTRATOR:
Upon receipt of the completed application, the administrator shall affix the date of application
acceptance thereon. The administrator shall place the application on the agenda for consideration
at the next regular or special meeting of the commission after the date of acceptance. (Ord. 52,
1978)

16.48.030: RECOMMENDATION BY COMMISSION:
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The commission shall review the request and all agency response and make a recommendation to
the council for either approval, conditional approval, or denial. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.48.040: ACTION BY COUNCIL:

A When considering an application for vacation procedures, the council shall establish a date for a
public hearing and give such public notice as required by law. The council may approve, deny,
or modify the application.

B. When considering an application for dedication procedures, the council may approve, deny, or
modify the application. When a dedication is approved, the required street improvements shall
be constructed or a bond furnished assuring the construction, prior to acceptance of the
dedication. To complete the acceptance of any dedication of land, the owner shall furnish to the
council a deed describing and conveying such lands to be recorded with the county recorder.
(Ord. 52, 1978)

Chapter 16.52
VARIANCES
16.52.010: PURPOSE:
The commission may recommend to the council as a result of unique circumstances such as
topographic-physical limitations or a planned unit development, a variance from the provisions of
this title on a finding that undue hardship results from the strict compliance with specific provisions
or requirements of this title or that application of such provision or requirement is impracticable.
(Ord. 52, 1978)

16.52.020: FINDINGS:
No variance shall be favorably acted upon by the council unless there is a finding upon
recommendation by the commission, as a result of a public hearing, that all of the following exist:

A There are such special circumstances or conditions affecting the property that the strict
application of the provisions of this title would clearly be impracticable or unreasonable; in such
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cases, the subdivider shall first state his reasons in writing as to the specific provision or
requirement involved.

B. Strict compliance with the requirements of this title would result in extraordinary hardship to the
subdivider because of unusual topography, other physical conditions, or other such conditions
which are not self-inflicted, or that these conditions would result in inhibiting the achievement of
the objectives of this title.

C. The granting of the specified variance will not be detrimental to the public welfare or injurious to
other property in the area in which the property is situated.

D. Such variance will not violate the provisions of the Idaho Code or any ordinance of the county or
the city.

E. Such variance will not have the effect of nullifying the interest and purpose of this title, the
comprehensive plan, or any zoning or other ordinance of the city. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.52.030: COSTS:
The applicant for variance shall be charged a sufficient fee tocover all costs of processing the
application, and of publishing and mailing notices of required public hearings. (Ord. 52, 1978)

Chapter 16.56
AMENDMENTS
16.56.010: PROCEDURE GENERALLY:
The council may, from time to time, amend, supplement, or repeal the regulations and provisions of
this title in the manner prescribed by the Idaho Code. A proposed amendment, supplement, or
repeal may be originated by the council, commission, or by petition. All proposals not originating
with the commission shall be referred to it for a report thereon before any action is taken on the
proposal by the council. Any amendment shall require complete public hearings by the commission
and the council. (Ord. 52, 1978)
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Chapter 16.60
ENFORCEMENT AND VIOLATIONS
16.60.010: DETECTION OF VIOLATION; PROCEDURE:
The administrator shall periodically research the county assessor's records and perform the
necessary investigation to detect any violations of this title. (Ord. 52, 1978)

16.60.020: ENFORCEMENT:

A Violations of this title are declared to be a nuisance, and the city or the administrator, after thirty
(30) days' written notice to remove or correct the violation may prevent, remove and abate the
same at the expense of the party creating or maintaining the same, in which event the city may
levy a special assessment as provided in Idaho Code section 50-1003 on the land or premises
whereon the nuisance is situated, to defray the cost or to reimburse the city for the cost of
abating the same.

B. In addition to or in lieu of the foregoing, the city may bring any appropriate civil action, including
abatement, injunction, and/or damages in which event the city shall be entitled to all costs
including attorney fees in prosecution of such action.

C. In addition to the foregoing, any person violating the provisions of this title shall be deemed
guilty of misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be subject to such penalties as
provided by law. (Ord. 52, 1978)
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0

City of Stanley
P.O. Box 53, Stanley, Idaho 83278
Tel: 208.774.2286 / Fax: 208.774.2278
www.stanley-ldaho.org
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Fwd:example of a building pf

'it for a "local" that they like.

Page 1 of2

From: Rebecca <rebamold@aol.com>
To: tlloyd <tlloyd@greenerfaw.com>; (shoemaker <fshoemaker@greenerfaw.com>
Cc: rebamold <rebamold@aol.com>

Subject: Fwd:exampfe of a building permit for a "local" that they like.
Date: Tue, May 19, 2015 12:21 pm
Attachments: Bunding__Permrt_#841_Joe_Lamb.pdf (84K)

I think that I sent this to you before but was going back through my file and this just struck me as how arbitrary the City can be. I don't
know Fitzer can argue to the Court tomorrow with a straight face that the City really has any standards for building permits! The council
noted on the record at the July 10 Council meeting that they received this email but never responded. They also did not impose any other
requirements on the attached permit. Definitely a different process/standard (as in NONE) for locals that they like. This was approved
just 4 months after thy denied my permit 831.
R

Sincerely,
Rebecca Arnold
(208) 841-2530

--Original Message-From: Rebecca <rebarnold@ao/ com>
To: cityclerk. <crtyc!erk@ruralnetwork.net>

Sent: Thu, Jul 10, 2014 4:48 pm
Subject: tonight's council meeting

Please provide this email to the Mayor and council for tonight's meeting and include a copy in the meeting record ..
Mayor and Council:
Building Permit 841 is listed on the agenda for tonight's council meeting as having been approved under the administrative process (see
attached copy of the building permit) . Would you please confirm that hand drawn site plans that are not to scale are acceptable for
building permits (since this one is approved with a hand drawn site plan that is not to scale) and that this shall apply to all building permits
equally for all property owners?
Would you please confirm that hand drawn site plans that do not show any dimensions are acceptable for building permits (since this one
is approved with a hand drawn site plan that does not show any dimensions) and that this shall apply to all building permits equally for all
property owners?
Would you please confirm that hand drawn site plans that do not show any locations of easements are acceptable for building permits
(since this one is approved with a hand drawn site plan that does not show any locations of any easements) and that this shall apply to all
building permits equally for all property owners?
Would you please confirm that someone other than the record owner of the property can apply for a building permit (since this one is
approved with Joe Lamb as the applicant but the Assessor's website lists Selma Lamb as the owner this property) and that this shall apply
to all building permits equally for all property owners?
Would you please confirm that it is acceptable NOT to address flood plane issues for building permits (since this one is approved without
addressing flood plain issues even though some portion of this property is shown in the floodplain on the FEMA flood maps) and that this
shall apply to all building permits equally for all property owners?
thank you
Sincerely,
Rebecca Arnold

(208) 841-2530
-Original MessageFrom: Stanley City Clerk <ct!Yclerk@ruralnetwork.net>
To: 'Rebecca' <rebarnold@aol.com>
Sent: Wed, Jul 9, 201411:18am
Subject: RE:

As per your request.
Cari Tassano

City Clerk/Treasurer
Stanley, Idaho 83278
citvclerk,ii'stanlev .id .gov
(208)774-2286
(208)774-2278 Fax
From: Rebecca [p1ailto.rebarnoldra'lao! comJ
Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2014 7:52 AM
To: cit\ ;:lerkfd'.rura!neh\inrk net

Subject: Re·
Thank you Cari! Would you please send me copies of building permits on the agenda with site plans so I can decide if I have any comments?

httos://mail.aol.com/webmail-std/en-us/PrintMess~t.
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Thank you'
Sincerely,
Rebecca Arnold
(208) 841-2530

-Original MessageFrom: Stanley City Clerk< c1tyclerk@ruralnetwork.net>
To: cityclerk < c1tyclerk@stanley.id.gov>
Sent: Tue, Jul 8, 2014 06:22 PM

Please see attached agenda.

Cari Tassano
City Clerk!rreasurer
Stanley, Idaho 83278
cih·clerk{aistanfev.id.go\
(208)774-2286
(208)774-2278 Fax

2.00
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